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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation offers an examination of announcement effects in US Treasury and corporate 
bond markets. Announcements include both macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth and 
consumer price inflation, as well as announcements of supply and demand for Treasury securities 
at auction. While there is a vast literature that documents the prime importance of 
macroeconomic announcements in driving US Treasury bond return activity, my research calls 
into question the empirical methodologies employed in traditional studies and suggests that 
recent advances in econometric theory offer an improved set of tools for evaluation of 
announcement effects. The primary tools are the General-to-Specific econometric approach, 
popularized by Oxford’s Sir David F. Hendry, and the recent improvements automated model 
discovery and indicator saturation methods.  
 
The three main chapters deal with US Treasury returns responses to macroeconomic 
announcements, US corporate bond returns and trading activity (total trades, institutional trades, 
and intermediated trades), and US Treasury return responses to Treasury auction announcements, 
respectively. The findings, elaborated on further, have important implications for market 
efficiency and market microstructure. However, the main contribution of the collective essays 
are in the area of econometric modelling. I show that, using a general-to-specific modeling 
strategy (known as Gets modeling or the LSE econometric approach) and indicator saturation 
methods we are able to capture the important features of the local data generating process and 
provide unbiased parameter estimates. I show that the typical modelling approach in the existing  
 2 
 
bond market macro-announcement effect literature is inadequate and fails to capture salient 
characteristics of the LGDP. As a result, parameter results in these models are likely to suffer 
moderate to severe omitted variables bias. I show that the size of the omitted variable bias 
greatly exceeds unadjusted Gets estimates, based on the correction methods demonstrated by the 
important work of Hendry and Krolzig (2005). 
 
I shall proceed by further elaborating on the background of the methodological approach, 
focusing particularly on the history of the GETs approach. Afterward, I will provide detailed 
descriptions and contributions of the three main essays. 
A. Methodological Aspects – Historical Perspective of the LSE Approach 
 
These empirical tools are based on a “Probability Approach” to econometric modelling approach 
with foundations dating back to the work of Nobel Laureate Haavelmo (1944). The General-to-
specific approach – also known as the LSE Approach – grew out of the London School of 
Economics in the 1960s and 1970s, where rigorous specification testing was a core principal 
advocated by Professor J. Denis Sargan, one of the leading econometricians of that era. Sargan’s 
contributions to the founding concepts of this approach can be found in Sargan (1961),  Sargan 
(1964), Sargan (1980), Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1984), and in two posthumously published 
articles based on earlier work Sargan (2001a), entitled “Model Building and Data Mining,” and 
 3 
 
Sargan (2001b) “The Choice Between Sets of Regressors.” Interested readers should also see his 
retrospective of econometrics at LSE in Sargan (2003).
12
   
 
Hendry, with his coauthors, built an econometric modelling ideology around the core 
methodological contributions. The methodology is laid out in great detail in Hendry (1993), 
Hendry (1995), Hendry and Krolzig (2001), and Hendry and Krolzig (2005). Additional recent 
advances have been developed, including the second-generation automated Gets modelling 
process called “Autometrics” – which represents an improvement on previous incarnation of the 
approach, known as PC-Gets. The techniques are adeptly presented in: Hendry, Johansen and 
Santos (2008), Hendry and Johansen (2011), Castle, Doornik and Hendry (2012), Castle, 
Clements and Hendry (2013), and Hendry and Doornik (2014).  
 
In harnessing this new technology, I am able to better evaluate a line of research on 
macroeconomic indicator effects on financial markets that has been applied to various classes of 
securities. I demonstrate the benefits of employing GETs modelling via Autometrics in a 
financial setting, whereas these techniques have most-often been applied in macroeconomic 
studies. Only recently have researchers began to use these models in finance. The results should 
be interesting both to researchers in finance, macroeconomics and other areas of empirical 
                                                          
1
 Sargan passed away in 1996, however, his later publications were published after his death. Sargan (2001a) was 
written in March of 1973 and presented at the Association of University Teachers of Economics in Manchester. 
Sargan (2001b) was originally written in June of 1981 and presented at the LSE MIME Econometrics Workshop. 
Sargan (2003) is taken from an address given during his visiting appointment at Universidad Carlos III in 1995. 
2
 Students of Sargan, including David Hendry (Oxford), Peter Phillips (Yale), Neil Ericsson (Federal Reserve 
Board) and others have carried the tradition. Key contributions to the core concepts have also been made to the 
ideology/methodology by other LSE Approach advocates, including but not limited to: Graham Mizon 
(Southampton and Oxford), Jean-Francois Richard (Pittsburgh), Jurgen Doornik (Oxford), Jennifer Castle (Oxford), 
and Aris Spanos (Virginia Tech). 
 4 
 
academic research, as well as to practitioners who wish to build similar models. However, in the 
area of finance, the gains in terms of precision and bias reduction are, perhaps, most obviously 
translated into monetary value. Thus, the contribution can be seen as potentially financial as 
opposed to strictly pedagogical. 
 
The cornerstone of the General-to-Specific methodology is “testimation” – i.e., as argued by 
David Hendry:
3
  
 
“The three golden rules of econometrics are: that all three rules are broken 
regularity in empirical applications is fortunately easily remedied. Rigorously 
tested models, which adequately describe the available data, encompass previous 
findings and were derived from well-based theories would greatly enhance any 
claim to be scientific. “ 
 
While financial markets literature in mainstream finance journals tend to be derived from well-
based theories, it does not appear that there is much evidence to support the other aspects cited 
by Hendry – at least with respect to macro-announcement studies in bond markets. 
Encompassing testing appears to be virtually non-existent in finance. Researchers often fail to 
provide rigorous specification testing, instead opting for adjusting standard errors using methods 
such as the well-known Newey West procedure. However, this would not be acceptable within 
                                                          
33
 See page 406 of Hendry (1980) and page 360 of Spanos (2014). The later represents an outstanding perspective on 
the LSE tradition from a student of both Hendry and Sargan. 
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the LSE framework, which look upon such techniques as a sort of “patchwork” incapable of 
delivering congruence or avoiding omitted variable bias. 
 
B. The Effect of Macroeconomic Announcements on Credit Market 
 
 In this chapter, I show that a congruent, parsimonious, encompassing empirical model 
discovered via Hendry’s Gets modelling approach is able to overcome many inadequacies that 
are typical of specifications found in financial markets literature – specifically in studies related 
to macroeconomic announcement effects in bond markets. All too often, studies present 
empirical results without the accompanying diagnostic tests. These procedures include tests for 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, nonlinearity, and parameter stability. Within the framework 
of the “LSE Econometric Approach” – as Hendry’s methodology is often called—a model is not 
congruent unless it passes all such tests. Failure to achieve congruence means that the data 
generating process is not adequately captured by the specification and that the model potentially 
suffers from not only inefficiency but possibly also has biased estimates. While model selection 
in the Gets paradigm will result in some level of bias, the results are “nearly unbiased” without 
adjustment and a simple bias adjustment of the parameters can be used to correct for this malady. 
However, if an empirical model suffers many forms of mis-specification, the results are likely to 
contain omitted variable bias, which is of an unknown form and cannot be corrected.  
 
In finance, model risk can be translated into financial losses. Biased results could wreak havoc 
on a portfolio or a risk management strategy. However, only rarely has the Gets procedure been 
 6 
 
seen in the financial economics literature. I show that a common specification regressing US 
Treasury bond returns on contemporaneous surprises in macroeconomic announcements fails 
nearly every specification test. This is rather disturbing, particularly considering the number of 
studies in the academic literature which employ the very same specification – sometimes with 
even fewer regressors.  
 
One challenge would be to respecify the model in a more general form. For example, one could 
easily add additional lags of macro surprises, but it is unlikely to be of much help as the lags are 
likely insignificant due to the efficiency of markets—i.e., information is reflected in security 
prices so rapidly that there would be no significant effect the following day. Therefore, one must 
rely further on theory and intuition to find other sources or parameterization.  I use the EGARCH 
framework of Nelson (1991) to show that asymmetries exist in Treasury bond returns and make 
that a basis for the inclusion of separate positive and negative surprises in the initial unrestricted 
model. I further include an autoregressive term and lags of the contemporaneous announcements 
as well. Additionally, to assure congruence, I employ indicator saturation methods.
4
 Finally, I 
further examine the relative adequacy of the competing models by appealing to the 
encompassing principle, which states that a good model should be able to explain the results of 
rival models. In doing so, the results favor the Gets models that incorporate asymmetries and 
employ indicator saturation. These models formally encompass the rival static models in testing, 
the static models fail to encompass the Gets models. This further support the use of Hendry’s 
methodology in finance. 
                                                          
4
 See Castle, Doornik, Hendry and Pretis (2015) and Ericsson (2012). 
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Results indicate that there are significant asymmetric effects associated with macroeconomic 
announcements. While the asymmetric affects in equity markets can be attributed to “leverage 
effects” such an explanation would not apply to the US Treasury market. However, one can 
make a case that the time varying risk premia is a valid explanation. Thus, the results square 
nicely with existing academic literature on fixed income markets.
5
 
 
Outside of the aforementioned contributions to the existing GARCH and risk premia literature, 
the study makes a strong case for the use of Gets modelling and indicator saturation methods in 
finance, as well as the usefulness of the Oxmetrics “Autometrics” procedure for performing the 
process without human intervention in the model reduction process.
6
 It casts doubt on the 
efficiency, unbiasedness and stability of parameters in prior macroeconomic announcement 
studies that do not depend on rigorous model testing. General-to-Specific model discovery, 
therefore, becomes a cornerstone of the following chapter which we discuss next.   
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Time-Varying Risk Premia articles include: Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), Evans (1994), Lee (1995), 
Kryzanowski, Lalancette and To (1997), Campbell, Kazemi and Nanisetty (1999), and Koijen, Nijman and Werker 
(2010). 
6
 Human involvement in the selection of competing models is a long-standing criticism of model selection methods. 
Autometrics functions without human intervention and avoids this criticism. Note also, users without access to the 
commercial Oxmetrics product can now perform automated Gets modelling in the manner it was designed to be 
conducted using the R package “gets” by downloading it at https://cran.r-project.org/package=gets. The package is 
created and adapted by Pretis, Reade and Sucarrat (2016) with details in the following paper 
http://www.sucarrat.net/R/gets/gets.pdf. More details are available at http://www.sucarrat.net/R/gets/ and 
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/gets/index.html. 
 8 
 
C. A High-Frequency Analysis of Trading Activity in the Corporate Bond 
Market 
In this chapter we explore whether factors that drive trading activity of US corporate bond 
market are macroeconomic announcements or seasonal. Prior studies have documented a 
significant response of returns and interest rates to surprises in macroeconomic data in the stock, 
US Treasury and Treasury futures markets. Likewise, studies document that trading activity 
changes sharply, based on informational shocks that arrive by way of the release of economic 
data. We improve on the existing literature by analyzing how both daily and intraday measures 
of trading activity are impacted by surprises in macro data as well as various measures of 
seasonality.  
 
Again, we employ the general-to-specific (Gets) modeling approach, also known as the 
“LSE/Oxford Approach” of Professor David F. Hendry, which commences from a broad 
unrestricted model and then employs an automated “testing down” procedure which seeks to 
reduce the model to a statistically valid representation of the data generating process (DGP) 
based on the characteristics of the local data generating process.
7
 Additionally, given that 
efficient markets does not rule out persistent effects on trading activity (as opposed to returns), 
we also test for various forms of seasonality in the trading activity regressions. 
 
Our main findings are that corporate bonds is less affected by surprises in individual economic 
reports and that corporate bond market trading activity is dominated by day-of-week and time-
                                                          
7
  An extensive review of the Gets modeling literature is provided by Campos and Ericsson (1999). 
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of-day affects, as opposed to macroeconomic announcements.
8
  We find that, unlike daily returns 
on the S&P 500, corporate bonds are sensitive to surprises in both labor market and inflation 
data. Trading activity is affected by absolute surprises in core CPI and nonfarm payrolls, but 
neither core PPI nor jobless claims affect order flow. The trading activity regressions that show 
statistical significance for macro indicators, however, seem to lack economic significance, as the 
size of the parameter estimates tend to be very small. Taken together, the results seem to suggest 
that the significance of returns to macroeconomic surprises of credit spreads and corporate bond 
returns may be associated simply with Treasury rates. Because corporate bonds trade less 
frequently, they are often marked to market based on hypothetical prices based on a spread over 
Treasuries. This “matrix pricing” effect may suggest announcement effects that are, therefore, a 
mere mirage. 
 
Perhaps most interesting, however, is the presence of “behavioral seasonal” effects associated 
with the onset and incidence of seasonal affective disorder. This “winter blues” effect has been 
seen affecting activity in equity markets by Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2000), Kamstra, Kramer 
and Levi (2003), and Kamstra, Kramer, Levi and Wermers (2012) with respect to mutual fund 
asset flows. The effect is also documented  in Garrett, Kamstra and Kramer (2005) and, more 
recently, the theoretical foundations for this empirical regularity are outlined in Kamstra, 
Kramer, Levi and Wang (2014) . This chapter, however, presents the first study to document 
such an effect in the trading activity in the corporate bond market. Finally, the “loans-on-sale” 
seasonal effect, first documented by Murfin & Peterson (Journal Financial Economics, 2014). 
                                                          
8
 Macroeconomic data come from the Action Economics Survey and include Core CPI, Core PPI, Nonfarm Payrolls 
and Initial Jobless Claims. Future work could and should expand the set of macroeconomic indicators to further 
verify this finding. 
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D. The Effect of Treasury Auction Results on Interest Rates: The 1900s 
Experience 
 
The 1990s presented a change of environment in terms of government budget deficits. As the 
decade progressed, reductions in spending and increases in tax revenue resulted in considerable 
improvement on the budgetary front. As a result, budget deficits slowly gave way to budget 
surpluses and, by the end of the decade, the scarcity of Treasury securities actually became a 
concern for policymakers.  
 
In this chapter I examine the secondary-market response of U.S. Treasury rates, returns and bid-
ask spreads to the release of details from the government’s primary-market auctions during the 
1990s. I build on prior studies by Two notable papers, Schirm, Sheehan and Ferri (1989) and 
Wachtel and Young (1987), focus on effect of debt and deficit announcements on interest rates.
9
 
However, to the author’s knowledge, only  Wachtel and Young (1987) specifically examined the 
effect of Treasury auction demand statistics on returns while also controlling for 
contemporaneous macroeconomic announcements.
10
 This set an important precedent for this 
type of study. Because of the importance of macroeconomic announcement surprises for 
Treasury returns, failure to incorporate announcements when analyzing auction effects on the 
market represents a risk to the empirical modeler. Such neglect could have an effect on the 
efficiency of parameter estimates as well as opening the door to likely omitted variable bias. 
 
                                                          
9
 As noted in the chapter, Cebula (2013) explores the impact of budget deficits, but on nominal Aaa-rated corporate 
bond yields. 
10
 Again, as the chapter notes, Bahamin, Cebula, Foley and Houmes (2012) provide an analysis of bid dispersion is 
positively related to bid-to-cover ratio but negatively related to the percentage of noncompetitive bids and 
percentage on competitive bids accepted at auction during the period of 1998 to 2010.  
 11 
 
I provide evidence of how failure to model announcements results in a lack of statistical power 
when trying to evaluate whether auction day returns behave differently than other days. The 
contribution of this chapter is that is demonstrates that studies such as the important study of 
Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) could be improved upon significantly by incorporating 
macroeconomic announcement surprises.  
 
 Standard t-tests for differences in mean returns between auction and no-auction days show that 
returns differ significantly only for on-the-run 1-year bills and off-the-run 5-year notes. Longer 
maturities did not reveal differences in mean returns.  Yet it is unclear if there is no difference or 
if this is just a lack of statistical power. 
 
However, Brown and Forsyth’s F-test of homogeneity of variance indicate no significant effects 
stemming from the existence of Treasury auctions. I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
homogeneous variance, even when partitioning the sample into auction-, announcement-, and 
“quiet” days.  
 
Again, these results do not account for surprises in contemporaneous macroeconomic 
announcement effects, nor do they take into account the information content of the auction 
results.  This strongly suggests that a more sophisticated analysis would be required to assess 
more carefully if Treasury auction operations represent a substantial source of disruption to the 
market. 
 
 12 
 
I proceed by adopting a GARCH model to control for other important announcements including 
both macroeconomic reports and Federal Reserve target rate changes. In doing so, we are better-
equipped to evaluate the significance of specific auction demand statistics and are able to 
compare the effects of Treasury fiscal policy funding operations to the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy operations and eleven major macroeconomic announcements.
11
 
 
Specifically, I examine how the release of auction details affect US Treasury return movements 
based on both surprises in auction results (bid-to-cover ratios and volume of noncompetitive 
bids) and changes in issuance volume.  
 
Consistent with my priors, I find a positive relationship between surprises in bid-to-cover ratios 
and returns on Treasury notes in three out of four maturities under investigation. The lone 
exception appears to be more of a function of modeling expectations of the 10-year note which 
was affected by changes in the auction schedule, as well as having relatively fewer auctions to 
base estimation on. Also, the effect of these surprises on coverage ratio is roughly of equal order 
of magnitude to coefficients on standardized surprises of several of our macroeconomic variables 
and is greater than that of several announcements – notably: unemployment, retail sales and 
capacity utilization.  
 
                                                          
11
 Announcements include Core PPI, Core CPI, Nonfarm Payrolls, Durable Goods, Capacity Utilization, 
Unemployment Rate, Initial Jobless Claims and Retail Sales reports. It should be noted that additional 
macroeconomic announcements could be added to the study. Future work should increase the sample size and the 
number of macroeconomic announcements so as to allow for better comparability to Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013). 
Due to issues regarding data acquisition, I must leave this to future work for the immediate future but plan on 
revisiting the issue in the near future. 
 13 
 
The volume of noncompetitive bids did not provide additional explanatory power. Only the 30-
year Treasury bond appears sensitive to surprises in this auction statistic, despite there being 
fewer auctions at that maturity to use in the estimation. However, that the benchmark 30-year 
bond coefficient on surprises in noncomps is greater than that of the bid-to cover ratio is notable. 
Clearly, surprises in auction demand statistics were most important on the long end of the yield 
curve. The fact that this maturity has the fewest auctions, yet achieves the most significant 
results underscores the relative importance at this maturity. Again, an expanded study with a 
longer time series should be used to confirm this finding. 
 
With respect to market volatility, I employ a GARCH model to characterize the effect of auction 
data on conditional variance. I find interest rate volatility to be largely unaffected by the 
Treasury auction process. By comparison, Federal Reserve policy announcements and ‘quiet 
days’ – when no macroeconomic announcement or auction takes place – are shown to have a 
significant effect on volatility. This is consistent with microstructure literature that links 
information and trading activity. 
 
The results provide evidence that the U.S. Treasury’s financing operations are conducted in a 
manner that exerts no more pressure on the market than that of most regularly-scheduled 
macroeconomic announcement. Further, I find the market to be more sensitive to FOMC policy 
surprises than Treasury operations. 
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CHAPTER II 
“THE EFFECT OF MACROECONOMIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ON CREDIT 
MARKETS: AN AUTOMETRIC GENERAL-TO-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
GREENSPAN ERA” 
 
A. Abstract 
I show that a congruent, parsimonious, encompassing model discovered using David Hendry’s 
econometric modelling approach and Autometrics can overcome the many inadequacies of the 
typical static models of US Treasury returns regressed on macroeconomic announcements. The 
typical specification tends to fail most, if not all, specification tests. Further, the techniques 
employed are able to expand our knowledge of time varying risk premia and asymmetric news 
responses in financial markets. Previously studied within a GARCH framework, such methods 
offered little evidence as to the precise sources of the asymmetries. Asymmetric effects are 
shown to be concentrated in a handful of announcements, such as the Employment Cost Index 
and Core PPI. Results suggest a place for general-to-specific modelling in financial economics, a 
place where it has only recently begun to be employed. These results underscore the 
contributions of David F. Hendry and his collaborators in econometric modelling, they also and 
demonstrate the need for better models in finance that may be alleviated by employing modelling 
practices advocated by econometricians doing research in the LSE/Oxford tradition.  
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 15 
 
 
B. Introduction 
This essay addresses a very general question: How do macroeconomic announcements affect 
fixed income markets? This question has been asked many times and modeled in a number of 
different ways, I show that an automated general-to-specific (Gets) dynamic specification and 
model reduction process can be used to provide consistent and efficient parameter estimates 
while eliminating unnecessary regressors. The process avoids the major deficiencies of other 
model specification procedures, such as path dependency. Moreover it delivers a congruent, 
parsimonious, encompassing final model without requiring any human involvement in the model 
selection process. Thus it avoids the common criticism of adventitious selection that is often 
associated with other model selection approaches such specific-to-general. Such approaches are 
often characterized as a “fishing expedition.” 
 
The process that I undertake is the general-to-specific methodology (Gets) of Oxford’s David F. 
Hendry, also known as the LSE/Oxford approach to econometric modelling.
12
 The methodology 
is laid out in great detail in Hendry (1993), Hendry (1995), Hendry and Krolzig (2001), and 
Hendry and Krolzig (2005). However, a plethora of recent developments have taken place, 
including the second-generation automated Gets modelling process called “Autometrics” – 
which represents an improvement on previous incarnations of the approach. These advances 
                                                          
12
 While the General-to-Specific method is traditionally been labelled the ‘LSE approach” I will opt to use 
“LSE/Oxford approach” in this paper for the purpose of recognizing the many talented researchers at Oxford 
University who have played a role the development and application of Gets modelling and Automated Gets 
modelling. These include, but are not limited to: Jurgen Doornik, Hans Martin Krolzig, Jennifer Castle and a number 
of others. See references for a mere partial listing of authors. A more detailed listing of Gets modelling research is 
found in Campos, Ericsson and Hendry (2005) (https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2005/838/default.htm). 
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have been put forward in: Hendry, Johansen and Santos (2008), Hendry and Johansen (2011), 
Castle, Doornik and Hendry (2012), Castle, Clements and Hendry (2013), and Hendry and 
Doornik (2014). By taking advantage of this new methodology, I am able to better evaluate a line 
of research on macroeconomic indicator effects on financial markets that has been applied to 
various classes of securities. In doing so, I demonstrate the benefits of employing such a 
procedure in a financial setting, whereas these techniques have most-often been applied in 
macroeconomic studies. Only recently have researchers began to use these models in finance. 
The results should be interesting both to researchers in finance and macroeconomics, as well as 
to practitioners who wish to build similar models. 
 
In particular, I choose to examine the period of 1990 to 2001 – the heart of the Alan Greenspan 
era at the Federal Reserve. Greenspan, a macroeconomic forecaster during his career prior to 
joining the Federal Reserve, he was known for his intense attention to a wide array of 
macroeconomic indicators.
13
  
 
This study has more to do with the econometric methods of David F. Hendry, none the less, 
some attention needs to be paid to the lead economic policymaker of the 1990s whose decisions 
were at the forefront of US Treasury market participants during the period under examination. 
By the time the 1990s rolled around, Greenspan had several years under his belt as Fed 
Chairman. He had previously served as Chairman of President Gerald Ford’s Council of 
Economic Advisors from 1974 to 1977. He was the head of the economic forecasting corporation 
                                                          
13
 Details of Greenspan’s career can be found in Sicilia and Cruikshank (2000) and in his memoirs Greenspan 
(2007).  
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Greenspan & Townsend for over 30 years. Greenspan was well known to financial market 
economists and traders for both his work in government and in a number of scholarly 
publications. His contributions were typically in practitioners journals such as Challenge, and 
Business Economics, and yet, several articles and comments appeared in main stream economic 
journals, the American Economic Review and Journal of Finance.
14
 As a result, he was no 
stranger to Treasury market participants when he took the helm at the Board of Governors. 
 
In addition to his reputation for focusing on esoteric economic indicators, Greenspan was known 
for his use of what would come to be called “Fedspeak” or “Greenspeak” (the art of answering 
policy-related questions with relatively incomprehensible stream of consciousness responses that 
would leave market participants without clear convictions as to the likely policy response that 
would result.)
1516
 For this reason, the financial press would parse each word for meaning. 
Eventually tried to infer policy actions from the girth of Greenspan’s briefcase (the briefcase 
indicator) on the morning of Federal Open Market Committee meetings. Such rock star status 
and media attention put monetary policy on the front page and every economic indicator under 
intense scrutiny. 
 
                                                          
14
 For examples of Greenspan’s pre-FRB scholarly works, see: Greenspan, Simpson and Cutler (1958), Greenspan 
(1964), Greenspan (1971), Hymans, Greenspan, Shiskin and Early (1973), Greenspan (1978), and Greenspan 
(1980). 
15
 Examples of “Greenspeak” can be found at: http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/04/historical-
echoes-fedspeak-as-a-second-language.html#.VAkDKpUg_mI and 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120212132248/http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/greenspeak.html 
 
16
 See also: Hanes (2014) regarding “Open-Mouth Operations” during the 1990s, 
http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~chanes/openmouth17.pdf  
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Given the large number of economic variables being of interest to traders in this period, an 
empirical methodology capable of handling such a situation is critical. A fair number of studies 
have included the many macro indicators in recognition of this. However, so far none have 
employed Hendry’s LSE approach to evaluate the effect of macroeconomic announcements on 
financial markets. Nor have asymmetric responses to macro indicators been evaluated in this 
manner. By making use of the methodology, this essay provides a basis for determining which 
indicators were of critical importance to Treasury market participants.  
 
Using a set of 26 macroeconomic announcements, I use Hendry’s approach to provide a 
perspective on how interest rates behave relative to revisions to the macroeconomic information 
set that occur when macroeconomic data surprises occur. In doing so, we are able to evaluate 
which indicators actually mattered during the heart of the Greenspan Era. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, I document sources of time varying risk premia that generate asymmetric 
volatility can be – at least partially – to asymmetric responses to surprises in key macroeconomic 
variables. This augments the existing EGARCH literature and demonstrates the value of the 
LSE/Oxford econometric approach in the area of financial markets. 
 
From a financial economics perspective, a key economic theory being tested is that of market 
efficiency – i.e. that information is rapidly incorporated into security prices. From a 
statistical/econometric perspective, I demonstrate the ability of a model selection procedure to 
 19 
 
handle a reduction of a large set of independent variables and produce sensible results. This 
allows us to compare these results to previous studies in this area.
17
 
 
The essay will proceed in the following manner. Section II contains a literature review of 
macroeconomic announcement effects in financial markets. Section III provides a preliminary 
analysis using EGARCH techniques and news impact curves to provide a basis for investigating 
asymmetric responses of Treasury returns. Section IV provides a description of the US Treasury 
return data used in the study and the macroeconomic announcement surprise data. Section V 
contains model discovery results based on Hendry’s general-to-specific modelling techniques 
using Autometrics, documents extensive model diagnostic and encompassing testing, applies 
bias correction to the Gets coefficients and shows the relative superiority to the Gets models 
compared traditional static regression results often seen in academic literature. Section V 
summarizes results relative to the existing literature and concludes the analysis. 
 
C. Review of Macro-Announcement Effect Literature 
 
Over the years, numerous studies have focused on announcement effects in financial markets.  
Macroeconomic announcements, in particular, have been a popular point of focus – especially in 
the cases of interest rates and foreign exchange.  While early studies tended to examine daily 
                                                          
17
 In particular, Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) is a comparable study in the mainstream finance literature. While 
they take advantage of intraday data, they fail to provide evidence of rigorous specification testing and use a 
somewhat shorter time sample. I show that the LSE approach offers a modelling alternative that offers sharper 
unbiased estimation results compared to the type of estimation presented in this important study.  
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data, the recent availability of intraday data has opened new doors and have been especially 
illuminating for researchers in the area of market microstructure. 
1. Treasury Markets 
Urich and Wachtel (1984) examined the effect of money supply and inflation on interest rates, 
finding that unanticipated results led to an immediate impact on short-term rates. Money supply 
was en vogue as the macroeconomic indicator of choice for then Federal Reserve Chairman Paul 
Volcker, this was reinforced by the 1970s wave of monetarist thinking based on the popularity of 
Milton Friedman’s philosophy given the double digit inflation rates of that era. Under Alan 
Greenspan, the Federal Reserve would de-emphasize the use of monetary aggregates in forming 
monetary policy. Instead the focus shifted to a wide array of macroeconomic indicators. 
 
Ederington and Lee (1993) used intraday data to show that macroeconomic announcements are 
responsible for most of the observed time-of-day and day-of-week volatility in Treasury bond, 
Eurodollar, and deutsche mark futures markets 
 
Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998) examined the effect of employment and producer price 
index data on daily Treasury bond prices.  They find that announcement-day volatility does not 
persist beyond the day of announcement.  However, they do uncover day-of-week effects in 
volatility which deserves further investigation, especially given that they are only controlling for 
two macroeconomic announcements. It is possible that the day-of-week effects found here are 
strictly announcement related. 
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In other studies, Li and Engle (1998) examine the effect of macroeconomic announcements on 
the volatility of U.S. Treasury futures, while Fleming and Remolona (1999) look at the effect of 
public information on price formation and liquidity in the Treasury market.  
 
Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000) find that the employment report, PPI, employment cost index, 
retail sales, and the national association of purchasing managers survey have the greatest effect 
on the volatility of Treasury futures. 
 
Similarly, Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) studied surprises in 17 public news releases of 
economic data. They also note and measured the effect on Treasury bond prices, bid-ask spreads, 
volume, and volatility. 
 
Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2005) explore the response of global financial markets 
to the release of U.S. macroeconomic data.  They find that markets react differently to the same 
news depending on the state of the U.S. economy.  In the case of equity markets they found that 
bad news had a positive impact during expansions but a negative impact during recessions. 
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2. Equity Markets 
In one of the earliest high-frequency studies of announcement effects was the Jain (1988) paper 
which examined money supply, inflation, industrial production and unemployment 
announcements on equity markets. Jain found that only money supply and CPI significantly 
affected stock prices, and that the adjustment was complete within an hour (using hourly data).  
 
Connolly and Stivers (2005) examined the effect of macroeconomic announcements on stock 
turnover and volatility clustering using a sample of daily data for 29 firms over a 15 year time 
frame.  They find volatility clustering tends to be stronger during periods of greater uncertainty 
as measured by dispersion of beliefs with respect to economic announcements. Increasingly, 
asymmetries in expectations and responses have become of interest to financial economists both 
on the theoretical and empirical sides.
18
 
  
Each of the aforementioned studies represent an important contribution to the literature in this 
area. These studies do not, however, emphasize specification testing and rarely provide evidence 
that such tests have been performed. The highly dimensional nature of financial markets, the 
existence of outliers in the data, and the potential for regime shifts may well suggest that a full 
battery of diagnostic testing should be at the core of the modelling strategy for such a study. I 
expect to demonstrate herein, why such “testimation” in the “model discovery” process should 
be considered by researchers performing this type of study, as the financial data environment 
                                                          
18
 For example, see Kazemi (1991), Aktas, de Bodt and Levasseur (2004), Bessembinder, Chan and Seguin (1996), 
and Brockman, Chung and Pérignon (2009). 
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often contains the very same modelling challenges that Hendry and LSE approach practitioners 
focus in the area of macroeconomics.  
  
3. Data Sources 
The data for this study comes from several sources, mainly the CRSP US Treasuries database 
and Standard & Poor’s. Survey data from the Standard & Poor’s MMS Macroeconomic Indicator 
Survey are used to capture the effect of revisions to the existing information set at the time of an 
announcement. Importantly, using “as-reported” data allows us to evaluate the true information 
signal existing at the time of announcement. The use of revised indictor data would distort the 
data as revisions are frequent and often translate into a much different signal. For this reason, the 
MMS data has become the standard for performing this type of analysis.
19
 
 
The survey reports the median expected value from survey participants with the unrevised value 
reported to the market at the time of announcement. The difference of these two values 
represents a “surprise” value for the economic indicator. Further, I standardize this variable by 
dividing by the full-sample standard deviation so that we compared the “standardized surprise” 
across indictors. 
 
                                                          
19
 Notable studies using MMS Survey Data include:Urich and Wachtel (1981), Urich (1982), Urich and Wachtel 
(1984), Jain (1988), Aggarwal, Mohanty and Song (1995), Li and Engle (1998), Almeida, Goodhart and Payne 
(1998), Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), Simpson and 
Ramchander (2004), Ramchander, Simpson and Chaudhry (2005), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2007), 
and Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009). The survey was the main source for such studies for over 25 
years. 
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In table 2.1, we see distributional and descriptive data for standardized surprises in the MMS 
macroeconomic announcement data. The table provides information about the accuracy of 
market expectations in macro variables.  Certain indicators may tend to give false signals, 
leading market participants to focus elsewhere.   
 
We observe mild to moderate excess kurtosis across most indicators. Noticeably, core producer 
price index (PPIXFE), which excludes the volatile food and energy components, stands out with 
the greatest excess kurtosis at 7.38. Large negative skewness of -1.33 is seen in the GDP price 
deflator.  
 
Overall, the data fail to reveal any significant abnormalities that would suggest that the market’s 
reaction to any one indicator is due to a systematic inability of economists to forecast indicators. 
The range of observations for standardized surprises, however, does offer a few interesting 
outcomes. Leading indicators (LEI) and PPIXFE showed the largest negative standardized 
surprises at -5.22 and -4.43, respectively. With respect to positive standardized surprises, 
capacity utilization stands out with the largest positive standardized surprise at 4.19.  
 
US Treasury returns are compiled from the CRSP Daily US Treasury database. I create simple 
returns for both “on-the-run” and first “off-the-run” 30-year bonds and 10-year notes. The most-
recently issued security at a given maturity is considered the “on-the-run” issue (hereafter OTR), 
while the first “off-the-run” (hereafter, FTR) issue refers to the second-most-recently issued 
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security. Bond market participants have typically shown a marked preference for the OTR issues. 
This phenomena, called the bond-old bond spread, has been explored in great detail by 
Krishnamurthy (2002).
20
 It has also been well documented as a factor in the famous failure of the 
hedge fund Long Term Capital Management.
21
 
Table 2.1 
Properties of Consensus Forecasts
Descriptives for as-reported economic indicators announced from 
January 1990 to November 2001.
     Central Tendency Range          
Indicators Abbreviation # Obs. Avg SS Avg Abs. SS MIN SS Max SS
Auto Sales AUTOS 199 0.00 0.78 -2.92 2.47
Business Inventories BUSINV 142 0.19 0.76 -2.30 2.76
Capacity Utilization CAPACIT 141 0.12 0.78 -2.69 4.19
Consumer Confidence CONFIDN 130 0.07 0.76 -2.16 2.71
Construction Spending CONSTRC 142 0.08 0.78 -2.29 2.33
Consumer Price Index CPI 130 -0.15 0.74 -2.48 2.48
Core CPI (excludes food and energy) CPIXFE 141 0.08 0.66 -1.68 3.36
Durable Goods Orders DURGDS 141 -0.01 0.76 -2.60 3.46
Employment Cost Index ECI 30 -0.05 0.83 -2.03 3.04
Gross Domestic Product GDP 138 0.24 0.77 -2.19 3.10
GDP Price Deflator GDPPRIC 117 -0.20 0.63 -3.79 1.89
Goods and Services GDSSERV 142 0.11 0.79 -2.40 3.79
Hourly Earnings HREARN 142 0.10 0.82 -2.22 2.66
Home Sales HSLS 141 0.13 0.81 -2.57 2.33
Housing Starts HSTARTS 142 0.15 0.80 -2.42 3.41
Industrial Production INDPROD 142 0.10 0.77 -2.62 3.37
Index of Leading Economic Indicators LEI 142 0.07 0.72 -4.43 3.16
National Association of Purchasing Managers Index NAPM 142 -0.11 0.80 -2.65 2.25
Nonfarm Payrolls NONFARM 143 -0.16 0.77 -2.53 3.30
Personal Consumption Expenditures PCE 140 0.19 0.77 -3.96 2.48
Personal Income PERSINC 141 0.17 0.69 -3.90 3.47
Producer Price Index PPI 143 -0.16 0.77 -2.88 3.24
Core PPI (excludes food and energy) PPIXFE 143 -0.15 0.71 -5.22 2.61
Retail Sales RETSLS 142 -0.15 0.78 -4.02 2.68
Retail Sales (excluding auto sales) RSXAUTO 142 -0.17 0.72 -3.36 2.52
Unemployment Rate UNEMP 143 -0.22 0.76 -2.72 2.72
Note:
SS indicates standardized surprise based on standard deviation of forecast surprise  
 
D. Preliminary Examination of Asymmetries in Treasury Returns 
 
Owing largely to the work of Nelson (1991) and Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), 
asymmetric forms of the generalized autoregressive conductional heteroscedasticity models have 
gained popularity over the years. Just as the ARCH model of Engle (1982) and the GARCH 
extension of Bollerslev (1986) enabled researchers to capture the clustering of volatility in asset 
returns that previously posed a problem to researchers of financial markets, the asymmetric 
                                                          
20
 See also: Pasquariello and Vega (2007) regarding the “on-the-run liquidity phenomenon.” 
21
 See page 464 of Krishnamurthy (2002). 
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GARCH extensions have been particularly useful in modelling “leverage effects” in equity 
market returns. Li and Engle (1998) show evidence of asymmetric volatility in the US Treasury 
Futures market. Bond market returns asymmetries have also been explored by de Goeij and 
Marquering (2004), de Goeij and Marquering (2006), and Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006). 
Although the leverage effect interpretation of asymmetric volatility does not apply in the case of 
US Treasury bonds, the existence of a time varying risk premium is typically seen as an 
explanation.
22
  
 
Table 2.2 presents asymmetric volatility models of US Treasury returns for both OTR and FTR 
bonds and notes in the form of Nelson’s EGARCH model.23  Here, the asymmetry term is γ. The 
impact is asymmetric if γ ≠ 0. We can see in the estimation results that the asymmetry term is 
highly significant in all four cases. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to show that the OTR issues demonstrate a 
greater degree of asymmetry associated with “bad news.” We should also note that, in the world 
of US Treasuries, good economic news is bad news for market participant. This is because 
positive economic news is considered as contributing to inflation risk. Negative economic news 
would be preferred by bond holders because a decreased inflation risk premia translates into 
higher bond prices and a greater return. 
                                                          
22
 Relevant Time-Varying Risk Premia articles include: Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), Evans (1994), Lee (1995), 
Kryzanowski, Lalancette and To (1997), Campbell, Kazemi and Nanisetty (1999), and Koijen, Nijman and Werker 
(2010). 
23
 Nelson (1991) assumes generalized error distribution, whereas the models in the table are based on a Student’s t-
distribution with degrees of freedom estimated. 
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Equation 2.1 
 
 
Table 2.2 - EGARCH Estimation Results 
AR(1) - EGARCH(1,1,1)
 30-Year 10-Year
OTR FTR OTR FTR
Mean Equation Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Constant 0.043 ** 0.046 ** 0.040 ** 0.041 **
AR(1) 0.019 0.014  0.057 * 0.054 *
Variance Equation
ω -0.103 ** -0.097 ** -0.150 ** -0.144 **
α 0.088 ** 0.083 ** 0.105 ** 0.099 **
β -0.027 * -0.028 * -0.014 * -0.013
γ 0.961 ** 0.965 ** 0.960 ** 0.963 **
T-Dist. DOF 7.51 ** 7.81 ** 6.09 ** 6.19 **
Log Liklihood -2748.93 -2706.68 -1469.64 -1358.89
SIC 1.90 1.87 1.02 0.95
Included observations: 2927 2927 2927 2927
Sample: 1/02/1990 to 9/10/2001
**,* indicate significance at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Optimization Algorithm: BFGS
OTR = On-the-Run
FTR = 1st Off-the-Run
 
  
While the regression results are interesting, using the estimation results to plot out so-called 
“news impact curves” is additionally informative. The curves visually convey the extent of the 
asymmetry between the value of the conditional variance with respect to the value of the lagged 
shock.  
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In figure 2.1, we see that the OTR news curves in the left column are markedly steeper for 
negative shocks when compared to the FTR curves. The benchmark 30-year Treasury bond 
shows the greatest degree of asymmetry. The reason for the greater asymmetry is unclear. The 
OTR and FTR securities are typically nearly identical, other than a slightly shorter maturity and a 
possible change in the coupon. But the preference for OTR is well documented. To this we can 
add an apparent greater increase in asymmetry for OTR, compared to FTR. 
Figure 2.1 
 
What remains unexplored is how surprises in macroeconomic variables can induce such 
behavior. To answer this, we will need to look at many economic variables in the context of a 
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well specified econometric model. Such a situation allows us an opportunity to employ general-
to-specific modelling in a macro-finance setting.  The process of Gets modelling is outlined in 
figure 2.2 to provide a visual representation. 
Figure 2.2  – The Gets Model Reduction Process 
 
 
 
E. Gets Modelling of Macroeconomic Announcement Effects 
In this section I use the Gets approach to econometric modelling to estimate asymmetric effects 
of daily US Treasury bonds and notes. Models currently in the literature tend to be in the static 
 30 
 
form of equation 2.2, and results are often presented with little or no regression diagnostics – 
although standard errors are often adjusted using Newey-West or some other method to deal with 
heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation. While this is common practice, it is not necessarily the 
best way of performing empirical research – particularly when other forms of misspecification 
may be present. The Gets method of Hendry, requires meticulous testing when conducting 
econometric estimation, via a battery of specification tests. I will proceed by using the standard 
static model as representative of the “straw man” erected by Gilbert (1986), which we will refer 
to as the “Average Economic Regression”(hereafter, AvER) – a long-standing target of LSE 
econometricians.
24
 
 
Equation 2.2 
 
 
In performing estimation of equation 2.2 on US Treasury returns, one will quickly find that the 
resulting estimates suffer (badly) from numerous forms of test failures. Estimates will typically 
                                                          
24
 See also: Phillips (1988), Gilbert (1989), Phillips (2003), Sargan (2003), and Hendry and Phillips (2017) 
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fail in terms of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, nonlinearity, and parameter constancy. What I 
find, is that it’s not uncommon to fail 4 (or even all 5) tests. Yet, somehow, studies have been 
conducted (and published) using the very same Treasury returns and same macroeconomic 
announcements as predictors without providing specification testing results. Clearly, the problem 
is bigger than one requiring a “patchwork” approach of applying HAC standard errors. Such a 
strategy would probably leave us with a model likely to be plagued by omitted variables bias, 
with other issues still not addressed—namely, parameter constancy and nonlinearity. 
Fortunately, the Gets approach offers us the opportunity to build a better model. Moreover, 
recent advances, such as indicator saturation methods, make even the difficult case at hand 
workable. 
 
What the static AvER models like equation 2.2 suffer from is a lack of “congruence” with the 
local data generating process – i.e., the model is insufficiently general to capture the key 
attributes of the data under examination. A congruent model should have all the following 
properties;
25
 
1.) homoscedastic, independent errors; 
2.) weak- or strong-form exogeneity of conditioning variables for the parameters of interest; 
3.) constant invariant parameters of interest; 
4.) theory-consistent identifiable structures; 
                                                          
25
 Based on Hendry and Nielsen (2007), pages 166-169, Hendry (1980), Hendry and Richard (1983), and Hendry 
(1995), and Hendry (2001). Note, however, the literature tends to require only weak form exogeneity. Therefore, the 
second property of congruence lists “weak or strong” exogeneity, instead of strong form exogeneity, as in Hendry 
and Nielsen (2007). Note also, I turn off pre-search lag reduction for this study as I wanted to assess the ability of 
Automated Gets to test the Efficient Market Hypothesis, not to bypass it. Leaving pre-search lag reduction on is 
likely to result in significantly shorter computation times. 
 32 
 
5.) data-admissible formulations on accurate observations; and 
6.) encompassing rival models. 
 
We can evaluate the congruence of our models via specification testing. While the true data 
generating process is unknowable, we can assess model congruence with the local data 
generating process by performing the requisite battery to tests prescribed by Professor Hendry 
and advocates LSE/Oxford approach. Using the Oxmetrics platform, I used the Autometrics 
functions in PC-GIVE, which automate the Gets procedures.
26
  The tests included by default are;  
1.) AR 1-2 test – a Lagrange Multiplier test for rth order autocorrelation; 
2.) ARCH 1-1 test – a standard ARCH test based on Engle (1982) and Engle, Hendry and 
Trumbell (1985); 
3.) Normality Test – is of the form of Doornik and Hansen (2008); 
4.) Hetero test is a general test for heteroscedastic errors, based on White (1980); 
5.) The RESET test (Regression Specification Test) based on Ramsey (1969), to test 
nonlinearity. 
 
The general-to-specific modelling strategy commences from a general unrestricted model, called 
the GUM, which is reduced based on the autometrics procedure. The estimation of equation 2.2 
already fails, thus any reduction will also fail as the model lacks sufficient generality. Thus, we 
                                                          
26
 See www.doornik.com for additional details on the software. I used the 64 bit version 7.1 of the Oxmetrics 
Enterprise Edition on a dual quad core processor IBM computer with CPU processing speed of 2.2 GHz to perform 
model reductions. Windows Server 2008 R2 is the operating system. Given the large amount of data and regressors, 
the computation can take several hours. However, the cost of computation time in menial compared to the cost of 
model misspecification. Given advances in processing speed, potential gains from GPU processing and the 
likelihood of further gains from additional parallel processing and chip architecture advances, a newer machine 
would likely perform much more favorably compared to my computation times. 
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need to re-specify the model in a more general form. This can be done in a number of ways, but 
the objective is to go from general to specific, not specific to general.
27
 Further, the model should 
be consistent with theory. 
 
That the Treasury market is affected by macroeconomic data and that the surprise component of 
announcements that moves markets is obvious to all. Introducing lags of the independent 
variables pose only a minor problem. Namely, it would represent a violation of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis that says financial markets adjust rapidly and fully to new information. Given 
that the Treasury markets are considered the most liquid financial market on the planet, adding 
lags is unlikely to be of any help achieve congruence, although it does allow us the opportunity 
to test EMH using Gets. This is one way of incorporating theory into a model within the 
LSE/Oxford modelling paradigm, to model a violation of theory and test down to see if the 
variable survives the model reduction.  
 
In order to commence from a sufficiently general specification, we allow for violations of the 
EMH to occur, we will, however, likely need more than that to achieve a congruent, 
parsimonious, encompassing specification. However, based on the notion of time varying risk 
premia and asymmetric volatility, I allow for additional marginal affects associated with positive 
and negative surprises in macroeconomic announcements. This aspect has yet to be examined in 
this manner and represents a significant improvement over many poorly specified models in the 
                                                          
27
 For a comparison of RETINA and Gets modelling with PcGets (which preceded Autometrics), see Perez-Amaral, 
Gallo and White (2005). A comparison with LASSO can be found in Camila Epprecht, Dominique Guegan, Álvaro 
Veiga and Rosa (2013). See also: Castle, Doornik and Hendry (2013). 
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existing financial markets literature.
28
 Additionally, I allow for inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable by adding an autoregressive term to the GUM.  
 
Yet, arriving at a congruent model specification can sometimes still require greater generality 
than data availability would easily provide. Such is the case when there are structural breaks, 
such as level shifts, or the presence of outliers in the data. Fortunately, recent advances in 
indicator saturation methods have offer us an additional set of tools for producing congruent 
empirical models when such complications exist. By adding indicator saturation methods to be 
used in the modelling process, we arrive at the specification of the GUM that is in equation 3. 
The equation takes the typical autoregressive distributed lag model, built with the dynamic 
model typology of dynamic models in Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1984).
29
 
1. Indicator Saturation Results 
Knowing that the highly stochastic nature of fixed income markets is a difficult environment, I 
proceed first by running Autometrics reductions with each of the Autometrics indicator 
saturation methods individually to see which, if any, are able to provide a congruent model. The 
methods are large residual saturation (LRS), impulse indicator saturation (IIS), step indicator 
saturation (SIS), differenced impulse indicator saturation (DIIS) and combinations of IIS+SIS 
and SSI+DIIS. The results are provided in tables 2.3 and 2.4.
30
 
                                                          
28
 However, two interesting and important studies that adopt a different empirical framework on the subject are 
found  in studies by de Goeij and Marquering (2006) and Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009). 
29
 See also: Fisher (1925), Koyck (1954), Almon (1965), Dhrymes (1971), Forest and Turner (2013). 
30
 IIS is discussed in Santos, Hendry and Johansen (2008), Castle, Doornik and Hendry (2013),Castle and Hendry 
(2013), Hendry and Doornik (2014). SIS is discussed in Doornik, Hendry and Pretis (2013) and Castle, Doornik, 
Hendry and Pretis (2015). A wider range of saturation methods are examined by Ericsson (2012), which include IIS, 
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Equation 2.3 
 
Table 2.3 contains results for the OTR and FTR 30-year bonds, while table 2.4 contains results 
for 10-year notes. What is clear from the results, is that the combined indicator saturation 
methods appear to do the best job at achieving a congruent model specification in this particular 
application. Given there is a greater body of literature on single saturation methods, and given a 
preference for parsimonious models being a cornerstone of the methods advocated by David 
Hendry, I chose to opt for either IIS or SIS when either passed the full battery of tests. If a single 
test failed, even at 0.01 significance, I opted for the combined IIS+SIS (if congruent). Based on 
the success of the IIS and SIS methods, it appears that saturation methods have much to offer for 
the financial econometrician.
31
 
 
Certainly, additional regressors could have been included in the general unrestricted model that 
could have lessened the degree of saturation required to achieve a congruent representation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
SIS, DIIS among others. See also: Johansen and Nielsen (2009), Marczak and Proietti (2014), Johansen and Nielsen 
(2016) and Doornik (2016) . 
31
 It should be noted, also, that the use of DIIS appears to actually introduce nonlinearity issues in this particular 
application as a failure of the RESET test is found in all four securities when using DIIS. However, the combined 
IIS+DIIS clearly rectifies the problem. 
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local data generating process. For example, we could have added additional regressors and/or 
dummy variables for the following: 1.) key speeches, such as Greenspan’s Humphrey Hawkins 
testimonies before Congress, 2.) additional macroeconomic announcements such as Johnson 
Redbook Retail Sales and the Philly Fed Manufacturing Index, 3.) announcements of Treasury 
auction volumes and auction results
32, 4.) lead dummy variables to account for “set-up effects” 
ahead of key macro announcements and auctions
33
, 5.) some quantification of the Federal 
Reserve’s “Beige Book” release of regional economic activity and/or FOMC meeting minutes,34 
6.) dummy variables for known market predicaments that affected Treasury rates, such as the 
failure of Long-Term Capital Management, the Orange County CA bankruptcy, the failure of 
Barings bank, the Russian sovereign debt default and the Asian currency crisis.  
 
Due to the unavailability of date or difficulties in compiling such data, some of the above are not 
attempted simply due to a cost benefit analysis on the part of the researcher.
35
 However, 
Treasury auctions, set-up effects, and particularly FOMC meetings (3, 4, 5, and 6 above) are 
relatively manageable. Nevertheless, for the purpose of evaluating the ability of saturation 
methods in capturing unmodelled effects, I leave the task up to the indicator saturation 
algorithms to capture these effects.
36
  
                                                          
32
 See Wachtel and Young (1987), Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) and Forest (2017a) 
33
 See van Dijk, Lumsdaine and van der Wel (2016) and  Forest and Berry (2017b) 
34
 See Ericsson (2016) 
35
 For example, Johnson Redbook retail sales are proprietary reports not frequently forecast by economists, nor are 
they considered to be market movers in the Treasury market. The cost associated with finding forecasts of this series 
might be significant, while the benefits are likely to be negligible. 
36
 See Appendix A for a table of 15 days of large moves in fixed income markets when there were no 
macroeconomic announcements. The table provides evidence supporting the ability of indicator saturation methods 
to pick up unmodelled effects such as the LTCM crisis and FOMC meetings. But, specific to FOMC meetings, 
Appendix B shows that most of the 99 FOMC meetings in the 1990s were not associated with an indicator saturation 
variable being retained. This could simply be because expectations were usually “baked in” to the market. 
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Table 2.3–Alternative Indicator Saturation Methods, 30-Year Bond 
On-the-Run Bonds 1st Off-the-Run Bonds
Static No Saturation 
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2898) = 4.9146 [0.0074] ** AR 1-2 test: F(2,2897) = 0.37984 [0.6840]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 34.129 [0.0000] ** ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 26.925 [0.0000] **
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 450.27 [0.0000] ** Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 474.57 [0.0000] **
Hetero test: F(52,2874)= 1.8332 [0.0003] ** Hetero test: F(54,2872)= 2.026 [0.0000] **
RESET23 test: F(2,2898) = 2.3131 [0.0991] RESET23 test: F(2,2897) = 1.9772 [0.1386]
Large Residual Saturation
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2884) = 0.40261 [0.6686] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2883) = 0.22184 [0.8011]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.13277 [0.7156] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 1.0499 [0.3056]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.5398 [0.2809] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 1.9546 [0.3763]
Hetero test: F(23,2875)= 1.9387 [0.0047] ** Hetero test: F(27,2872)= 1.8861 [0.0038] **
RESET23 test: F(2,2884) = 1.1726 [0.3097] RESET23 test: F(2,2883) = 3.1519 [0.0429] *
Impulse Indication Saturation
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2808) = 0.56198 [0.5701] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2815) = 1.2327 [0.2917]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.53201 [0.4658] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 1.1711 [0.2793]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 4.32590 [0.1150] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 1.9221 [0.3825]
Hetero test: F(20,2800)= 1.83460 [0.0132] * Hetero test: F(18,2808)= 1.8625 [0.0148] *
RESET23 test: F(2,2808) = 0.46745 [0.6266] RESET23 test: F(2,2815) = 0.40963 [0.6639]
Step Indicator Saturation
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2760) = 3.4536 [0.0318] * AR 1-2 test: F(2,2751) = 1.70890 [0.1813]   
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 2.7299 [0.0986] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 1.25510 [0.2627]   
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.5819 [0.2750] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 0.60785 [0.7379]   
Hetero test: F(133,2752)= 1.0596 [0.3075] Hetero test: F(151,2739)= 1.18810 [0.0629]   
RESET23 test: F(2,2760) = 2.9626 [0.0518] RESET23 test: F(2,2751) = 1.28880 [0.2758]   
IIS and SIS
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2764) = 1.6495 [0.1923] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2784) = 0.7803 [0.4584]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 2.4525 [0.1174]   ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.41604 [0.5190]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.6591 [0.2646]   Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 0.70898 [0.7015]
Hetero test: F(98,2756)= 1.1454 [0.1591]   Hetero test: F(86,2777)= 1.1656 [0.1442]
RESET23 test: F(2,2764) = 1.4723 [0.2296]  RESET23 test: F(2,2784) = 2.4078 [0.0902]
Differenced IIS
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2817) = 3.0847 [0.0459] * AR 1-2 test: F(2,2806) = 2.9772 [0.0511]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 1.9619 [0.1614] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 2.6195 [0.1057]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.3248 [0.3127] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 1.8608 [0.3944]
Hetero test: F(192,2734)= 0.6189 [1.0000] Hetero test: F(210,2716)= 0.59851 [1.0000]
RESET23 test: F(2,2817) = 6.3752 [0.0017] ** RESET23 test: F(2,2806) = 10.254 [0.0000] **
IIS and DIIS
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2805) = 0.99931 [0.3683] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2823) = 0.82454 [0.4385]   
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 3.3756 [0.0663] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 3.1551 [0.0758]   
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 0.87191 [0.6466] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.196 [0.3335]   
Hetero test: F(124,2749)= 0.65844 [0.9986] Hetero test: F(94,2779)= 0.70666 [0.9851]   
RESET23 test: F(2,2805) = 1.3507 [0.2592] RESET23 test: F(2,2823) = 0.87421 [0.4173]   
Notes on the tests above based on descriptions provided in the PCGIVE documentation. 
Greater detail is available at https://www.doornik.com/pcgive/index.html
1) Autocorrelation test (AR 1-2 test) i s  the Lagrange-multipl ier test for rth order res idual  autocorrelation.
The F- form of the test i s  used. Under the nul l  hypothes is  that there i s  no autocorrelation (that i s , that the errors  are white noise). 
2) ARCH 1-1 test i s  the s tandard Autoregress ive Conditional  Heteroscedasti ty test H0: γ=0. The F-form is  reported.
Both fi rs t-order and higher-order lag forms  are eas i ly ca lculated (see Engle, 1982, and Engle, Hendry, and Trumbul l , 1985)
3) Normal i ty Test i s  of the form of Doornik and Hansen (1994) with the nul l  being that of normal i ty.
4) Hetero test i s  a  genera l  test for heteroscedastic errors : H0 is  that the errors  are homoscedastic. Test i s  based on White (1980). 
5) The RESET test (Regress ion Speci fication Test) due to Ramsey (1969) tests  the nul l  of correct speci fication of the origina l  model  aga inst the a l ternative that powers  of ŷt  have been omitted.
Autometrics  procedure a lso involves  parameter s tabi l i ty testing  based on the approach in Hansen (1992). 
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Table 2.4 – Indicator Saturation Methods, 10-Year Note 
`
On-the-Run Notes 1st Off-the-Run Notes
Static No Saturation 
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2897) = 0.37984 [0.6840] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2898) = 4.347 [0.0130] *
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 26.925 [0.0000] ** ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 24.823 [0.0000] **
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 474.57 [0.0000] ** Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 479.71 [0.0000] **
Hetero test: F(54,2872)= 2.026 [0.0000] ** Hetero test: F(52,2874)= 1.599 [0.0043] **
RESET23 test: F(2,2897) = 1.9772 [0.1386] RESET23 test: F(2,2898) = 2.0078 [0.1345]
Large Residual Saturation
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2871) = 0.63503 [0.5300] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2875) = 0.56044 [0.5710]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.040235 [0.8410] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.093487 [0.7598]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 7.7743 [0.0205] * Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 13.294 [0.0013] **
Hetero test: F(36,2855)= 1.622 [0.0111] * Hetero test: F(37,2859)= 1.5888 [0.0135] *
RESET23 test: F(2,2871) = 3.899 [0.0204] * RESET23 test: F(2,2875) = 4.9986 [0.0068] **
Impulse Indication Saturation
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2819) = 1.2836 [0.2772] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2796) = 2.6703 [0.0694]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.91307 [0.3394] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.21052 [0.6464]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.2006 [0.3328] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.9671 [0.2268]
Hetero test: F(20,2811)= 1.7026 [0.0264] * Hetero test: F(20,2788)= 1.3793 [0.1208]
RESET23 test: F(2,2819) = 0.53229 [0.5873] RESET23 test: F(2,2796) = 0.12934 [0.8787]
Step Indicator Saturation
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2757) = 1.9565 [0.1415]   AR 1-2 test: F(2,2771) = 1.47890 [0.2281]   
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.62871 [0.4279]   ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.37855 [0.5384]   
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.3116 [0.3148]   Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 1.00720 [0.6044]   
Hetero test: F(134,2747)= 0.95983 [0.6132]   Hetero test: F(123,2761)= 0.93475 [0.6817]   
RESET23 test: F(2,2757) = 2.1907 [0.1120] RESET23 test: F(2,2771) = 2.82890 [0.0592]   
IIS and SIS
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2727) = 0.92569 [0.3964] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2726) = 2.80810 [0.0605]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.17571 [0.6751] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.05769 [0.8102]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 4.5265 [0.1040] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 1.57020 [0.4561]
Hetero test: F(112,2719)= 1.3208 [0.0149] * Hetero test: F(121,2716)= 1.01850 [0.4286]
RESET23 test: F(2,2727) = 2.58 [0.0760] RESET23 test: F(2,2726) = 1.90110 [0.1496]
Differenced IIS
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2814) = 0.61483 [0.5408]   AR 1-2 test: F(2,2796) = 0.5749 [0.5628]   
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 3.8205 [0.0507] ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 2.4689 [0.1162]   
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 2.0524 [0.3584]   Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 0.69013 [0.7082]   
Hetero test: F(194,2732)= 0.5 [1.0000]   Hetero test: F(225,2701)= 0.59947 [1.0000]   
RESET23 test: F(2,2814) = 14.498 [0.0000] ** RESET23 test: F(2,2796) = 10.724 [0.0000] **
IIS and DIIS
AR 1-2 test: F(2,2798) = 0.15254 [0.8585] AR 1-2 test: F(2,2781) = 0.074857 [0.9279]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 4.0607 [0.0440] * ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,2925) = 0.43975 [0.5073]
Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 1.9943 [0.3689] Normality test: Chi^2(2)  = 1.6227 [0.4443]
Hetero test: F(133,2739)= 0.56899 [1.0000] Hetero test: F(118,2730)= 0.54746 [1.0000]
RESET23 test: F(2,2798) = 5.5684 [0.0039] ** RESET23 test: F(2,2781) = 5.9552 [0.0026] **
Notes on the tests above based on descriptions provided in the PCGIVE documentation. 
Greater detail is available at https://www.doornik.com/pcgive/index.html
1) Autocorrelation test (AR 1-2 test) i s  the Lagrange-multipl ier test for rth order res idual  autocorrelation.
The F- form of the test i s  used. Under the nul l  hypothes is  that there i s  no autocorrelation (that i s , that the errors  are white noise). 
2) ARCH 1-1 test i s  the s tandard Autoregress ive Conditional  Heteroscedasti ty test H0: γ=0. The F-form is  reported.
Both fi rs t-order and higher-order lag forms  are eas i ly ca lculated (see Engle, 1982, and Engle, Hendry, and Trumbul l , 1985)
3) Normal i ty Test i s  of the form of Doornik and Hansen (1994) with the nul l  being that of normal i ty.
4) Hetero test i s  a  genera l  test for heteroscedastic errors : H0 is  that the errors  are homoscedastic. Test i s  based on White (1980). 
5) The RESET test (Regress ion Speci fication Test) due to Ramsey (1969) tests  the nul l  of correct speci fication of the origina l  model  aga inst the a l ternative that powers  of ŷt  have been omitted.
Autometrics  procedure a lso involves  parameter s tabi l i ty testing  based on the approach in Hansen (1992). 
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 The Autometrics software does additional testing in the model reduction process that is not 
reported in the table. However, this is not to suggest that these tests are of lesser importance. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Encompassing testing and parameter constancy tests are 
an integral part of the model reduction process.
37
  
Table 2.5—Parameter Stability AvER Models 
 
Model and Parameter Instability Tests
Static Modes with no Selection/Saturation 
OTR FTR OTR FTR
30-Year 30-Year 10-Year 10-Year
Hansen Instability tests: 
variance 1.764 ** 2.185 ** 0.769 * 0.815 **
joint 7.030 ** 7.641 ** 6.333 * 6.393 *
Individual instability tests:
Constant 0.037 0.038 0.045 0.050
ss_autos 0.114 0.106 0.176 0.142
ss_businv 0.103 0.085 0.184 0.138
ss_capacit 0.461 0.381 0.471 * 0.486 *
ss_confidn 0.080 0.076 0.087 0.083
ss_constrc 0.173 0.218 0.248 0.278
ss_cpi 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054
ss_cpixfe 0.063 0.060 0.079 0.082
ss_durgds 0.123 0.144 0.090 0.162
ss_eci 0.072 0.078 0.105 0.104
ss_gdp 0.041 0.049 0.046 0.048
ss_gdppric 0.122 0.114 0.232 0.210
ss_gdsserv 0.147 0.156 0.157 0.168
ss_hrearn 0.127 0.128 0.085 0.090
ss_hsls 0.211 0.264 0.188 0.211
ss_hstarts 0.577 * 0.577 * 0.751 * 0.673 *
ss_indprod 0.328 0.175 0.311 0.292
ss_lei 0.104 0.111 0.098 0.102
ss_napm 0.253 0.306 0.142 0.160
ss_nonfarm 0.157 0.146 0.123 0.134
ss_pce 0.477 * 0.566 * 0.544 * 0.558 *
ss_persinc 0.172 0.192 0.116 0.110
ss_ppi 0.175 0.164 0.226 0.189
ss_ppixfe 0.488 * 0.400 0.581 * 0.533 *
ss_retsls 0.455 0.382 0.547 * 0.478 *
ss_rsxauto 0.052 0.046 0.061 0.063
ss_unemp 0.082 0.104 0.053 0.075
Instability based on Hansen (1992)
Larger values indicate parameter/model non-constancy (marked by * or **).  
 
                                                          
37
 See Hendry and Doornik (2014), Chapter 13, regarding the role of encompassing in the model discovery process. 
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2. Parameter Stability 
In this section, I provide evidence for the effectiveness of Autometrics in achieving parameter 
constancy in the Gets models relative to the AvER models. Table 2.5 contains model and 
parameter stability tests for the static AvER models, based on Hansen (1992). Models of all four 
securities under investigation fail in terms of parameter constancy. The offending predictors are: 
capacity utilization, housing starts, personal consumption expenditures, core producer prices 
(PPI excluding food and energy), and retail sales.  
 
We can contrast these results with those of table 2.6, which contains test results for the Gets 
models. Because Hansen’s test in not appropriate for models with dummy variables, the 
individual parameter stability results are from the same specification as the Gets model, but 
having dropped the dummy variables. This is just to give a sense of the level of improvement. 
The model constancy tests are the standard Chow tests that are a default test in the Autometrics 
procedure. 
 
The result provided in table 2.6 clearly underscores the value of Gets modelling with 
Autometrics. All four models pass the parameter constancy tests. While retail sales are indicated 
as potentially unstable, again, this is based on a reduced model that excludes the indicator 
saturation dummy variables. What we can say is that parameter constancy appears to have come 
partially by way of indicator saturation and partially by way of model reduction. 
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Clearly, we have done a tremendous amount of testing thus far without yet focusing on the 
estimation results. This is because our primary concern is achieving an admissible representation 
of the local data generating process. Having achieved improved results in testing down to a 
satisfactory model, we may now shift our attention to the regression results. 
 
Table 2.6 – Parameter Stability of Gets Models 
 
Model and Parameter Instability Tests
Gets Models with Indicator Saturation
OTR FTR OTR FTR
30-Year 30-Year 10-Year 10-Year
Chow Breakpoint Tests (H0: Break at 70% of sample): 
P-Value 0.723 0.353 0.675 0.800
Cut-Off 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Individual instability tests based on Hansen (1992):
Dependent Variable(-1) 0.259
Constant 0.065
ss_confidn 0.091 0.091 0.099 0.084
ss_cpixfe 0.065 0.063 0.100 0.082
ss_durgds 0.157 0.184 0.107 0.209
ss_eci
ss_gdp
ss_hrearn 0.141 0.142 0.100 0.105
ss_napm 0.239 0.295 0.141 0.156
ss_nonfarm 0.165 0.153 0.127 0.141
ss_ppixfe 0.250
ss_ppixfe_1 0.270
ss_retsls 0.509 * 0.404 0.623 *  
neg_ss_eci 0.112 0.118 0.123 0.131
neg_ss_persinc 0.027
neg_ss_ppixfe 0.085 0.119
pos_ss_cpi 0.050
pos_ss_eci 0.075 0.154
pos_ss_hsls 0.038
pos_ss_ppi 0.191
Parameter Instability based on Hansen(1992).
Due to presence of indicator saturation dummies in these models,
Model tests are given by standard Chow Breakpoint Tests with
break occurring at 70% of the sample. This is the PC-Give software default in Autometrics.
Individual parameter instability based on Hansen (1992), with indicator saturation dummies removed.
Larger values in  indicate parameter non-constancy (marked by * or **).  
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3. Estimation Results 
In this section we analyze and interpret the regression results to better assess the underlying 
question of the sources of asymmetric risk premia in the US Treasury market. Thus far, we have 
gained an appreciation for the benefits of Gets modelling in financial econometrics. Poorly 
specified AvER models attempting to relate fixed income returns to contemporaneous surprises 
in macroeconomic variables failed to represent the local data generating process adequately. 
Those models failed (or nearly failed) virtually every specification test. Such models would 
prove far too inadequate to be repaired with a duct tape and bubble gum solution of HAC 
standard errors. General-to-specific modelling via Autometrics was employed to solve the 
problem and we were able to achieve a congruent, parsimonious, encompassing, model 
alternative.  
 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 contain the regression results for the 30-year and 10-year securities, 
respectively. The results suggest that fewer economic variables were market movers than 
originally expected. However, the big headline macro variables that were watched closely during 
the Greenspan era at the Fed are retained in the model reductions—i.e., nonfarm payrolls, the 
Employment Cost Index (ECI), durable goods orders, consumer confidence, etc..  
 
We also see yet another benefit of the Gets procedure, that being the ability to discern between 
competing variable definitions such as CPI and Core CPI, which excludes food and energy 
prices. The popular press tended to, and perhaps still does, report more on the overall index. 
However, policymakers tend to pay closer attention to the core rate of inflation. The results 
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appear to confirm the wisdom of this approach, with the core rates for CPI and PPI tending to 
survive, while the headline number is reduced out. 
 
With respect to market efficiency, the EMH holds as expected as only one single lagged macro 
variable failed to be reduced in the model reduction process – that being Core PPI in the FTR 30-
year bond regression model. Given the target “size” of 1%, we would expect to see an occasional 
retention of a variable that does not belong in the model. But the benefits clearly outweigh the 
costs and I would not consider this a violation of the EMH. If a case were to be made for Core 
PPI representing a market anomaly, we would have expected to see the variable retained at other 
maturities or in the OTR bond as well.
38
 
 
With respect to one of the main points of the paper, a small number of variables that appear to 
generate the asymmetric response effects suggested by the estimation results from our EGARCH 
models. Interestingly, the Employment Cost Index (ECI) appears only to affect Treasury returns 
significantly when the surprise is negative. This result is seen in all four securities, with the same 
sign on the coefficient and similar order of magnitude. Other indicators that appear to elicit 
asymmetric responses include: Core PPI, PPI, CPI, home sales, personal income, and capacity 
utilization. From this, I would draw the conclusion that these variables contribute to the 
asymmetric time varying risk premia. To some, it may be surprising that that nonfarm payrolls, 
                                                          
38
 This is because the on-the –run and off-the-run issues at each maturity are near perfect substitutes for one another. 
Likewise, the 10-year note and 30-year bond are at the long end of the Treasury yield curve and the behavior of the 
returns for these securities are affected by common risk factors. The US government has never defaulted on its 
obligations and market participants consider these securities to be free of default risk. The main risk component for 
long-term Treasuries is the inflation risk premia.  
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the most widely followed macro variable of the Greenspan era, does not appear to be a source of 
asymmetry. 
Table 2.7 – 30-Year Bond Estimation 
30-Year On-the-Run 30-Year 1st Off-the-Run
A. B. C. A. B. C.
2-Step 2-Step
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
bond_30_ftr_1_rt(-1) -0.086 -0.085 **
Constant 0.031 ** 0.035 **
ss_autos -0.073 -0.070
ss_businv 0.014 0.021
ss_capacit -0.130 -0.137
ss_confidn -0.225 ** -0.243 -0.242 ** -0.216 ** -0.247 -0.246 **
ss_constrc -0.015 -0.010
ss_cpi -0.068 -0.070
ss_cpixfe -0.182 ** -0.248 -0.248 ** -0.180 ** -0.185 -0.176 **
ss_durgds -0.189 ** -0.137 -0.098 ** -0.188 ** -0.171 -0.157 **
ss_eci -0.316 ** -0.311 **
ss_gdp -0.023 -0.018
ss_gdppric -0.104 -0.090
ss_gdsserv 0.008 0.014
ss_hrearn -0.243 ** -0.139 -0.102 ** -0.237 ** -0.122 -0.065 **
ss_hsls 0.069 0.129
ss_hstarts -0.015 -0.008
ss_indprod -0.006 0.024
ss_lei -0.043 -0.049
ss_napm -0.312 ** -0.363 -0.363 ** -0.297 ** -0.329 -0.329 **
ss_nonfarm -0.394 ** -0.317 -0.317 ** -0.402 ** -0.355 -0.355 **
ss_pce -0.007 -0.013
ss_persinc -0.090 -0.091
ss_ppi 0.063 0.062
ss_ppixfe -0.160 ** -0.170 ** -0.231 -0.229 **
ss_ppixfe(-1) -0.122 -0.064 **
ss_retsls -0.191 ** -0.133 -0.081 ** -0.194 ** -0.117 0.000 **
ss_rsxauto 0.023 0.025
ss_unemp 0.066 0.071
neg_ss_eci -0.785 -0.785 ** -0.915 -0.915 **
neg_ss_ppixfe -0.229 -0.219 **
pos_ss_ppi 0.227 0.161 **
sigma 0.62 0.52 0.61 0.52
log-likelihood -2738.69 -2157.68 -2685.54 -2139.80
no. of observations 2927 2927 2927 2927
mean(Y) 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.036
RSS 1113.411 748.585 1073.699 739.498
no. of parameters 27 161 27 174
se(Y) 0.639 0.639 0.628 0.628
Saturation None IIS+SIS None SIS
Congruent @ 1% No Yes No Yes
Diagnostic Test P-Value P-Value P-Value P-Value
AR 1-2 test: 0.5259 0.1923 0.8202 0.1813
ARCH 1-1 test: 0.0000 ** 0.1174 0.0000 ** 0.2627
Normality test: 0.0000 ** 0.2646 0.0000 ** 0.7379
Hetero test: 0.0075 ** 0.1591 0.0005 ** 0.0629
RESET23 test: 0.3359 0.2296 0.1877 0.2758
ss = standardized surprise
**,* indicate significance at .05 and .01, respectively
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Table 2.8 – 10-Year Note Estimation Results 
 
10-Year On-the-Run 10-Year 1st Off-the-Run
A. B. C. A. B. C.
2-Step 2-Step
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 0.030 ** 0.032 ** 0.040 0.040 **
ss_autos -0.039 -0.041
ss_businv 0.004 0.006
ss_capacit -0.105 * -0.108 *
ss_confidn -0.174 ** -0.167 -0.166 ** -0.169 ** -0.170 -0.169 **
ss_constrc -0.011 -0.009
ss_cpi -0.037 -0.042
ss_cpixfe -0.117 ** -0.143 -0.142 ** -0.108 ** -0.122 -0.112 **
ss_durgds -0.117 ** -0.111 -0.102 ** -0.114 ** -0.100 -0.087 **
ss_eci -0.210 ** -0.196 **
ss_gdp -0.031 -0.018
ss_gdppric -0.051 -0.056
ss_gdsserv 0.009 0.011
ss_hrearn -0.162 ** -0.180 -0.180 ** -0.153 ** -0.173 -0.173 **
ss_hsls -0.187 -0.267
ss_hstarts -0.012 -0.014
ss_indprod 0.016 0.022
ss_lei -0.022 -0.022
ss_napm -0.225 ** -0.238 -0.238 ** -0.210 ** -0.228 -0.228 **
ss_nonfarm -0.303 ** -0.208 -0.208 ** -0.282 ** -0.174 -0.174 **
ss_pce -0.013 -0.011
ss_persinc -0.051 -0.055
ss_ppi 0.076 0.075
ss_ppixfe -0.094 * -0.081 *
ss_retsls -0.136 ** -0.083 -0.042 ** -0.138 **
ss_rsxauto 0.007 0.008
ss_unemp 0.063 0.074 *
neg_ss_eci -0.426 -0.424 ** -0.382 -0.378 **
neg_ss_persinc -0.126 -0.068 **
neg_ss_ppixfe -0.109 -0.076 **
pos_ss_capacit -0.111 -0.076 **
pos_ss_cpi -0.148 0.000 *
pos_ss_hsls -2.894 -2.299 **
sigma 0.405 0.340 0.389 0.322
no. of observations 2927 2927 2927 2927
mean(Y) 0.030 0.030 0.033 0.033
RSS 474.878 318.420 438.820 289.954
log-likelihood -1491.600 -906.658 -1376.030 -769.603
no. of parameters 27 168 27 129
se(Y) 0.420 0.420 0.403 0.403
Saturation None SIS None IIS
Congruent @ 1% No Yes No Yes
Diagnostic Test P-Value P-Value P-Value P-Value
AR 1-2 test: 0.0074 ** 0.1415 0.0130 * 0.0694
ARCH 1-1 test: 0.0000 ** 0.4279 0.0000 ** 0.6464
Normality test: 0.0000 ** 0.3148 0.0000 ** 0.2268
Hetero test: 0.0003 ** 0.6132 0.0043 ** 0.1208
RESET23 test: 0.0991 0.1120 0.1345 0.8787
ss = standardized surprise
**,* indicate significance at .05 and .01, respectively
Bias Correction Based on Code Courtesy of Hendry, Doornik and Castle
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4. Dealing with Bias – The Known vs. the Unknown 
A point of contention for critics of Gets model discovery methods, is that the parameter estimates 
are not perfectly unbiased. Admittedly, this is a verifiable fact. Notwithstanding, Professor 
Hendry and LSE approach advocates will argue that the estimates are, in fact, nearly unbiased.
39
 
Further, the form of the bias is well understood and easily corrected via a routine bias adjustment 
procedure.
40
  
 
Because of sampling, some relevant variables will likely have  in a particular sample. 
Conditional estimates will be biased away from the origin as variables are based on the condition 
. By chance, approximately α(N-n) irrelevant variables will be retained due to 
adventitiously significant .
41
 However, as shown in Hendry and Krolzig (2005), bias 
correction will achieve approximate unbiasedness of the relevant variables while also driving 
coefficients on the irrelevant variables to zero. The two-step bias correction procedure can be 
applied to parameter estimates, and requires only the estimated parameters, t-stats, sample size 
and significance level from the Gets estimation.  
 
When compared to the “phantom menace” of omitted-variables-bias, which is likely to plague an 
empirical model that does not adequately represent the local data generating process, the small 
                                                          
39
 See chapter 10 of Hendry and Doornik (2014). 
40
 The bias correction process is described in great detail in Hendry and Krolzig (2005). 
41
 Hendry and Doornik (2014) page 133. 
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and manageable bias of the Gets estimator poses little risk to the empirical modeler.
42
 But when 
models fail specification tests at the degree we see in this study, omitted-variable bias is likely to 
be present. Clearly, the downside of Gets modeling – i.e., computation time and bias correction – 
are pale in comparison to the upside – efficient, consistent, and unbiased parameter estimates. In 
tables 2.10 and 2.11, I attempt to provide a sense of the degree of Gets estimator bias vs omitted-
variable bias. The analysis draws heavily from Hendry and Krolzig (2005) and  Hendry and 
Doornik (2014).
43
  The results are favorable to the Gets modeler but AvER models are shown to 
suffer badly in terms of bias relative to the un-corrected Gets model coefficients. Gets bias is low 
in absolute terms, often producing estimates with no bias at all. When bias exists in the 
uncorrected coefficients, the size of the bias tends to be less than half that of the omitted variable 
bias in the uncorrected AvER regressions. 
 
For example, looking at the results for the 30-year on-the-run bond, the bias in the AvER model 
coefficient on hourly earnings surprises is 138.2% of the bias corrected Gets coefficient. By 
comparison, the bias in the uncorrected Gets coefficient is only 36.7% of the bias corrected Gets 
coefficient. All of the common coefficients in the AvER model suffer from bias, while the 
uncorrected Gets model has bias in only 3 of 7 coefficients.  Also, with respect to the 30-year 
off-the-run bond, we see the retail sales coefficient is driven down to zero. While the percent bias 
is undefined due to division by zero, in absolute terms the AvER parameter estimate is -.194 
instead of zero. In finance, nineteen basis points can amount to a lot of money – particularly 
                                                          
42
 This ghostly characterization in quotes is based on the imaginative description in the title of Clarke (2005). 
43
 I would like to thank David Hendry, Jurgen Doornik and Jennifer Castle for making their Ox code for the bias 
adjustment available to me. 
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when moving lots of Treasury bonds between large institutions. So the losses associated with 
poor parameter estimation in finance stand to be costly on more than just an analytical level. 
 
Uncorrected Gets parameter estimates for the 10-year on-the-run note achieve even lower levels 
of relative bias. The troublesome retail sales series, which we had warning signs on earlier in the 
study when it was revealed that the presence of stability issues, has the greatest bias. Uncorrected 
Gets bias is 95% compared to the corrected counterpart. However, the AvER model bias is 
220.0% greater than the corrected Gets estimate. Having 4 models, with 29 common coefficients 
estimated, only one uncorrected Gets coefficient showed larger bias relative to the corrected Gets 
coefficient than did its AvER model counterpart – that being the case of core CPI which had 
positive 8.4% bias relative to the corrected Gets, while the AvER had a -4.1 percent relative bias 
estimate. While uncorrected Gets failed to pitch a shutout against AvER, a 28 to 1 score looks 
pretty convincing. Given the ease of applying the bias correction, the general to specific 
methodology looks even more attractive for the financial econometrician.  
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Table 2.9 – Analysis of Bias in Common Coefficients - 30-Year Bond 
 
30-Year On-the-Run 30-Year 1st Off-the-Run
AvER Gets Gets Gets AvER AvER Gets Gets Gets AvER
Without Without 2 Step Bias Bias Est. OV Bias Without Without 2 Step Bias Bias Est. OV Bias
Correction Correction Corrected % % Correction Correction Corrected % %
Constant
ss_autos
ss_businv
ss_capacit
ss_confidn -0.225 -0.243 -0.242 0.6 -6.9 -0.216 -0.247 -0.246 0.5 -12.1
ss_constrc
ss_cpi
ss_cpixfe -0.182 -0.248 -0.248 0.2 -26.7 -0.180 -0.185 -0.176 5.3 2.0
ss_durgds -0.189 -0.137 -0.098 40.7 93.1 -0.188 -0.171 -0.157 9.0 19.3
ss_eci
ss_gdp
ss_gdppric
ss_gdsserv
ss_hrearn -0.243 -0.139 -0.102 36.7 138.2 -0.237 -0.122 -0.065 88.1 266.2
ss_hsls
ss_hstarts
ss_indprod
ss_lei
ss_napm -0.312 -0.363 -0.363 0.0 -14.2 -0.297 -0.329 -0.329 0.0 -9.7
ss_nonfarm -0.394 -0.317 -0.317 0.0 24.3 -0.402 -0.355 -0.355 0.0 13.4
ss_pce
ss_persinc
ss_ppi
ss_ppixfe -0.170 -0.231 -0.229 0.6 -25.7
ss_retsls -0.191 -0.133 -0.081 64.4 136.1 -0.194 -0.117 0.000 Undefined Undefined
ss_rsxauto
ss_unemp
ss = standardized surprise
Bias Correction Based on Code Courtesy of Hendry, Doornik and Castle
P-Value =0.01
OV Bias %=( AER Coefficient -Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient)/Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient
Gets Bias %=( Unadjusted Gets Coefficient -Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient)/Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient
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Table 2.10 – Analysis of Bias in Common Coefficients - 10-Year Note 
10-Year On-the-Run 10-Year 1st Off-the-Run
AvER Gets Gets Gets AvER AvER Gets Gets Gets AvER
Without Without 2 Step Bias Bias Est. OV Bias Without Without 2 Step Bias Bias Est. OV Bias
Correction Correction Corrected % % Correction Correction Corrected % %
Constant 0.032 0.040 0.040 0.0 -19.1
ss_autos
ss_businv
ss_capacit
ss_confidn -0.174 -0.167 -0.166 0.3 5.0 -0.169 -0.170 -0.169 0.1 -0.5
ss_constrc
ss_cpi
ss_cpixfe -0.117 -0.143 -0.142 1.1 -17.5 -0.108 -0.122 -0.112 8.4 -4.1
ss_durgds -0.117 -0.111 -0.102 9.3 14.7 -0.114 -0.100 -0.087 14.4 30.4
ss_eci
ss_gdp
ss_gdppric
ss_gdsserv
ss_hrearn -0.162 -0.180 -0.180 0.0 -9.5 -0.153 -0.173 -0.173 0.0 -11.5
ss_hsls
ss_hstarts
ss_indprod
ss_lei
ss_napm -0.225 -0.238 -0.238 0.0 -5.4 -0.210 -0.228 -0.228 0.0 -7.8
ss_nonfarm -0.303 -0.208 -0.208 0.0 46.1 -0.282 -0.174 -0.174 0.0 62.1
ss_pce
ss_persinc
ss_ppi
ss_ppixfe
ss_retsls -0.136 -0.083 -0.042 95.2 220.0
ss_rsxauto
ss_unemp
ss = standardized surprise
Bias Correction Based on Code Courtesy of Hendry, Doornik and Castle
P-Value =0.01
OV Bias %=( AER Coefficient -Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient)/Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient
Gets Bias %=( Unadjusted Gets Coefficient -Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient)/Gets 2 Step Bias Corrected Coefficient
 
F. Encompassing Tests 
A cornerstone of the LSE approach to econometric modelling is the idea and encompassing and 
the advocacy of a progressive research strategy. The concept of encompassing is rather simple, it 
is basically the notion that a model should be able to explain the results of a competing model. 
The concept is discussed in great detail in chapter 14 of Hendry (1995). 
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Therein, Hendry states that when two or more explanations compete in describing a 
phenomenon, one or more of them must be incorrect. He states that, because models are simply 
just reduction of the data generating process, they are reduced re-combinations of the data. If a 
model, M1, purports to explain the data, then it should be able to explain re-combinations of the 
data that the rival models of other investigators purport to explain. In this section, I treat the 
AvER model as M1 and the Gets model as M2 and perform formal encompassing tests of whether 
M1 encompasses M2 and whether M2 encompasses M1. In terms of notation, the varepsilon is 
used for encompassing – i.e., we test M1 ε M2 and M2 ε M1, respectively.
44
 
 
While I have already demonstrated that the traditional static AvER model often found in the 
academic literature on macroeconomic announcement effects is inadequate for reliable 
estimation and that automated Gets models offer a statistically admissible alternative (especially 
when applying bias correction), it can also be shown that the Gets models are capable of 
explaining the results of the typical AvER model. Furthermore, it can be shown that the AvER 
models fail to encompass the Gets models. This is yet another example of the inadequacy of the 
AvER models—i.e., that they fail to explain the models of their rivals. 
 
Gets modeling employs extensive use encompassing in the model reduction process, in that case 
the test is a test against the nesting general unrestricted model. However, encompassing testing 
of non-nested models is also a valuable tool for the applied econometrician. In the case of the 
                                                          
44
 Hendry (1995) page 502 
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AvER and Gets models, M1 and M2 are mutually non-nested. There are four tests for each model. 
The first two tests are for variance encompassing – i.e., whether the adjusted likelihoods of the 
rival models are compatible. The tests are based on Cox (1961) and Ericsson (1983), respective. 
We find that, only in the case of the on-the-run 30-year bond, M2 ε M1. This somewhat favors 
Gets over AvER, albeit at a loose significance of 5%. Yet there is mutual failure to encompass at 
1% significance in the three other models. 
 
Table 2.11  
Encompassing Tests
30-Year On-the-Run Bonds 30-Year 1st Off-the-Run Bonds
Test Model 1 vs. Model 2 Model 2 vs. Model 1 Test Model 1 vs. Model 2 Model 2 vs. Model 1
Cox N(0,1)   =   -266.5 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =   -2.517 [0.0118]* Cox N(0,1)   =   -282.8 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =   -2.924 [0.0035]**
Ericsson IV N(0,1)   =    218.0 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =    2.441 [0.0147]* Ericsson IV N(0,1)   =    234.1 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =    2.828 [0.0047]**
Sargan Chi^2(154)=   968.13 [0.0000]** Chi^2(20) =   25.390 [0.1869] Sargan Chi^2(166)=   919.00 [0.0000]** Chi^2(19) =   22.525 [0.2589]
Joint Model F(154,2746)=   8.9358 [0.0000]** F(20,2746)=   1.2720 [0.1864] Joint Model F(166,2734)=   7.6405 [0.0000]** F(19,2734)=   1.1871 [0.2586]
sigma[M1] = 0.619625 sigma[M2] = 0.520229 sigma[Joint] = 0.519718 sigma[M1] = 0.608474 sigma[M2] = 0.518281 sigma[Joint] = 0.517947
10-Year On-the-Run Notes 10-Year 1st Off-the-Run Notes
Test Model 1 vs. Model 2 Model 2 vs. Model 1 Test Model 1 vs. Model 2 Model 2 vs. Model 1
Cox N(0,1)   =   -251.8 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =   -3.024 [0.0025]** Cox N(0,1)   =   -241.4 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =   -5.283 [0.0000]**
Ericsson IV N(0,1)   =    205.9 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =    2.927 [0.0034]** Ericsson IV N(0,1)   =    195.4 [0.0000]** N(0,1)   =    5.134 [0.0000]**
Sargan Chi^2(161)=   968.03 [0.0000]** Chi^2(20) =   17.828 [0.5987] Sargan Chi^2(122)=   1001.2 [0.0000]** Chi^2(21) =   33.428 [0.0417]*
Joint Model F(161,2739)=   8.5242 [0.0000]** F(20,2739)=  0.89072 [0.5996] Joint Model F(122,2777)=   12.008 [0.0000]** F(21,2777)=   1.5989 [0.0411]*
sigma[M1] = 0.404662 sigma[M2] = 0.339722 sigma[Joint] = 0.339857 sigma[M1] = 0.388534 sigma[M2] = 0.321914 sigma[Joint] = 0.321193
Notes:
1. The Cox non-nested hypotheses  test (Cox, 1961)
This  tests  whether the adjusted l ikel ihoods  of two riva l  models  are compatible. It i s  equiva lent to checking variance encompass ing.
2. The Ericsson Instrumental  Variables  test (Ericsson, 1983) - This  i s  an IV equiva lent to the Cox test.
3. The Sargan restricted/unrestricted reduced form test (Sargan, 1964)
This  checks  i f the restricted reduced form of a  s tructura l  model  encompasses  the unrestricted reduced form including exogenous  regressors  from riva l  models .
4. The joint model  F-test - checks  i f each model  pars imonious ly encompasses  the l inear nesting model .
Note: Shading indicate tests  reflecting models  where encompass ing in not rejected
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%  
 
We focus our attention on the bottom two tests in the output, the results more convincingly favor 
the Gets models. The test of Sargan (1964) checks if the restricted reduced form of a structural 
model encompasses the unrestricted reduced form including exogenous regressors from rival 
models. The fourth test is a Joint Model F-test which checks whether each model parsimoniously 
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encompasses the linear nesting model. Both the Sargan Test and the Joint Model F-test suggest 
that M2 ε M1—i.e., the Gets models encompass their AvER model rivals.
45
 In three of the four 
cases, we fail to reject encompassing at both 5% and 1%. In the case of the 10-year off-the-run 
note, we would reject the null at 5% but fail to reject the null at 1%. With respect to the 
hypothesis that M1 ε M2, we can reject AvER models encompassing the Gets model rivals at 1% 
in all four cases. There is no evidence that the AvER models of macroeconomic announcement 
effects are able to explain the results of the Autometrics Gets models with indicator saturation.  
 
G. Conclusion 
Herein, I have shown that a congruent, parsimonious, encompassing model discovered using 
Hendry’s LSE/Oxford econometric modelling approach with Autometrics and indicator 
saturation can overcome the many inadequacies of the typical static models of US Treasury 
return behavior and macroeconomic announcements that tend to fail virtually every specification 
test imaginable. Further, such modelling techniques are able to expand our knowledge of time 
varying risk premia and asymmetric news responses in financial markets that were previously 
studied within a GARCH framework that offered little or no evidence as to the precise sources of 
the asymmetries. Despite a wide array of macroeconomic indicators covered by the financial 
press during the Greenspan Era at the Federal Reserve, only a handful of 7 or 8 key indicators 
were consistent driving factors in US Treasury market returns. However, other indicators like the 
Employment Cost Index demonstrated one-sided asymmetric effects which appears to be likely 
contributor to the asymmetric volatility and time varying risk premia in this market. 
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 Other related studies include: Govaerts, Hendry and Richard (1994), Hendry and Richard (1982), Hendry and 
Richard (1983), Mizon and Richard (1986), Hendry (1988a),  Hendry (1988b), Ericsson, Hendry and Mizon (1998), 
Ericsson and Hendry (1999), Manera (1995), Florens, Hendry and Richard (1996), Mizon (1995), Bontemps and 
Mizon (2001), Bontemps and Mizon (2008), Ermini and Hendry (2008), Spanos, Hendry and James Reade (2008), 
and Ericsson (2008) and Doornik, Hendry and Cook (2015) 
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Results strongly suggest a place for Gets modelling in financial economics, a place where it has 
only recently begun to be employed. The use of non-nested encompassing tests further 
underscore the relative strength of the Gets models vs. the AvER model alternatives that are 
common in the existing literature. These results underscore the contributions of David F. Hendry 
and his collaborators in the “LSE approach” to econometric modelling school of thought and 
demonstrate the need for better models in finance that may be alleviated by employing modelling 
practices advocated by econometricians doing research in the LSE/Oxford tradition.  
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CHAPTER III. 
A HIGH-FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF TRADING ACTIVITY IN THE CORPORATE 
BOND MARKET: MACRO ANNOUNCEMENTS OR SEASONALITY? 
A. Abstract 
We explore the factors that drive trading activity of US corporate bond market. Prior studies 
have documented a significant response of returns and interest rates to surprises in 
macroeconomic data in the stock, US Treasury and Treasury futures markets. Likewise, studies 
have also documented that trading activity changes sharply, based on informational shocks 
provided by the release of economic data. We contribute to the existing literature by examining 
how both daily and intraday measures of trading activity are impacted by surprises in macro data 
as well as various measures of seasonality. Our main findings are that the thinly-traded market 
for corporate bonds is less affected by surprises in individual economic reports and that the 
market is dominated by day-of-week and time-of-day affects. We find that, unlike daily returns 
on the S&P 500, corporate bonds are sensitive to surprises in both labor market and inflation 
data. Trading activity is affected by absolute surprises in core CPI and nonfarm payrolls, but 
neither core PPI nor jobless claims affect order flow. Perhaps most interesting, however, is the 
presence of “behavioral seasonal” effects associated with the onset and incidence of seasonal 
affective disorder. This “winter blues” effect has been seen affecting activity in equity markets 
by Kamstra, M. J., L. A. Kramer and M. D. Levi (American Economic Review; 2000, 2003) and 
with respect to mutual fund asset flows in Garrett, I., M. J. Kamstra and L. A. Kramer (Journal of 
Empirical Finance, 2005). This is the first study to document such an effect in the trading activity 
in the bond market. Finally, the “loans-on-sale” seasonal effect, first documented by Murfin & 
Peterson (Journal Financial Economics, 2014). 
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        B. Introduction 
In this study, we examine a market that shares attributes of both fixed-income and equity 
markets. We address the determinants of daily and intraday trading activity in the US corporate 
bond market with respect to macroeconomic announcements, seasonality, and aggregate credit 
ratings activity. Thus far, few academic research studies has addressed factors determining the 
dynamics of high-frequency trading activity in the US corporate bond market. Our results extend 
the existing body of knowledge on the mechanics of fixed-income markets. We show that recent 
advancements in the literature that suggest relatively unexplored forms of seasonality exert 
significant effects in the corporate debt market and demonstrate the usefulness of econometric 
techniques typically employed in the macroeconomic literature as being particularly useful in 
this type of financial markets research setting. 
 
We employ the econometric methodology of Hendry, also known as the “LSE/Oxford approach” 
or general-to-specific (Gets) methodology. We show that trading activity in this market is 
affected by macroeconomic announcements, but only to a lesser degree when compared to other 
factors and only when compared to the effects seen to be exerted in other markets.  
 
Various measurements of trading activity prove to be dominated by seasonality of various forms 
– both in the typical form as well as with respect to newer behavioral and structural forms 
suggested in recent literature. We show that the daily and intraday reaction of total trades, 
institutional trades and dealer-intermediated trades are all dominated by seasonality. These 
findings have implications for researchers investigating return/order-flow and volatility/order-
flow relationships in financial markets.  
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Perhaps most interesting in the results is the consistency with the “winter blues” human-behavior 
based seasonal factors of Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2000), Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003), 
Garrett, Kamstra and Kramer (2005), and Kamstra, Kramer, Levi and Wang (2014) are seen to 
affect trading activity across each of our trading activity measures. The seasonal factors 
associated with daylight savings time and the onset and incidence of seasonal affective disorder 
(SAD) are shown to be prevalent for both investment grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) issues, as 
well as within the Aaa rated IG subgrouping. Likewise, we also consistently see the recent 
“Loans-on-Sale” effect documented by Murfin and Petersen (2016) to be statistically significant 
in the corporate bond marketplace, both in “actively-traded” IG and HY bonds. 
 
Numerous studies have also documented significant effects of macroeconomic data surprises on 
returns in US Treasury markets and foreign exchange rates, including Fleming and Remolona 
(1999), Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000), Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), and Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009). 
While equity market returns have also been shown to been shown to be sensitive to these 
announcements by Jain (1988), Fair (2002). 
 
However, macroeconomic influences are not as prevalent as has been seen in prior literature 
from the stock, bond, FX and futures markets. The corporate bond market has relatively lower 
liquidity, slower turnover, and slower information dissemination in the corporate bond market. 
Therefore, it is not overly surprising to see a muted response to macro announcements in the 
corporate debt market, compared to that of corporate equity and US Treasury marketplaces. To 
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the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on corporate bond trading. The relative lack of importance in driving trading 
activity places this study in direct contrast to results seen in other related markets. 
 
We assess the effects of announcements on both returns and trading, using the empirical 
approach of Hendry (1995) and Hendry and Doornik (2014), This general-to-specific (Gets) 
modeling approach is often referred to as the LSE approach or Hendry’s approach.46 We 
reconcile the findings between corporate and government securities and provide an important 
distinction between the behavior of securities in the corporate market – which can be thought of 
as a hybrid market sharing both equity and bond market attributes.  
 
Additionally, as we wish to draw inferences on the parameters of interest, our empirical 
investigation is built on a methodology that requires rigorous model testing to assure a 
specification that is congruent with the local data generating process.
47
 While the empirical 
approach has been regularly used in the area of macroeconomics, it has just recently been 
employed in a number of financial studies. These include: Bauwens and Sucarrat (2010), 
Sucarrat and Escribano (2012), Fratzscher, Rime, Sarno and Zinna (2015). To the best of the 
                                                          
46
 The connection to the London School of Economics is based on David Hendry, Denis Sargan and other 
researchers that were affiliated with the university. Foundations of the modeling technique may be found in Sargan 
(1961), Sargan (1964), Hendry (1974), Davidson, Hendry, Srba and Yeo (1978), Sargan (1980), Hendry (1980), 
Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983), Chong and Hendry (1986), Hendry and Ericsson (1991), Mizon (1995), Florens, 
Hendry and Richard (1996), Ericsson, Hendry and Mizon (1998), Sargan (2001a), Sargan (2001b), Hendry (2003), 
Sargan (2003) 
47
 A congruent empirical model is one that is consistent with the local data generating process. Formal mis-
specification testing can be employed to evaluate model congruence. General-to-specific modeling requires a model 
be free of heteroscedasticity, non-normality, serial correlation, parameter instability, non-linearity and possibly other 
forms of mis-specification. See Bontemps and Mizon (2001) for a formal explanation. 
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authors’ knowledge, this study represents the first application of Gets modeling to corporate 
bond markets, trading activity, and macroeconomic indicators. 
 
We proceed with some insight on the market structure of the corporate bond, providing the 
reader with an enhanced understanding of the setting in which corporate bond trading takes 
place, and by surveying recent research on corporate bond trading. 
   
C. Corporate Bond Market Structure and Literature Review 
To understand trading in the corporate bond market, one should begin with market structure. 
This is because the buy-and-hold nature of the market and the institutional trading arrangements 
that facilitate trading in the market distinguish it from other types of financial markets. Unlike 
the organized equity markets, such as New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the vast majority of 
corporate bond trades occur based on verbal quotations between traders and dealers in an “over-
the-counter” (OTC) market. Historically, this market has been opaque as no mandatory reporting 
of transactions was required. In this particular market, improved data availability is intimately 
intertwined with the evolution of empirical research. 
 
In an opaque dealer market, traders actively seek quotes from various dealers to discover the best 
price available. Market participants may be able to purchase the same bond for appreciably 
different prices from different dealers.  Investors were essentially blind in this market as they 
could only receive quotes through direct contact with dealers. The environment, where 
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information dissemination was historically a word-of-mouth process, is adeptly described by 
Saunders, Srinivasanb and Walter (2002).
48
  
 
Although the New York Stock Exchange does list corporate bonds, the vast majority of the 
market was still “behind the curtain” of the dealer market.49 Researchers were usually left to 
analyze a much-smaller subset of bond data. These included: credit spread aggregates, NYSE-
traded bonds, and several other sources.
50
  However, the market has slowly evolved and become 
more transparent to investors and researchers.  
 
As dealer market data slowly became more accessible to researchers, new paths of discovery 
were paved. For example, the Capital Access International (CAI) bond database is a significant 
catalyst for the following two studies.  
 
From a market-microstructure perspective, Hong and Warga (2000) undertake a comparative 
empirical analysis of liquidity in the OTC dealer-market vs. NYSE-traded corporate bonds. They 
find that effective bid-ask spreads are similar in their sample. They also find that the magnitude 
of price differences appear to be associated with risk and liquidity proxies. 
 
                                                          
48
   For example, see pgs. 96-97 for greater detail. 
49
  This characterization comes from the title of the article by Schultz (2001), discussed later. 
50
  For example, corporate bond market indices from credit ratings firms Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
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In a related study, Schultz (2001) examines trading costs in the OTC market and finds that 
trading costs are lower for large trades. Smaller institutions pay higher trading costs relative to 
large institutions. Further, smaller bond dealers charge more than large dealers. Across bond 
ratings, however, trading costs do not appear to vary. 
 
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) find that expected default accounts for a “surprisingly 
low” percentage of credit spread, while state taxes play a significant role. Risk factors commonly 
associated with equity risk premia are also found to affect credit spreads. We take this factor into 
account in our analyses. 
 
Using the FIPS data set, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) pave the way for future high-frequency 
research on corporate bond market trading activity. In a sample of 50 actively-traded bonds, they 
find that stocks do not lead bonds in reflecting firm-specific information.  They also find that 
earnings news is rapidly incorporated into bond prices, as is the case in equity markets. 
Importantly, the article highlights the connection between corporate bonds and stocks and 
provides an early examination of intraday corporate bond activity on an hourly basis. Like this 
study, we will also examine intraday activity.
51
 
 
Campbell and Taksler (2003) also build on the prior literature examining the connection between 
equity market volatility and corporate bond yields.  Using panel data from the late 1990s, they 
                                                          
51
  Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) use hourly data, while we aggregate to a half-hourly frequency. 
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show that idiosyncratic firm-level volatility explains as much cross-sectional variation in yields 
as do credit ratings.  
 
Criticism of the OTC market’s opacity eventually took root and in 2002 regulations took effect 
aimed at increasing bond market transparency. The regulatory response was a new trade 
reporting system, the “Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine” (TRACE), launched in July 
2002 by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
52
   
 
TRACE was designed to improve the flow of information between market participants, create a 
transaction database that allows regulators to supervise the market, and improve investor 
confidence in the market. TRACE has evolved continuously since its introduction. Initially, only 
500 investment-grade bonds and 50 high-yield issues reported trades on the system. But by 2005, 
information on approximately 99% of all public bond transactions were disseminated via 
TRACE.
53
  As the data history has grown, so has the associated research stream.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious target for research, given the availability of the new data, was in 
investigating the effect of transparency on the market. After all, TRACE data are merely a 
byproduct of a system designed to improve information flow between agents participating in the 
                                                          
52
  FINRA was previously known as the National Association of Securities Dealers or NASD TRACE 
database. 
53
  Source: TRACE Fact Book 2007 – The current version is available at the following url: 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/ContentLicensing/TRACE/P085342 
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corporate bond market. Given the newly available data, that initial studies focus on transparency 
was not surprising. 
 
Two other path-breaking studies examine this effect of increased transparency in trading costs 
and pricing. Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) study show a 50% reduction in 
trade execution cost on TRACE-eligible insurance bonds.  They also find evidence of a "liquidity 
externality" in the reduction of trade execution cost by 20% versus bonds ineligible for reporting 
to TRACE.  Likewise, Edwards, Harris and Piowar (2007) also find lower costs for bonds which 
publicly disseminated trade information via TRACE, and that overall trading costs also dropped 
when TRACE reporting began. 
 
Additionally, Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) examine the effect of transparency on both 
volume and liquidity.  They found that the effect of greater transparency on market liquidity may 
be either neutral or positive. With respect to trading activity, transactions per day did not 
increase during their sample period.  In all but one category, spreads declined on newly-
transparent bonds by a greater amount than declines for non-disseminated control bonds.  
However, it is notable that transparency had no effect on bonds which trade very infrequently.
54
 
 
                                                          
54
  Unlike this study, we do not look at infrequently traded bonds and focus strictly on the actively traded 
bonds reporting to TRACE. However, we encourage future work to see if the effects found in this study do, in fact, 
carry over to bonds that are not actively exchanged in the marketplace. 
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In a related study, Hotchkiss and Jostova (2007) examine the determinants of corporate bond 
trading volume and liquidity based on a large transaction database from the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners. They find that the most important determinants of trading volume 
are the bond’s issue size and age. Also, they find that companies with actively-traded stocks tend 
to have more actively-traded bonds.
55
 The authors focus on the relationship between bond 
characteristics and trading volume, as opposed to time-varying order flow and informational 
effects that we study herein in a time series context. 
 
Pasquariello and Vega (2007) demonstrate the importance of order flow in fixed income markets, 
within the contest of US Treasury securities. But the role of macroeconomic announcements in 
determining order flow of corporate bond markets remain a stone that is largely left unturned. 
One need look no further than Savor and Wilson (2013), who study effects of macroeconomic 
announcements on equity and Treasury securities, to find an impetus for examining the effects 
on corporate bonds. Given that corporate bonds share characteristics of both markets, it would 
not be surprising to find that announcements, shown to be important for both stocks and 
Treasuries, would also be important for participants in the corporate debt market.  
 
We build on both the early literature on macroeconomic announcement effects and the more-
recent TRACE literature by investigating the impacts of macroeconomic announcements, 
information surprises, end-of-year, holiday and other seasonal effects. In the next section we will 
elaborate with a description of the data used in this study, followed by a preliminary analysis 
                                                          
55
  The data covered the period of January 1995 to December 1999, which preceded the TRACE platform.   
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with some descriptive statistics. Afterward, we describe the empirical modeling approach and the 
model structure. 
D. Description of Data 
1. Dependent Variables: Corporate Bond Performance Data & Trading Activity 
Bond market performance data includes daily simple returns on the Bank of America/Merrill 
Lynch Investment-Grade and High-Yield Corporate Bond Market Indexes. These data are 
downloaded from the St. Louis Federal Reserve's Fred database.
56
 For comparison to corporate 
equity securities, we use returns and volume data from the Standard & Poor's 500 Index.
57
 The 
return data are used as dependent variables in preliminary regressions to provide for comparison 
to previous studies and to add context to the trading activity regressions that follow. These 
regressions provide for a basis of comparison to prior literature on market efficiency and 
macroeconomic announcement effects that have been performed in stock, bond, futures and 
foreign exchange markets. They will also allow us to contrast results from trading activity 
regressions and enable us to characterize more effectively the return/order-flow relationship in 
the vast and relatively-unexplored corporate debt market. 
 
Trading activity data were extracted from the FINRA TRACE database.
58
  The TRACE database 
contains transaction data details over a vast set of corporate debt issues. We focus only on bonds 
identified as being “frequently traded” based on their inclusion in the FINRA-Bloomberg 
                                                          
56
  Specifically, for corporate bond market returns, we use Bank of America Merrill Lynch US Corp Master 
Total Return Index and US High Yield Master II Total Return Index to compute simple returns for investment-grade 
and high-yield. These are downloadable from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED Database series: 
bamlcc0a0cmtriv and bamlhyh0a0hym2triv, respectively. 
57
  This data can be downloaded at no cost from Yahoo! Finance 
58
  http://www.finra.org/industry/trace 
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corporate bond indexes.  We use this set of (relatively) active corporate bonds as a representation 
of the ‘top bonds’ that, according to Ronen and Zhou (2013), help facilitate the price discovery 
process.
59
  
 
We believe this dichotomy is a useful characterization of a market that has long been segmented 
into a small group of actively-traded bonds and a larger set of bonds that are largely bought and 
held to maturity. To be sure, Biais and Green (2007) trace back to the early 1900s the existence 
of an “active crowd” of exchange traded corporate bonds and a “cabinet crowd” of inactive 
bonds on the NYSE.
60
 
 
Approximately 750 investment-grade bonds and 300 high-yield bonds were in the Investment-
Grade and High-Yield indices, respectively. We extracted 441 investment-grade bonds and 38 
high-yield bonds from the indices.
61
 Bonds were excluded based on the following criteria; Bonds 
that matured during our sample period were dropped so that trading activity data would not be 
biased by securities that matured during our sample period.
62
 Likewise, we excluded bonds that 
                                                          
59
  Ronen and Zhou (2013) define a top bond as an issue that attracts most of the institutional trades following 
the release of firm-specific information and facilitates the price discovery process. 
60
  See also, Meeker (1922) and Shultz (1946).  
61
 FINRA incrementally increased in the number of bonds reporting to the system during our sample period. 
Therefore, we chose a subset of securities from this universe as described in the following paragraphs. 
On October 1, 2004, TRACE phase IIIa implementation started requiring reporting of all bonds not qualified for 
delayed dissemination. Due to the limited number of speculative-grade bonds reporting prior to this date, we use this 
as the beginning of the sample period. For investment-grade bond, however, there were a sufficient number of bonds 
reporting. Therefore, we use June 1, 2004 as the beginning date for the investment-grade sample. 
62
  This also enables us to test the hypothesis that bonds trade less actively as they age – a phenomena often 
referred to as the “seasoning” effect. We discuss this more completely, later in the study. 
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changed in terms of credit quality between investment-grade and speculative-grade categories in 
order to hold this factor constant.
63
  
 
2. Independent Variables: Economic Survey, Ratings & Seasonal Data 
Macroeconomic survey data were acquired from Action Economics, a San Francisco firm 
specializing in capital market analysis and economic forecasting. Action Economics (hereafter 
AE) surveys market participants weekly on expectations for the following week’s economic data 
releases. We choose to examine labor market data in the form of weekly initial jobless claims 
and monthly nonfarm payrolls and inflation in the form of Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the 
Producer Price Index (PPI) core rates.
64
 
 
Importantly, AE survey data represents consensus expectations for these economic variables at 
the time of the announcement and retains the actual “as-reported” results for the announcement 
date. This is consistent with prior academic studies of macroeconomic announcements, which 
have typically used the now-defunct S&P Money Market Services (MMS) data. This real-time 
capture of changes in expectation is critical in evaluating the information set available to the 
                                                          
63
  Another aspect of particular interest is whether trading activity differs across industry categorization. 
Therefore, we also partition sub-samples of bonds in the financial and industrial sectors for both the investment-
grade and speculative-grade credit ratings. 
64
  “Core rates” exclude food and energy prices which tend to be volatile and have the propensity to deviate 
from the underlying level of price pressures in the broader consumer and producer markets. Economists and market 
participants tend to focus on the core rates as they tend to provide a better representation of the underlying inflation 
pressures. This preference is documented by Forest (2018) and seen in Forest (2017a). 
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market as frequent revisions to economic data would otherwise render use of revised historical 
data ineffective.
65
 
 
As seen in prior studies, we follow the convention of standardizing the surprise component 
(reported value minus expected value) by dividing by the sample standard deviation of the 
surprise. Thus, the regression coefficients on an economic variable can be interpreted as 
expected change in the dependent variable associated with a one standard deviation surprise in 
that particular macroeconomic factor. 
 
In order to avoid omitted variables bias, we include dependent variables that are likely to be of 
importance to market participants. For example, we control for changes in credit ratings by 
aggregating historical US corporate bond ratings changes. The Senior Ratings Table (SRT) data 
of Moody's Default Risk Service were acquired for this purpose. The Moody's Senior Ratings 
Algorithm (SRA) is used to generate the SRT.
66
 The data are split into two series, one that 
aggregates the number of “notches up” of and another of “notches down” for Moody’s rated debt 
issues. A notch represents a level change – e.g., from A1 up to Aa3 or A3 down to Baa1—in the 
                                                          
65
  The data were acquired directly from the company. The Action Economics website is: 
http://www.actioneconomics.com/. 
66
  The SRT's data are recorded as estimated equivalent unsecured senior debt ratings and associated historical 
up/down rating notch changes. While Moody’s discloses that the SRT consists of SRA-based estimates and may not 
precisely reflect the published Moody's ratings (which are based on further analysis by Moody's), the SRT is still 
useful in our regression as a proxy for changes in credit quality.   
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bond rating hierarchy.
67
 Again, to facilitate meaningful interpretations of estimated coefficients, 
we standardize this series by dividing by the sample standard deviation.
68
 
 
E. Preliminary Analysis 
Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics for data within our sample separated into sub-samples 
and based on credit quality.
69
 We find that the investment-grade financial bonds tend to trade 
more frequently than non-financial bonds – about 9 times per day per bond versus 7.35 times per 
day per bond, respectively. In the smaller high-yield sample, however, bonds traded 4.72 times 
per day, compared to 8.01 times for non-financials. Our data sample spans the period from June 
1, 2004 to July 31, 2006.
70
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
67
  Details are provided by Moody’s in the February 2009 Moody’s Global Credit Policy Special Comment, 
entitled “Moody’s Senior Ratings Algorithm & Estimated Senior Ratings.” The report is available for download at 
the following link:  https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007300000572017.pdf. Details of 
“notching” procedures are depicted on page 4 (see Table 1.).  
68
  It should also be noted that the notches down series retains its negativity for non-zero record – i.e., it is not 
in absolute value form. 
69
  We break the data down further, into financial, non-financial subsets. Also, we filter our trade sample based 
on recent research in Zitzewitz (2011) which shows a relatively active inter-dealer market that supports dealer-client 
transactions. The study shows that nearly 40 percent of dealer-client trades are accompanied by an inter-dealer trade 
for the exact amount and often at nearly the exact same second. The filtered trades will serve as a benchmark for the 
degree of dealer intermediated trades, which we will investigate further in the regression analyses. 
70
  The HY sample begins on October 1, 2004. The reason for the shorter sample is because we needed to hold 
the number of bonds constant during the full sample, so as not to distort volume and trade data being reduced due to 
bonds maturing.  
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Table 3.1 – Independent Variables for Regression Analysis 
 
Factor Lag Structure Description Selected Citations
Macroeconomic  
Announcement Day
Contemporaneous, Lead, 
Lag 
Dummy Variables for 
Surprises for Nonfarm 
Payrolls, Initial Jobless 
Claims, Core-CPI, Core-
PPI
Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000), Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003),
Credit Quality Contemporaneous
Moody’s Ratings 
(Aggregate Net 
Notches Up/Down)
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), 
Financial Market Returns Contemporaneous, Lag S&P 500 Returns
Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Hakkio and 
Pearce (1985),  McQueen and Roley (1993), 
Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
(2009),
Seasonal – Month of Year Contemporaneous December, January
Branch (1977), Schneeweis and Woolridge 
(1979), Thaler (1987), Chang and Huang 
(1990), Maxwell (1998),Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2001) , Hansen and Lunde 
(2003).
Seasonal – Behavioral/Mood Contemporaneous
Incidence and Onset of 
Seasonal Affective 
Disorder
Branch (1976), Kamstra, Kramer and Levi 
(2000), Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003), 
Garrett, Kamstra and Kramer (2005), 
Kamstra, Kramer, Levi and Wermers (2012), 
Kamstra, Kramer, Levi and Wang (2014),
Seasonal – Trend Contemporaneous Linear Time Trend
Lindvall (1977), Boardman and McEnally 
(1981), Sorensen (1982), Hong and Warga 
(2000), Cai, Helwege and Warga (2007),
Seasonal – Pricing Contemporaneous
Dummy Variable for 
Expensive and Cheap 
Loan Periods
Murfin and Petersen (2016)
Seasonal – Holiday 
Contemporaneous, Lead, 
Lag
Anticipatory Behavior
Fields (1934), Ariel (1990), Cadsby and 
Ratner (1992), Kim and Park (1994), Meneu 
and Pardo (2004), 
“Set-Up Effects”, 
Delayed Effects
Leads/Lags of Variables Lead, Lag
MacKinlay (1997), Tchuindjo (2015), van 
Dijk, Lumsdaine and van der Wel (2016)
Macro Announcement 
Surprises 
Contemporaneous, Lag
Standardized Surprises 
and Absolute 
Standardized Surprises 
for Nonfarm Payrolls, 
Initial Jobless Claims, 
Core-CPI, Core-PPI
Hardouvelis (1988), Jain (1988), Engle and 
Ng (1993), McQueen and Roley (1993), 
Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998), 
Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998), 
Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000), Balduzzi, 
Elton and Green (2001), Green (2004), 
Green (2004), Chatrath, Miao, Ramchander 
and Villupuram (2012), Beber, Brandt and 
Luisi (2015),
 
Regardless of credit quality or industry sector, trading activity per bond issue appears very low 
relative to equity markets. These bonds are, however, actively-traded relative to the larger 
universe of US corporate bonds. Clearly, the characterization of the FINRA-Bloomberg High-
 72 
 
Yield Index as an index of “actively-traded” issues is relative to corporate bonds and not to 
markets such as the U.S. equity or Treasury markets. 
 
For purpose of comparison, an actively-traded equity security such as IBM regularly trades at 
about 7 million times in a day, or a market volume of about $800 million dollars. By comparison, 
IBM had 21 corporate bonds issues listed on FINRA. Those IBM bonds with a 7 percent coupon 
and maturing in December of 2045, for example, had a mere 25 transaction records during the 
prior month. The number of bonds traded in any single transaction ranged from a low of 5,000 
bonds to a high of 50,000.
71
  
 
According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), average daily 
trading volume in the corporate bond market was $14.3 billion per day during 2008, compared to 
$551.3 billion in the US Treasury market and more than $1 trillion per day in US fixed-income 
markets as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71
  Data are based on price and volume data reported on the FINRA website in December 4, 2009 for both 
equity and fixed-income securities 
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Table 3.2  
 
 
F. Empirical Methodology 
In this section we estimate the effect of macroeconomic announcements on returns corporate 
bond market (IG and HY) as well as for the S&P 500 within a distributed lag framework. The 
distributed lag modeling approach has been common in economics since first introduced by 
Fisher (1925) in the context of business cycles. They have been applied in virtually all areas of 
economics, including: agricultural, monetary, and financial economics. The models are 
particularly useful in analyzing dynamics of economic processes of when institutional or 
technological rigidities are present.
72
 Financial markets tend to be considered to be highly 
efficient – i.e., that prices reflect all past information – and suggest that no significant lags in 
performance regressions on financial instruments should be present.  
                                                          
72
  Forest and Turner (2013) study the application of distributed lag models with respect to estimation of 
cointegrating vectors and demonstrate the superiority of this estimator compared to DOLS. 
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Note that we would expect residuals from estimated models to be normally, independently and 
identically distributed. However, regressions of financial market activity often fail to meet this 
critical standard. In particular, financial market data tend to be plagued with sources of potential 
econometric misspecifications, such as: outliers, location shifts, measurement error, parameter 
non-constancy, and fat-tailed distributions.  
 
In order to deal with these issues appropriately, we turn to an econometric approach that is 
designed to provide robust estimates under such adverse situations. We employ the general-to-
specific (Gets) modeling approach, also known as the “LSE/Oxford Approach” of Professor 
David F. Hendry, which commences from a broad unrestricted model and then employs an 
automated “testing down” procedure which seeks to reduce the model to a statistically valid 
representation of the data generating process (DGP) based on the characteristics of the local data 
generating process.
73
  
 
Foundations of the approach can be found in Hendry (1993) and Hendry (1995), while 
extensions and improvements are laid out in Hendry and Doornik (2014).
74
 Particularly 
                                                          
73
  An extensive review of the Gets modeling literature is provided by Campos and Ericsson (1999). 
74
  Automated model selection procedures have also been examined by Phillips (2005)  
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importance are recent innovations to the methodology, such as impulse indicator saturation (IIS), 
and step indicator saturation (SIS).
75
  
 
Although these techniques tend to be employed in macroeconomics, Sucarrat and Escribano 
(2012), offer an application within financial econometrics. We believe the application of these 
methods in the area of financial econometrics represents a key novelty or innovation in this area 
of research.
76
 
 
The methodology is carried out using the commercial Oxmetrics software, which is designed by 
Jurgen Doornik and David F. Hendry of Oxford University.
77
 The “Autometrics” procedure is 
employed to carry out the automated model reduction process.
78
 We allow for outlier and 
structural break detection employing both IIS and SIS to achieve model congruence – i.e., 
meeting Gauss-Markov criterion. Optimal reductions are sought by reducing the general 
unrestricted model based on the default tests: normality, heteroscedasticity, Chow test, error 
autocorrelation test, and ARCH test.
79
 Target size is also set at the default p-value of 0.01. The 
properties of the defaults are studied extensively in Doornik (2009), based on extensive Monte-
Carlo simulations. 
 
                                                          
75
  IIS has been explored in Johansen and Nielsen (2009), and Santos, Hendry and Johansen (2008) while the 
more-recent extension of SIS is detailed by Doornik, Hendry and Pretis (2013) and Castle, Doornik, Hendry and 
Pretis (2015). 
76
  Extensions can be found in Campos and Ericsson (1999; Campos, Hendry and Krolzig (2003) 
77
  Limited academic versions of the software are available at http://www.doornik.com/products.html 
78  The programs used to run the regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
79
  Normality test is that of Doornik and Hansen (2008) 
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G. Daily Regression Results 
1. Performance Analysis 
We proceed by estimating equation 3.1, in the form of a standard autoregressive distributed lag 
model, ADL(L, J, X) with a constant, L
th
-order autoregressive terms, J distributed lags for 
exogenous factors X. We also add the parameter δk,j and exogenous variable D to denote day-of-
week effects.
80
  
AUTOREGRESSIVE DISTRIBUTED LAG MODELS (ARDLX) 
Equation 3.1: The General Unrestricted Model [GUM0] in ARDLX Form with AR=1 
Δyt = μ+ πt + αyt-1 + βjXi,t-l + εt 
                     
 
                             
 
 where  can be factored into contemporaneous (time = 0) and lagged (time = 
1) components.  
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 Specifically, we include contemporaneous dummy variables for weekdays other than Thursday. The choice 
of eliminating Thursday is based on the existence of a weekly macroeconomic announcement, initial jobless claims, 
on that day. 
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Likewise,  and  may also be decomposed into their constituent 
components. Other exogenous variables, include ratings change data, equity market data, and 
other bond market factors. Behavioral variables,   and  seasonal variables, are 
also included to capture the underlying data generating process and for additional hypothesis 
testing. 
VARIABLES 
Δyt = first difference of return/interest rate variable Yt 
xi,t = the i'th macroeconomic surprise or other exogenous variable x at time t 
SSAj,g = absolute standardized surprise in macro announcement j at lag g 
SSj,g = standardized surprise in macro announcement j at lag g 
 = seasonal factor i at time t 
 = the dummy variable for a one-period-ahead lead for economic indicator j 
           i.e., announcement tomorrow for economic indicator j, or "set-up effect" 
εt  = error term~NIID(0,1) 
and where, 
i  = number of seasonal factors 
j  = the number of macro announcement variables 
g = lag length (lag truncation) 
PARAMETERS 
µ = a constant (mean change in dependent variable (intercept)), 
π = a time coefficient, 
α   = first-order autoregressive term 
   = coefficient one-step-ahead macro announcement dummy variable    
   = coefficient on n
th
 seasonal factor dummy variables  i , 
   = coefficient on surprise in macro announcement  j  at time  g , 
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Results from the estimation of equation 3.1 are provided in table 3.3, where we provide 
parameter estimates and regression diagnostics for three dependent variables: S&P 500, and the 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch Investment Grade and High Yield bond indexes, respectively. 
All variables were included prior to model reduction, with surviving variables listed with 
parameter estimates.  
 
We note that the AR(1) terms are reduced out of all three models – i.e., the returns for all three 
classes of securities exhibit temporal independence. This is a common test of the weak form of 
market efficiency and provides evidence of the efficiency of these three markets. Further, the 
lagged terms on macroeconomic surprises, macroeconomic dummy variables, and absolute 
macroeconomic surprises are all eliminated in the model reductions in each of these markets. For 
the S&P 500, we see that even the contemporaneous announcements are reduced, indicating that 
any significant effect dies out and is not observable at a daily data frequency. This firmly 
underscores the finding of semi-strong form market efficiency in the market for blue chip US 
equities at the index level. But we should be careful not to discount the apparent efficiency of the 
corporate bond market. There do appear to be announcement effects on bond returns that appear 
to be present in the daily data, but the effects do not appear to persist beyond one day.  
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Past research has also confirmed the existence of macroeconomic surprise effects in fixed 
income markets – which affect risk premia such as the inflation risk premium in the Treasury 
market. Yet, corporate bonds are also subject to default and liquidity risks, which may 
complicate things as far as impact of announcements of labor market data such as nonfarm 
payrolls and initial claims. A higher-than-expected (lower-than-expected) result for payrolls or 
claims might increase (decrease) the inflation risk premium, while at the same time decrease 
(increase) the default risk premium. Which effect prevails might change over time, depending on 
whether market participants weigh inflation risk more than default risk.  
 
Because of this, we need to consider carefully the state of the economy during the period under 
investigation. During the period of our sample, real GDP grew at over a 3% year-over-year rate 
each quarter with a maximum growth rate at just under 4.5%. Core-CPI growth increased from a 
year-over-year rate of 1.7% to just under 2.7%. Thus, one might describe it as a “Goldilocks” 
period where inflation and GDP growth appeared neither too hot nor too cold.
81
 Therefore, we do 
not believe market participants weighed one risk much more than the other. 
 
Indeed, regression results show that both inflation and labor market activity had an effect in the 
IG and HY sectors. Surprises in nonfarm payrolls and consumer prices had significant effects in 
the HY sector, while initial jobless claims and producer prices were significant in the IG sector.  
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  This is not to say there were no economic concerns during the period, as clearly some were alarmed by the 
degree of leverage in the financial sector. Yet, these pre-Great-Recession conditions were not fully appreciated in 
the market.   
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Positive surprises in core-PPI resulted in decreased IG returns – which appears to have more to 
do with revenue concerns and was likely felt most in the manufacturing and machinery issuers. 
The coefficient on jobless claims in the IG regression is positive, suggesting returns increased 
(decreased) when claims were higher (lower) than expected. This may be a result of projected 
labor costs as opposed to forecasts of economic growth. While the coefficients may not have the 
same sign as we would expect for Treasury securities, it makes clear that interpreting coefficients 
of macro surprises in corporate bond return regressions is less clear-cut than in the Treasury 
market.  
 
However, the fact that announcement day and pre-announcement day dummy variables are 
dropped from the regressions in the model reduction suggests no “set-up” effects, as seen in the 
Treasury market  by van Dijk, Lumsdaine and van der Wel (2016) in advance of FOMC 
meetings, nor did the mere existence of an announcement yielding a significant result.
82
 Rather, 
it is the information content of the announcement and how that information deviates from 
expectations that is of interest to market participants, as shown in the majority of studies of 
macro announcement effects.   IG bonds also show a sensitivity to changes in credit quality as 
the coefficient on the Moody’s ratings changes is both positive and significant. This is consistent 
with a prior that upgrades exceeding downgrades on a given day is a positive for returns in the 
IG sector. 
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  It should be noted that Heuson and Su (2003), also using the MMS database to explore US Treasury option 
implied volatility behavior, observe an increase in implied volatility on the afternoon of the day prior to 
announcements which is followed by a normalization on post–announcement volatilities return as rapidly as cash 
prices do and that traders are unable to earn arbitrage profits when accounting for transaction costs. 
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In the HY bond sample, core-CPI has a negative coefficient indicating positive surprises in 
consumer price inflation decreased returns of HY bonds. This could be a function of either the 
inflation risk premium or a lack of pricing power that would allow companies to increase profits 
by raising product prices. Nonfarm payrolls, known to be a focal point for bond market 
participants, also has a negative coefficient. This is typically what we see in the Treasury market, 
where we usually see lower-than-expected payroll growth as an indication that inflation 
pressures remain under control and the likelihood of FOMC rate hikes is reduced. Also 
interesting is the significant coefficients on S&P volume and one-period lagged S&P return.  
 
The return effect is consistent with the notion that stock returns lead corporate bond returns and 
may be a function of the increased search time associated with finding counterparties and 
negotiation trades in the corporate bond market. The results indicate, as expected, the existence 
of a cross market effect between the corporate debt and corporate equity markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 82 
 
Table 3.3 – Performance Regressions 
S&P 500 Inv. Grade Bonds High-Yield Bonds
Independent Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant -0.19 0.16 **+
SP_VOLUME -0.04 **
SP_RETURN(-1) 0.03 **+
CPI_SS -0.05 **
NONFARMS_SS -0.11 **+
CLAIMS_SS 0.06 **+
PPI_SS -0.13 **
MOODY'S 0.02 **+
AR 1-2 test: 2.91 [0.0556] 3.04 [0.0489]* 4.55 [0.0110]*
ARCH 1-1 test: 0.32 [0.5707] 0.00 [0.9967] 0.00 [0.9556]
Normality test: 1.26 [0.5327] 2.16 [0.3391] 7.13 [0.0282]*
RESET23 test: 0.00 [1.0000] 0.25 [0.7752] 1.10 [0.3353]
Log-likelihood -487.69 98.34 674.80
Parameters 21 32 70
Observations 541 540 540
** Significant at 1%
**+ Significant at 1% and unanimous selection in terminal models
 
 
Seasonality also comes into play when evaluating market efficiency. Given the assumption of 
market efficiency, our prior expectations for equities are that both seasonal factors will also be 
eliminated during the model reduction process. These priors are clearly met, as all seasonal 
factors are eliminated during the reduction process. This result appears to carry over to both the 
IG and HY markets and is a sign that these markets, despite the increased time to execute trades, 
are still weak-form efficient and that prior price information and seasonality cannot be used to 
predict returns. 
 
But while market efficiency produces strong priors with respect to the performance regressions, 
it offers little guidance with respect to trading activity and order flow. In the following section 
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we extend our analysis to offer insights that illuminate the relationships between returns and 
order flow and draw distinctions between these issues, respectively. 
 
2. Analysis of Trading Activity – A. Total Trades & Large-Volume Trades 
 
In this section we present the regression results for trading activity and can compare and contrast 
those results to those presented in the performance regressions table. Dependent variables are 
total trades and institutional trades for the IG and HY ratings classes. We note that TRACE caps 
volume data for trades at $5 million for investment-grade and $1 million high-yield par volume.  
 
Ronen and Zhou (2013) interpret these large-volume transactions as institutional trades. While 
no database field indicates whether large trades are actually institutional or retail, such an 
interpretation is very logical. Therefore, in the absence of such an identifier, we also tend to 
consider these trades to be generated from institutional market participants. Herein, these large-
volume trades will be abbreviated as “LVTs.” 
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Table 3.4—Trading Activity Regressions – Total Trades & Large-Volume Trades 
IF_TOT_TRDS IF_LVTTOT_TRDS HF_TOT_TRDS HF_LVTTOT_TRDS
Independent Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Trend -2.30 ** 0.19 **+
S_US_NOTCHESNETCHG_1 1.78 **
SP_VOLUME 9.14 **+ 32.77 **+
STRUC_MP_CHEAP 4348.37 ** 33.97 **+ 30.87 **
ABS_NONFARMS_SS_1 -162.05 **+
ABS_CPI_SS 8.96 **+
MONDAY -224.11 **+ -23.05 **+ -8.61 **+
TUESDAY 95.11 **+ 30.89 **+
WEDNESDAY 19.83 **
FRIDAY -443.70 **+ -19.60 **+ -38.87 **+ -10.60 **+
MONTH_JAN 25.42 **
MONTH_DEC -163.40 **+ -15.27 **+ -34.44 **+ -13.61 **
HOLIDAY_NYSE -2369.94 **+ -28.90 **+ -169.80 **+ -29.29 **+
HOLIDAY_NYSE_+1 -413.48 **+
EARLY_CLOSE_NYSE -1885.02 **+ -31.59 **+ -97.11 **+ -32.42 **
SAD INCIDENCE 67.09 **+
SAD ONSET -663.62 **+
AR 1.11 [0.3302] 2.28 [0.1036] 0.49 [0.6118] 1.43 [0.2412]
ARCH 0.02 [0.8759] 1.62 [0.2040] 2.17 [0.1416] 0.90 [0.3420]
Normality 2.04 [0.3609] 4.85 [0.0885] 5.85 [0.0537] 7.34 [0.0255]*
Hetero 0.99 [0.5037] 0.92 [0.5978] 0.85 [0.7226] 1.43 [0.0646]
RESET23 0.20 [0.8169] 6.94 [0.0011]** 0.29 [0.7454] 1.00 [0.3697]
** Significant at 1%
**+ Significant at 1% and unanimous selection in terminal models  
Regression results are in stark comparison to those seen in the performance regression, were all 
seasonals dropped out during the Gets model reduction. The existence of day-of-week effects is 
apparent, with pronounced drops on Monday and Friday in all four regressions.  
 
The well-known January effect, which we trace back to the tax-loss trading rule of Branch 
(1977), appears to reveal itself in the HY LVT regression by way of a significant and positive 
coefficient but does not in the other categories. However, December trading is lower across both 
measures of trading and for both IG and HY bonds. This may, in fact, be due to the trading rule 
whereby securities that have decreased in value during the year are sold near the end of the year 
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and bought back early the following year. The evidence is not conclusive, of course, but bears 
mentioning and deserves continued attention in empirical studies of trading activity.
83
 
 
But while the significance of traditional seasonal factors offer a clear departure from the results 
of the performance regressions, they are far from surprising. The seasonal factors that are most 
interesting, and provide the most important insights relative to recent academic literature are the 
significance of what we call “behavioral seasonal variables” that have only recently been known 
to financial researchers to affect securities markets.  
 
In the table we see that both the SAD onset and SAD incidence variables survive the Gets model 
reduction in the total trades regressions. With respect to the IG total trades, a sharp and highly 
statistically significant decline in the number of trades associated with the onset variable. On the 
HY side, however, the incidence variable survives the model reduction. These results support 
prior academic research that showed evidence of “winter blues” in financial markets. 
 
Still, another seasonal factor of interest is the Murfin and Petersen (2016) “loans on sale” factor 
based on evidence that credit conditions are cheaper during the months of May, June and 
October. We observe IG total trades to be increased by a large magnitude during this period and 
                                                          
83 Another very logical result is the significant drop-off in trading activity on market holidays. This result not surprising. 
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both IG and HY institutional trades are also significantly higher. This is consistent with a 
hypothesis that more favorable credit conditions attract market activity. 
 
With respect to macroeconomic announcements, the results offer an example of the beauty of the 
Gets modelling methodology – i.e., the ability of the methodology to discern an optimal 
specification when competing independent variable definitions are considered in the unrestricted 
model. We notice that, unlike in the performance regressions where it was the standard surprise 
in macro announcements that survive the reductions, the absolute standardized surprise is what 
matters with respect to volume. Thus, the degree to which the data deviates from expectations, 
not the direction of deviation that drives order flow. The LSE/Oxford Gets methodology is 
designed to deal with competing variable definition situations like this and this is an excellent 
example of how it can be used to tackle such problems without experiencing the drawbacks of 
alternative model reduction methodologies.
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3. Analysis of Trading Activity – B. AAA and AAA Financial Trading Activity 
 
For both robustness and in order to examine more-closely the results within specific subsectors, 
we chose to subsample the AAA and AAA Financial sectors to see if results are consistent with 
those found above. AAA, in general, is of particular interest as the credit quality of this ratings 
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 These include path dependency and repeated selection, among others. For more elaboration, see Hendry and 
Doornik (2014). 
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category is considered to be equivalent to that of US Treasury bonds.
85
 Further, the AAA 
Financial subsector would be seen as more likely to be affected by the same factors that affect 
treasury bonds as financial companies often depend on the spread between borrowing and 
lending rates as a source of revenue. We find, however, that the results are highly consistent with 
those seen above. Absolute surprises in CPI and payrolls data are seen to affect order flow – with 
large surprises suppressing the flow of trades—while PPI and jobless claims are again removed 
during the model selection reduction. Seasonal factors for SAD are again significant are the MP 
seasonal and other commons seasonal factors. 
 
Table 3.5 – AAA and AAA Financial Trading Activity 
AAA TOTAL TRADES AAA_LVT TRADES AAA_FINANCIAL TRADES AAA LVT FINANCIAL TRADES
Independent Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Trend -0.54 **+
S_US_NOTCHESNETCHG_1 1.50 **+
SP_VOLUME 21.77 **+ 2.31 **+
SP_VOLUME_1 -20.14 **+ -1.53 **+
NONFARMS_SS 15.54 **+
ABS_CPI_SS -2.11 **+ -1.72 **+
ABS_NONFARMS_SS_1 -20.05 **+ -15.77 **+
STRUC_MP_CHEAP 332.71 **+ 560.72 **+
MONDAY -13.04 **+ -11.85 **+
TUESDAY 14.75 **+ 1.18 **+
WEDNESDAY 1.70 **+ 1.33 **+
FRIDAY -42.71 **+ -34.13 **+
MONTH_DEC -25.36 ** -1.90 **+
HOLIDAY_NYSE -255.93 **+ -227.14 **+
HOLIDAY_NYSE_+1 -39.15 **+ -39.56 **+
EARLY_CLOSE_NYSE -182.78 **+ -118.01 **+
SAD INCIDENCE 2.17 **+
SAD ONSET -71.86 **+  
AR 0.93 [0.3933] 0.25 [0.7809] 0.66 [0.5161] 0.84 [0.4317]
ARCH 0.14 [0.7131] 0.08 [0.7825] 1.06 [0.3047] 0.00 [0.9948]
Normality 3.61 [0.1643] 39.97 [0.0000]** 0.10 [0.9496] 9.10 [0.0106]*
Hetero 0.69 [0.9303] 0.92 [0.5688] 0.96 [0.5515] 1.71 [0.0102]*
RESET23 1.09 [0.3360] 0.90 [0.4056] 4.51 [0.0115]* 0.93 [0.3937]
** Significant at 1%
**+ Significant at 1% and unanimous selection in terminal models  
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 It should be noted that, despite, the characterization of securities of this rating as ‘Treasury equivalents,’ no 
corporation has the power of taxation and would still be considered more likely to be downgraded than the US 
government. 
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4. Analysis of Trading Activity – C. Intermediated Trades Intraday Trading Activity 
Zitzewitz (2011) offers an important contribution to the research on corporate bond trades by 
identifying the existence of “paired bond trades” in the data set that arise as a function of inter-dealer 
intermediation (hereafter IDI) to facilitate transactions between two counterparties. The author finds 
nearly 40 percent of dealer-client trades are accompanied by an inter-dealer trade for the exact amount 
and often at nearly the exact same second.
86
 
 
Based on his methodology, we filter out these intermediated trades and create data series to 
examine in another subset of regressions. The removal of duplicated trades allows us to quantify 
trading activity in terms of client demand. We also suggest that the IDI transactions represent a 
proxy for the degree of intermediation needed to facilitate ultimate demand of market 
participants and represent an opportunity for future research.
87
 
 
With respect to macroeconomic announcements, we see the first evidence of order flow being 
affected by surprises in PPI. Absolute surprises appear to affect trading with a one-day lag for IG 
IDI total trades, increasing the number of trades in the session after a surprise. Whereas, HY 
LVT IDI are reduced contemporaneously on the day of a surprise.  
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  We follow suit by filtering out duplicate trades occurring within a 60 second window. While Zitzewitz 
(2011) uses a more-recent sample, which includes a data flag to distinguish between dealer-client and inter-dealer 
transactions, such flag was not available during our sample. However, the data clearly exhibit an abundance of what 
Zitzewitz refers to as “paired bond trades.” Therefore, we employ the same 60 second filter to eliminate distortions 
arising from inter-dealer intermediation. 
87
  Given the relative inactivity in the corporate bond market, the degree of inter-dealer intermediation likely 
speaks the dealer’s willingness to hold corporate bonds in inventory. Zitzewitz (2011) suggests that certain dealer 
firms are far more likely to require an inter-dealer transaction to facilitate client demand. For example, in Table 5 of 
the paper, we see that Merrill Lynch and UBS have a far higher percentage of “paired trades” – in excess of 50%. 
Conversely, Bank of America and Barclays had pairing rates of less than one percent. 
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A recurring finding across all three sets of regressions is that macroeconomic surprises appear to 
reduce the number of corporate bond transactions. Economic uncertainty may increase the 
difficulties traders encounter in finding one another. Thus, a greater search time may be required 
to complete desired transactions as market participants re-evaluate conditions. Again, given the 
buy-and-hold nature of this market, it is not overly surprising but, importantly, this does differ 
with what we see in equity and Treasury bond markets – i.e., announcements proving to be a 
catalyst to order flow. 
Table 3.6 
II_TOT_TRDS II_LVTTOT_TRDS HI_TOT_TRDS HI_LVTTOT_TRDS
Independent Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Trend
SP_VOLUME 53.386 **+ 1.666 **+ 11.815 **+ 2.469 **+
ABS_PPI_SS_1 45.695 **+
ABS_PPI_SS -1.495 **
MONDAY -0.945 **+
TUESDAY 31.088 **+ 1.148 **+ 4.892 **+
WEDNESDAY 1.244 **+
FRIDAY -78.720 **+ -1.073 **+ -6.958 **+ -1.243 **
STRUC_MP_CHEAP 733.311 **+
HOLIDAY_NYSE -554.854 **+ -3.669 **+ -20.965 **+ -3.626 **+
HOLIDAY_NYSE_-1 -119.735 **+ -1.567 **
HOLIDAY_NYSE_1 227.439 **+
EARLY_CLOSE_NYSE -321.619 **+
EARLY_CLOSE_NYSE_-1
MONTH_DEC -2.049 **+ -4.658 **+ -3.586  +
SAD INCIDENCE -19.671 **+
SAD ONSET -126.954 **+
AR 0.57 [0.5670] 3.58 [0.0287]* 0.15 [0.8575] 0.30 [0.7405]
ARCH 0.13 [0.7144] 1.05 [0.3069] 0.19 [0.6608] 6.06 [0.0142]*
Normality 1.88 [0.3902] 5.45 [0.0656] 8.84 [0.0121]* 9.06 [0.0108]*
Hetero 0.70 [0.9131] 1.59 [0.0509] 1.06 [0.3840] 1.62 [0.0255]*
RESET23 0.99 [0.3724] 0.30 [0.7390] 0.99 [0.3742] 1.45 [0.2352]
** Significant at 1%
**+ Significant at 1% and unanimous selection in terminal models
 + Insignificant at 1%, but unanimously selected in terminal models  
H. Intraday Trading Activity 
The following sets of graphs, offer a glimpse into the intraday trading activity. The set of graphs 
labeled as Panel 1 are for the investment-grade bonds while Panel 2 reflects activity in the high-
yield market. 
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The double humped structure of trading activity reflects a lull in activity during the middle of the 
day. We might consider this a “lunch time” effect. Importantly, however, is obvious diurnal 
patterns that exist in this market. Also, as noted by previous authors with respect to foreign 
exchange and Treasury bond markets, there is less trading activity on Monday morning and 
Friday afternoons. 
Figure 3.1 – Intraday Investment-Grade Trading Activity – Total Trades and Institutional 
Trades 
 
 
Likewise, figure 3.2 depicts the same information with respect to the high-yield market. In both 
sets of graphs, we notice a distinct double-humped camel shape – what is known as a “Bactrian 
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camel.” We can contrast this with the U-shaped intraday trading pattern in the US equity market, 
seen in figure 3.3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Intraday High-Yield Trading Activity 
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Figure 3.3 – NYSE Equity Trading Activity 
 
 
I. Conclusions 
We explore whether factors that drive trading activity of US corporate bond market. Prior studies 
have documented a significant response of returns and interest rates to surprises in 
macroeconomic data in the stock, US Treasury and Treasury futures markets. Likewise, studies 
have also documented that trading activity changes sharply, based on informational shocks 
provided by the release of economic data. We contribute to the existing literature by examining 
how both daily and intraday measures of trading activity are impacted by surprises in macro data 
as well as various measures of seasonality.  
 
Our main findings are that the thinly-traded market for corporate bonds is less affected by 
surprises in individual economic reports and that the market is dominated by day-of-week and 
time-of-day affects. We find that, unlike daily returns on the S&P 500, corporate bonds are 
sensitive to surprises in both labor market and inflation data. Trading activity is affected by 
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absolute surprises in core CPI and nonfarm payrolls, but neither core PPI nor jobless claims 
affect order flow.  
 
Perhaps most interesting, however, is the presence of “behavioral seasonal” effects associated 
with the onset and incidence of seasonal affective disorder. This “winter blues” effect has been 
seen affecting activity in equity markets by Kamstra, M. J., L. A. Kramer and M. D. Levi (2000, 
2003) and with respect to mutual fund asset flows in Garrett, I., M. J. Kamstra and L. A. Kramer 
(2005). This is the first study to document such an effect in the trading activity in the bond 
market. Finally, the “loans-on-sale” seasonal effect, first documented by Murfin & Peterson 
(2014) 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE EFFECT OF TREASURY AUCTION RESULTS ON INTEREST RATES: THE 
1990S EXPERIENCE 
 
A. Abstract 
Herein, I examine the secondary-market response of U.S. Treasury returns to pre-auction 
announcements of supply volumes and post-auction announcements of results from U.S. 
Treasury auctions during the declining-deficit period of the 1990s. Rate changes are found to 
differ significantly on auction days for one-year bills. I also find that surprises in the release of 
bid-to-cover ratios and noncompetitive bidding affect Treasury 30-year returns significantly. 
Other maturities, however, are relatively unaffected. These results suggest that, during the 1990s, 
the U.S. Treasury’s financing operations were conducted in a manner that exerted no more 
pressure on the market than that of many regularly-scheduled macroeconomic announcements. 
The results complement the recent study by Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) and show the benefits of 
controlling macroeconomic announcements in analyzing market responses to Treasury auctions.   
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B. Introduction 
 
Herein, I examine the effect of Treasury auction announcements on interest rates during the 
1990s. While an important recent study by Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) has shed light on the 
behavior of the market during the period surrounding auctions and brought renewed interest in 
empirical work in this area, no recent study has evaluated the effect of surprises in auction 
demand on market rates and returns. Not since Wachtel and Young (1987) and Wachtel and 
Young (1990), has the market effects of the US Treasury’s fiscal policy funding operations been 
taken up while simultaneously accounting for other announcement effects, such as FOMC and 
macroeconomic data announcements.
88
   
 
I pick up where earlier studies left off, the period of the 1990s – when macroeconomic 
announcements were paramount in determining Fed policy and falling deficits reversed the 
1980s run-up in interest rates – I am able to characterize these regime-specific results in order to 
compare findings from the decade before and in the years since this important era. Further, I 
provide a previously-neglected view of how Treasury market bid-ask prices behave around 
auctions.  
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 While an intraday study of the auction announcement response might be able to disentangle the effects more 
adeptly than a daily study, such intraday data are difficult to acquire, particularly over long time periods. The 
emphasis of this study, however, is on variation that persists beyond extremely short windows around 
announcements. The choice of daily data is consistent with the other studies mentioned that serve as a benchmark. 
Prior intraday Treasury market studies include Fleming and Remolona (1999), Fleming (1997) and Balduzzi, Elton 
and Green (2001). Typically these studies are of short time periods, within a single year. The third paper is the 
exception, however, the authors model macroeconomic announcement effects on an intraday basis but not Treasury 
auctions. That study, due to similar time frame, represents an interesting point of comparison to this study.  
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Specifically, I explore several important questions and relate the findings to the aforementioned 
studies. I ask the following: How do returns and volatility differ on auction and non-auction 
days?; How do surprises in auction results impact market rates?; Do Treasury debt funding 
operations exert a greater effect on interest rate volatility than the monetary policy actions of the 
Federal Reserve?; and Do results for the actively traded on-the-run securities behave similarly to 
those of the off-the-run issues?
89
  
 
Results indicate that, even in the declining-deficit environment of the 1990s, Treasury auctions 
had a propensity to move markets – particularly at the long end of the yield curve— at the 30-
year maturity. Here, surprises in auction results demonstrated the capacity to increase returns as 
greater-than-expected auction demand translated into secondary market behavior. However, 
volatility was not affected to any noticeable degree, nor were bid-ask prices particularly 
disturbed other than brief one-day spikes that occur infrequently.  
 
These results have important implications for asset pricing and risk management as they offer a 
sense of sources of jump risk in asset prices. Because effects tend to be short-lived, there is no 
significant effect on conditional volatility and a one-standard-deviation surprise in auction 
demand results tend to pose less risk to market participants than those of a one-standard-
                                                          
89
 Off-the-run Treasuries are the previously-auctioned securities. When a new security is auctioned, it becomes the 
new “on-the-run” security, while the previously-on-the-run issue becomes the 1st off-the-run issue. Barclay, 
Hendershott and Kotz (2006) show that trading volume decreases by more than 90% when an issue first goes off-
the-run. 
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deviation surprise in core-CPI, core-PPI or durable goods report. Surprises in nonfarm payrolls 
and the employment cost index (ECI) are shown to exert a much greater disturbance. 
 
From a modelling perspective, the key contribution is that I show that macroeconomic surprises 
are key variables that need to be modeled when analyzing the effects of Treasury auction 
announcements. Failure to model macro announcements is likely to result in omitted variables 
bias for the parameters in the model and could lead to faulty inferences. Likewise, when studying 
macroeconomic announcement effects, the researcher would be well advised to also control for 
contemporaneous auction results, due to the regularity of auction timing and announcement 
schedules. 
 
1. Treasury market background 
As the broadest and most liquid financial market in the world, the market for United States 
Treasury securities plays a critical role in the global financial system. An active over-the-counter 
secondary market exists with the majority of trading volume occurring between a group of about 
40 primary dealers.
90
 By 1997, an average of $125 billion worth of U.S. Treasury securities– 
about 1.5% of year-end GDP—traded daily in a market that functions virtually around the clock.  
 
                                                          
90
 Fleming (1997) pg. 9 
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In addition to its tremendous size and depth, the US Treasury market plays an important role in 
the financial system by establishing benchmark risk-free rates for a given maturity.
91
 Numerous 
derivative products exist on these issues, and many variable-rate instruments reset based on 
Treasury yields. Additionally, the bills, notes and bonds traded are widely accepted as “risk-free” 
assets as the U.S. Government has never defaulted on its debt – a legacy dating back to Treasury 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s post-Revolutionary War debt repayment policy.  
 
The central role of this market within the financial system illustrates the importance of 
understanding potential sources of disruption. Volatility in this market can easily be transmitted 
to other sectors of the financial market and the world economy.  
 
C. Literature Review 
A number of studies have examined the effect of macroeconomic announcements on interest 
rates, including: Cornell (1983), Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998), and Flemming and 
Remolona (1999). Additionally, Kuttner (2002) examines the effect of FOMC policy changes on 
interest rates while Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) studied the Fed policy effect on equity markets. 
These papers, in general, document the existence of an announcement day effect arising from the 
release of monetary policy or macroeconomic surprises.
92
  
 
                                                          
91
 by “risk-free” we are referring to default risk 
92
 More recently, Nikiforov and Pilotte (2017) look at the distribution of price-endings in the US Treasury market. 
Their  finding is that price clustering, volatility and bid-ask spreads all increase substantially in the minutes 
immediately following macroeconomic news announcements. Each of these measures normalize the hour after the 
announcement. Effects are strongest for on-the-run notes. 
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Other studies examining announcement effects on capital markets include, Engle and Ng (1993); 
Cook and Hahn (1989); Christie-David, Chaudhry and Lindley (2003); Bollerslev, Cai and Song 
(2000); Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001); and  Urich and Wachtel (1984). But almost no work 
has been done with respect to the effect of U.S. Treasury funding operations on market 
behavior.
93
  
 
A natural point of comparison exists between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. Just as the 
central bank is expected to conduct open market policy without disrupting the market, the U.S. 
Treasury is charged with financing its budgetary needs while disturbing the financial markets as 
little as possible. Just considering the incredible size of government borrowings this appears to 
be a significantly daunting task.  According to Nandi (1997), the U.S. government issued 
approximately $2 trillion in securities during 1995 alone – this represents more than 25% of  that 
year’s total U.S. gross domestic product.  
 
The Treasury market also offers us a rare opportunity to examine how an increase in the supply 
of government securities at a given maturity affects the prevailing interest rate – i.e., the cost of 
borrowing.
94
 Two notable papers, Schirm, Sheehan and Ferri (1989) and Wachtel and Young 
(1987), focus on effect of debt and deficit announcements on interest rates.
95
 However, to the 
                                                          
93
 Two notable exceptions are Sundaresan (1994) and Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996). However, these excellent 
articles do not model responses to auction announcements while controlling for macroeconomic announcement 
surprises. 
94
 Supply effects and market segmentation are considered in: Duffee (1996), Simon (1991), and Simon (1994) 
95
 Cebula (2013) explores the impact of budget deficits, but on nominal Aaa-rated corporate bond yields. 
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author’s knowledge, only one previously-published paper has specifically examined the effect of 
Treasury auction demand statistics on returns.
96
 
 
Wachtel and Young (1990) find a small but significant response to post-auction results but no 
response to pre-auction announcements of auction volume. This study contrasts and builds upon 
their study of auctions during the 1980s, when government budget deficits rose sharply, and sets 
the stage for future analysis of the first decade of the 21
st
 century. 
 
A similar conclusion is raised by Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013), who also take up the issue of 
Treasury auctions. They explore the pre- and post-auction price behavior over a 28-year period. 
They demonstrate a general increase in secondary market yields prior to Treasury auctions, 
followed by a subsequent decline. They estimate that this phenomena results in a 9 to 18 basis 
point issuance cost to the Treasury. I choose to complement their investigations by making use of 
valuable market expectations data. Additionally, I try to emphasize the importance of modeling 
both auctions and macroeconomic announcements as there may be a propensity for 
announcements to distort results when not factored into the model. I do not find any strong 
evidence to suggest their results would be altered, however, the potential for omitted variables 
bias is a clear possibility.
97
  
                                                          
96
 We also note that Bahamin, Cebula, Foley and Houmes (2012) provide an analysis of bid dispersion is positively 
related to bid-to-cover ratio but negatively related to the percentage of noncompetitive bids and percentage on 
competitive bids accepted at auction during the period of 1998 to 2010. Post-auction returns were positively related 
to demand at auction and they suggest that arbitrage opportunities exist between the primary and secondary market 
during periods of high demand for US Treasury securities. 
 
97
 Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) isn’t based on a regression framework but, in order to model macro-announcements, 
such a framework would be necessary. I performed tests to examine if results differ when excluding macro 
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The following research builds on the existing literature by focusing on the announcement-day 
effect of Treasury auction announcements. I look at both pre-auction announcements of issuance 
volume as well as auction-day announcements of auction demand. Importantly, I control for the 
effects of surprises in macroeconomic announcements and Federal Reserve policy 
announcements.
98
  
D. Preliminary Analysis 
 
In this section I perform a preliminary analysis by partitioning interest rate dates between auction 
and “non-auction” days. I conduct simple t- and F-tests in order to evaluate differential behavior 
of returns and bid-ask spreads across sub-samples for auction and non-auction days. I look at 
returns for both the on-the-run and 1
st
 off-the-run securities. This procedure allows us to get a 
feel for the difference in market behavior when an auction occurs. One might expect the new 
issuance of Treasury securities to cause returns to decrease as the market digests the fresh 
supply. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
announcements and it does appear that there is a potential for to (perhaps-falsely) achieve positive effects for 
auctions. I believe it is likely that this result is merely a function of omitted variables bias as, without including 
announcement, only a miniscule amount of variation in the dependent variable is achieved (even when including AR 
term in the mean equation). These results are available from the author upon request.  
98
 This is consistent with Wachtel and Young (1990) and Kuttner (2002). The research of Lou, Yan and Zhang 
(2012) provides a number of valuable results with respect to the behavior of the Treasury market during auction 
periods. They also suggest compelling policy implications, based on the cost of borrowing born by the US 
government. Additionally, they examine a very long sample period – from 1980 to 2008. However, they do not 
control for surprises in macroeconomic announcements and monetary policy actions. By focusing on a ten-year sub 
period and by employing market expectations data, we seek to build on the existing literature. By focusing on a 
shorter 10-year period, we avoid potential distortions associated with changing monetary policy regimes across the 
Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke FOMC tenures. 
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The results of t-tests are presented in table 4.1, with returns provided in panels A and B. While 
the increased supply might suggest lower returns on auction days, compared to no-auction days, I 
do not observe this to be the case in the middle or “belly” of the yield curve – i.e., the 5- and 10-
year notes. Returns are noticeably lower on bill auction dates but remain positive and are 
significant at the 5% confidence level. With respect to the 30-year bond, auction day returns data 
are positive on days with no auction, and negative on auction days. However, despite the large 
order of magnitude, the difference is not statistically significant. This may be due to the 
relatively few number of 30-year auctions, as only 30 occurred during the entire decade. Results 
for the 1
st
 off-the-run (hereafter FTR) returns basically mirror that of the on-the-run (hereafter 
OTR) returns for each of the maturities under examination. 
 
Bid-ask spreads are presented for OTR and FTR securities in panels C and D. A logical line of 
thinking in this area might suggest a widening of the bid-ask spread for auction days based on 
the well-documented preference for newly-issued securities, described in Krishnamurthy (2002). 
Indeed, a widening intraday bid-ask spread was documented by Fleming and Remolona (1999) 
on days when key macroeconomic data announcements take place which is statistically 
significant at the time of the announcement. Whether this result applies to Treasury auctions and 
if it will reveal itself at a daily frequency is unclear. Indeed, in  panel D of table 4.1, I see mixed 
results on this front. 
 
While there is a noticeable widening of the bid-ask spread at the 5- and 30-year maturities, such 
is not the case for the 1- and 10-year issues – which actually narrow, but at a statistically 
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insignificant level.  The widening in the 5-year note is statistically significant at very high 
confidence level – with a p-value lower than 0.01 for both OTR and FTR securities. Given the 
tremendous degree of liquidity in Treasury securities, the variation in the spread is small. The 
fact that the widening reveals itself in the case of the 5-year notes at a daily frequency suggests 
that auctions can have an effect on spreads. 
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Table 4.1 
Table 1. T-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Panel A. - Daily On-the-Run Return (Annualized)
Year-Bill# 5-Year Note 10-Year Note 30-Year Note
No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction
Mean 0.0791 0.0246 0.0958 0.2286 0.0987 0.2553 0.1136 -0.2827
Variance 0.0498 0.0181 2.3482 2.0808 2.3185 3.6320 5.4001 6.2183
Observations 1488 81 2402 100 2464 38 2472 30
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0 0
df 106 109 38 30
t Stat 3.40 *** -0.90 -0.50 0.87
P-Value one-tail 0.00 0.19 0.31 0.20
t Critical one-tail 1.66 1.66 1.69 1.70
P-Value two-tail 0.00 0.37 0.62 0.39
t Critical two-tail 1.98  1.98 2.02 2.04
Panel B. - Daily 1st Off-the-Run Return (Annualized)
Year-Bill# 5-Year Note 10-Year Note 30-Year Note
No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction
Mean 0.0782 0.0385 0.0899 0.1818 0.0930 0.1841 0.1035 -0.2780
Variance 0.0268 0.0148 0.8496 0.7376 2.1070 3.5789 5.1986 6.0064
Observations 1412 44 2308 61 2331 38 2339 30
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0 0
df 48 64 38 30
t Stat 2.10 *** -0.82 -0.30 0.85
P-Value one-tail 0.02 0.21 0.38 0.20
t Critical one-tail 1.68 1.67 1.69 1.70
P-Value two-tail 0.04 0.41 0.77 0.40
t Critical two-tail 2.01 2.00 2.02 2.04
Panel C. - Daily On-the-Run Bid - Ask Spread
Year-Bill# 5-Year Note 10-Year Note 30-Year Note
No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction
Mean 0.0176 0.017314 0.0584 0.0625 0.0585 0.0592 0.0600 0.0625
Variance 0.0000 1.39E-05 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
Observations 1430 45 2308 61 2331 38 2339 30
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0 0
df 47 2307 38 30
t Stat 0.55 -14.38 *** -0.26 -0.69
P-Value one-tail 0.29 0.00 0.40 0.25
t Critical one-tail 1.68 1.65 1.69 1.70
P-Value two-tail 0.59 0.00 0.80 0.50
t Critical two-tail 2.01 1.96 2.02 2.04
Panel D. - Daily 1st Off-the-Run Bid - Ask Spread
Year-Bill# 5-Year Note 10-Year Note 30-Year Note
No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction
Mean 0.0148 0.0144 0.0594 0.0625 0.0609 0.0600 0.0779 0.0813
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0007 0.0008
Observations 1394 43 2308 61 2331 38 2339 30
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0 0
df 45 2307 38 30
t Stat 0.69 -10.85 *** 0.36 -0.63
P-Value one-tail 0.25 0.00 0.36 0.27
t Critical one-tail 1.68 1.65 1.69 1.70
P-Value two-tail 0.49 0.00 0.72 0.53
t Critical two-tail 2.01 1.96 2.02 2.04
Note & Bond Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999
Year-Bill Sample: 9/24/1993 to 12/31/1999
Units: Percentage Return  
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An alternative approach for evaluating the differential effect between auction and non-auction 
days is to examine the second moment of the distribution for the two sub-sample data series. 
Table 4.2 contains the results of a test for homogeneity of variance using the Brown and 
Forsythe (1974) modified Levene (1960) statistic. The Brown and Forsythe test statistic uses the 
F-statistic based on absolute deviations from the median, compared to the Levene statistic which 
is based on the sample mean. 
 
Table 4.2 shows variance to be slightly higher for auction days in three of the four maturities 
tested. Across each of the four maturities, however, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
homogeneous variance at an acceptable level of statistical significance.  
 
Although the variance may not differ significantly between auction and non-auction days, other 
factors may be responsible. For example, contemporaneous macroeconomic data which impacts 
volatility may also be announced on auction days. Unfortunately, the Brown-Forsythe/Levene F-
stat methodology does not allow us to disentangle the impact of the economic announcements 
from that of the auction announcements unless we isolate auctions effects from that of 
contemporaneous macroeconomic announcements that have been shown in numerous studies to 
be key drivers of US Treasury market prices.  
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Table 4.2  
Table 2.
Brown-Forsythe (1974) Modified Levene (1960) Test
of Homogenity of Variance
Panel A. -Daily On-the-Run Return 
Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction
Variance 0.1561 0.1763 0.2726 0.174 0.4668 0.4055
Observations 100 2401 38 2463 30 2471
df1 1 1 1
df2 2499 2499 2499
F-Stat 0.040 0.382 1.825
P-Value 0.843 0.537 0.177
Panel B. -Daily 1st Off-the-Run Return 
Auction No Auction Auction No Auction Auction No Auction
Variance 0.0564 0.066 3.5789 2.1447 0.4508 0.3915
Observations 100 2401 38 2463 30 2471
df1 1 1 1
df2 2499 2499 2499
F-Stat 0.000 0.199 2.248
P-Value 0.998 0.656 0.134
Note and Bond Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999
H0: Homoscedasticity
Units: Percentage Return
10-Year Note 30-Year Note
5-Year Note 10-Year Note 30-Year Note
5-Year Note
 
 
However, we may be able to elaborate further, as I can easily identify days when little or no 
informational activity exerts pressure on the market and see if the lack of announcements result 
in a less volatile interest rate environment. Table 4.3 displays results from a three-way test 
adding a sample of “quiet days,” having no auctions, macroeconomic or FOMC 
announcements.
99
 
                                                          
99 In this study “quiet days” exclude days when the US Treasury auctioned the maturities under 
consideration, when the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee had policy meetings or conference 
calls, and on days when no surprise in any of 26 macroeconomic announcements tracked by MMS occur. 
The announcement series are as follows: auto sales, business inventories, capacity utilization, consumer 
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Table 4.3  
Table 3.
Brown-Forsythe (1974) Modified Levene (1960) Test
of Homogeneity of Variance
Panel A. - Daily On-the-Run Return (Annualized)
Macro† Quiet†† Auction Macro† Quiet†† Auction Macro† Quiet†† Auction
Variance 0.2105 0.1309 0.1562 0.2048 0.1309 0.2726 6.2290 4.2719 6.2183
Observations 1369 1032 100 1431 1032 38 1431 1032 30
df1 2 2 2
df2 2498 2498 2498
F-Stat 1.543 1.424 1.321
P-Value 0.214  0.241 0.267
Panel B. - Daily 1st Off-the-Run Return (Annualized)
Macro† Quiet†† Auction Macro† Quiet†† Auction Macro† Quiet†† Auction
Variance 0.0821 0.0443 0.0564 0.1886 0.1217 0.2686 0.4527 0.3035 0.4508
Observations 1369 1032 100 1431 1032 38 1439 1032 30
df1 2 2 2
df2 2498 2498 2498
F-Stat 1.872 0.082 1.374
P-Value 0.154  0.439 0.253
Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999
† Days with economic announcements but no auction specific to that maturity
†† Days with no auction, macroeconomic announcement, or Federal Reserve Board FOMC Meeting/FOMC Conference Call
5-Year Note 10-Year Note 30-Year Note
5-Year Note 10-Year Note 30-Year Note
 
The table reveals a noticeable drop-off in variance on “quiet days” in all four maturities, 
compared to days when macro announcements occur. Therefore, the lack of information on quiet 
days appears to offer traders less opportunity to revise expectations and discover new prices. But 
we are still unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal variances across all three samples, as 
auction day variance typically falls somewhere between that of quiet and macro days. One 
interesting exception is the case of the 1-year bill, where auction days are the lowest variance 
category for both OTR and FTR bills. Another interesting result, although clearly statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
confidence, construction spending, CPI, core-CPI (excluding food and energy), durable goods orders, 
employment cost index, GDP, GDP deflator, goods and services, average hourly earnings, home sales, 
housing starts, industrial production, index of leading economic indicators, NAPM report, non-farm 
payrolls, personal consumption expenditures, personal income, PPI, core-PPI (excluding food and 
energy), retail sales, x-autos retail sales (excluding auto sales), and the unemployment rate.  
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insignificant, is the case of the 10-year note. For that maturity, auction days have the highest 
variance. It should be noted that the year bill auctions tended to be large and frequent, while the 
10-year note auctions were generally smaller and less frequent offerings. 
 
What is critical to take from these results is that simply designating trading days into quiet-, 
macro- and auction-day categories and testing variance is not enough to tell whether auctions 
exert significant volatility effects on markets. Therefore, I am not yet able to judge how much 
auctions affect volatility in Treasury bond returns. 
 
 However, the Treasury market literature does offer some guide as to how best to proceed and 
better evaluate the role of auctions in a more meaningful way. An extensive literature documents 
the important role that information content of macroeconomic announcements play in 
determining return behavior. Therefore, the potential benefits seem obvious for taking both the 
information content of macro and auction announcements as well as the market’s expectation at 
the time of announcement. To effectively evaluate the effect of Treasury auctions on rates, a 
more detailed and sophisticated analysis is required. 
 
In the following sections I consider the market’s response to the information content provided in 
post-auction results from a more technical perspective. I begin in section II by introducing the 
information provided in these announcements. I provide details of Treasury auction 
announcements that market participants rely on, offer descriptive data to convey a historical 
 109 
 
perspective of auction behavior during the period under investigation, and propose a solution to 
modeling auction expectations to facilitate the GARCH models that will ultimately be used to 
perform the main analyses of this study. The goal is to perform the study while taking the most 
relevant market factors into consideration. Results up to this point clearly demonstrate that 
disentangling macro-announcement effects from auction effects is difficult. Thus, I shall 
incorporate both into the analysis. 
 
E. Auction Statistics of Interest 
 
We often assess the level of auction demand by analyzing statistics that are made available by 
the US Treasury following each auction. Such information is released shortly after the auction 
close through the wire services and can be found the following day in the Wall Street Journal.
100
  
This release includes statistics such as the auction yield, bid-to-cover ratio, and amount of 
noncompetitive bids.  The latter two measures offer market participants insight into the level of 
demand during the auction process and tend to be the most widely-reported and followed of the 
statistical release. 
 
We would expect this information to be relevant to those trading in the secondary market, 
especially in cases when a surprise in auction demand is conveyed. Indeed, the financial press 
often relates post auction performance to signals provided in the auction results. On November 5, 
1998, Gregory Zuckerman of the Wall Street Journal reported the following:  
                                                          
100
 Historical data are available via www.treasurydirect.gov 
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“The tone in the market was badly hurt by an auction of $12 billion of 10-year that 
proved ‘just terrible’ in the words of a trader. The bid-to-cover ratio, or ratio of 
bids to available securities, was just 1.52, well below the average of 2.3 from the 
past dozen auctions and the lowest in 20 years, according to Goldman Sachs.”101 
 
The author clearly suggests that market participants benchmark auction statistics based on the 
trend they have observed for recent auctions at a given maturity.  
 
Likewise, market analysts often view noncompetitive bidding as an indication of demand for the 
new issue. On May 10, 2000, Sonoko Setaishi of the Wall Street Journal quoted a bond trader’s 
post-auction assessment:
102
  
“’Strong ‘noncomps’ offset the bid-to-cover ratio,’” 
This is another example of how practitioners adapt to information from the auction bidding 
process. It is indicative of how the market also uses noncompetitive bidding as a measure of 
auction demand. Further, it shows that the surprise in one of the post-auction statistics (in this 
case: bid-to-cover ratio) can potentially be offset by another statistic (noncompetitive bids) – 
suggesting we should model both. But how exactly are these statistics defined? 
                                                          
101 “Prices of Treasury Bonds are Sent Tumbling by Stocks’ Strength, Fed Worries, Weak Auction” By Gregory Zuckerman. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern Edition). Nov. 5, 1998, 
pg. 1 
 
102
The trader was Yasunori Sugi of Fuji Bank Ltd. 
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The bid-to-cover ratio is defined as total auction bids divided by the accepted bids.  This is the 
most popular auction demand statistic by the financial wire services and convention suggests that 
higher ratios indicate stronger demand. 
 
Noncompetitive bids are typically made by individual investors or small banks as opposed to the 
primary dealers that actively compete in the auctions.  A high level of noncompetitive bids 
indicate strength in underlying retail demand, which suggests that dealers will have an easier 
time re-selling the supply purchased at the auction.
103
  
 
To convey some basic information about the auction process, descriptive statistics for auction 
results are provided in table 4.4 below. We see that the average bid-to-cover ratio decreases as 
we move from the bill sector, where auctions are 2.20 times “oversubscribed” on average, to the 
30-year bond, averaging only 1.27.
104
 Furthermore, the standard deviation of this statistic also 
decreases with term to maturity. Shorter maturities tend to be auctioned in higher volumes and 
are auctioned more frequently, as well. 
 
                                                          
103 Fleming (2003), Fleming and Rosenberg (2007), and Lou, Yan and Zhang (2012) provide excellent 
discussions of the inner workings of the Treasury market in relation to Treasury auctions and primary 
dealers. 
104
 By oversubscribed, we simply are looking at the excess of the bid‐ to‐ cover above 1 – where bids submitted 
would be exactly equal to those accepted. For example, if the coverage ratio is 3.20, oversubscription be 2.20 = 
(3.20‐ 1). 
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In table 4.4, demand appears to be higher for the short-term sector, although less consistent. 
Incorporating the level of demand achieved in the auction process may provide a more robust 
analysis of the announcement effect as clearly all auctions do not result in the same level of 
activity. 
Table 4.4  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: Auction Results
Issue  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. Obs.
Auction Size 30-Year Bond 10.43 10.00 12.00 8.25 0.85 30
($ Billion) 10-Year Note 11.48 11.88 14.00 10.00 1.06 42
5-Year Note 11.10 11.00 16.00 3.00 1.73 100
1-Year Note 14.82 15.25 19.44 10.00 3.58 82
Bid-to-Cover 30-Year Bond 2.27 2.32 2.82 1.48 0.35 30
10-Year Note 2.33 2.36 3.15 1.52 0.39 42
5-Year Note 2.64 2.61 3.76 1.74 0.44 100
1-Year Note 3.20 3.03 6.44 2.08 0.80 82
Noncomps 30-Year Bond 320.07 327.00 937.00 47.00 168.81 30
($ Million) 10-Year Note 437.45 449.00 754.00 55.00 197.85 42
5-Year Note 569.40 552.50 1,172.00 169.00 216.07 100
1-Year Note 897.18 917.25 1,643.90 347.00 231.36 82
Note and Bond Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999
Bill Sample:  9/23/1993 012/31/1999
-+ 
Unlike the case of macroeconomic announcements, where numerous sources publish surveys of 
market consensus, no source provides market expectations estimates for auction demand 
statistics. Market participants must rely on past auctions as a benchmark for auction demand or 
else for alternative metrics for projecting auction outcomes. Using time-series forecasts of post-
auction statistics, however, we are able to quantify auction expectations based on the information 
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available to traders prior to the auction and thereby evaluate the impact of a surprise auction 
outcome on interest-rate levels and volatility.
105
 
 
Therefore, I construct time series models for the auction variables using standard Box-Jenkins 
ARIMA methods with exogenous regressors. Note, the goal here is not to create a model that 
captures the most variation in the dependent variable. In fact, overfitting would undermine the 
forthcoming analysis. Rather, what I seek is to create a reasonable proxy for the market 
expectation for the auction result. Our proxy is based on the trend from prior auctions as well as 
other information available to market participants at the time of the auction. The structure of 
these models is summarized in table 4.5. Final model structure was determined by parsimonious 
inclusion of predictors based on Akaike information criteria.  
Table 4.5  
 
Table 5. Time Series Models for Auction Statistics
Model Regressors
Bid-to-Cover ARIMAX(p,d,q,x)      X     Adj. R^2 F-statistic Prob. (F-stat.) DW Adj. Obs. MAPE
1-Year Bill (2,0,0,1) A 0.461 18.267 0.000 2.042 82 13.7
5-Year Note (1,0,1,1) A 0.251 12.044 0.000 2.056 100 12.1
10-Year Note (1,1,0,0) N/A 0.246 7.670 0.002 2.305 42 16.6
30-Year Bond (0,1,1,0) N/A 0.352 8.884 0.001 1.980 30 13.0
Noncomps ARIMAX(p,d,q,x)      X     Adj. R^2 F-statistic Prob. (F-stat.) DW Adj. Obs. MAPE
1-Year Bill (1,0,0,0) N/A 0.679 86.782 0.000 1.781 82 10.9
5-Year Note (1,0,0,1) A 0.620 54.911 0.000 1.888 100 20.7
10-Year Note (1,0,1,0) N/A 0.627 23.997 0.000 1.872 42 34.7
30-Year Bond (1,1,0,0) N/A 0.127 3.100 0.061 2.172 30 34.3
Note and Bond Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999 A= auction volume
Bill Sample:  9/23/1993 012/31/1999 N/A = no exogenous regressors
 
                                                          
105
 Wachtel and Young (1990) also use Box-Jenkins methods to model auction expectations. 
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Table 4.5 displays ARIMAX time-series models used to forecast expected bid-to-cover ratios 
and noncompetitive bids. The models have autoregressive order p, order of integration d, 
moving-average order q, and x exogenous predictors. Exogenous predictors include the 
previously-announced auction volume. The majority of the models have a single AR parameter 
but several have I(1) structure and/or MA terms. 
 
Combining our forecasts for auction variables with forecasts for macroeconomic variables, I am 
able to disentangle the effects of contemporaneous announcement effects and thereby obtain a 
clearer picture of the pressure that the auctions exert on the market. As a result, we are better 
able to assess the true impact of auctions on the market, gauge the relative importance of auction 
announcements relative to macro announcements, and discern which auction statistics hold the 
most weight with market participants.
106
 
 
 
F. Announcement Effects – Post-Auction Statistics 
 
In this section I present regression results from GARCH-X models of Treasury security returns 
on auction statistics, macro announcements, fed funds policy and dummy variables for quiet 
days.
107
 The GARCH(1,1) specification includes a single ARCH term and a single GARCH 
term.  I present the model below, followed by a table explaining variables and coefficients. The 
model takes the following form: 
                                                          
106
 Based on coverage in the financial press, it would seem that there is a preference for the bid-to-cover ratio. 
107
 This is simply a standard generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model with additional 
exogenous mean and variance regressors. 
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Here, Rt is one-day total return on the Treasury security at time t. I include 4 auction variables, 
Xi,t, which are standardized surprise variables for the bid-to-cover ratio, volume of 
noncompetitive bids and two (1,0) dummy variable series indicating announcements of increased 
or decreased volume, respectively. Zi,t is the standardized surprise in economic indicator i at time 
t, Ft is the surprise in the federal funds rate in basis points and ɛt is the residual at time t.
108
 
Standardized surprises in economic indicators are calculated by subtracting the expected value of 
the economic variable from the as-reported result from the official release and dividing by the 
sample standard deviation. Standardization allows us to easily asses the return associated with a 
one standard deviation surprise in an auction or macroeconomic variable.
109
  
 
 
Model 4.1 
 
                                                          
108
 The federal funds rate surprise data are provided by Kuttner, surprises are measured in the (unstandardized) basis 
point difference between the announced funds rate minus the futures market implied funds rate. Further details are 
available in: Kuttner (2001)  
109
 Fed Funds surprise data are unstandardized. 
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Survey data are from Standard & Poor’s MMS and have been widely used in the existing 
literature as the basis for estimating standardized surprises in macroeconomic data. The OTR and 
FTR U.S. Treasury return data are created from the CRSP Daily Treasury database.
110
 Treasury 
auction results were compiled from the Treasury Direct website and checked against Bloomberg 
and the Wall Street Journal. The choice of Treasury security maturities analyzed reflect those 
government issues that were auctioned throughout the entire span of the decade, as some 
maturities were eliminated as government borrowing decreased.
111
 I provide maturities across the 
yield curve to enable analysis from the “preferred habitat” and “segmented market” perspective 
as it is often suggested that certain maturities attract a specific clientele as existence of such 
effects could reveal itself in differences in behavior at different maturities. I proceed with an 
analysis of the results for the mean equations for OTR and FTR returns, then continue with 
additional tests associated with the variance equations. 
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 The data are available to paid subscribers on WRDS at https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/index.cfm?  
111
 Additionally, the 2-year note was not included, partly due to the Salomon Brothers scandal during May of 1991 
which led to a disruption in the aftermarket supply for that particular issue. The 2-year note is studied extensively in 
the important recent article by Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013). I sought to complement their study, focusing on a 
particular time period when US federal budget deficits were declining to offer a contrast to their findings. Given the 
focus I place on macroeconomic announcements, and due to lack of macro announcement survey data in the period 
after that investigated in this study, I leave the longer time period for future study if such data becomes available. 
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Table 4.6 
Table 6. - GARCH(1,1) Regressions on Daily On-the-Run Returns
Treasury Rates and Auction Results 1990 - 1999
GARCH(1,1) estimates based on Student's t distribution
         One-Year Bill#     Five-Year Note      Ten-Year Note      30-Year Bond
Auction Announcement Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val.
θ1 Bid-to-Cover Surprise 0.003 0.864 0.542 0.000 ** -0.197 0.304 0.615 0.118  
θ2 Noncomps Surprise -0.001 0.966 0.106 0.474 -0.244 0.308 0.742 0.075 *
θ3 Decrease Dummy -0.063 0.006 ** 0.141 0.646 0.476 0.510 -0.792 0.497
θ4 Increase Dummy -0.044 0.036 ** 0.013 0.969 -0.105 0.746 0.183 0.800  
Economic Indicators Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val.
λ1 Capacity -0.075 0.000 ** -0.296 0.007 ** -0.286 0.008 ** -0.457 0.010 **
λ2 Confidence -0.051 0.001 ** -0.543 0.000 ** -0.530 0.000 ** -0.760 0.000 **
λ3 CPI (Core) -0.096 0.000 ** -0.614 0.000 ** -0.613 0.000 ** -0.842 0.000 **
λ4 Durable Goods -0.044 0.055 * -0.439 0.000 ** -0.476 0.000 ** -0.749 0.000 **
λ5 ECI -0.079 0.000 ** -1.127 0.000 ** -1.022 0.000 * -1.717 0.000 **
λ6 Hourly Earnings -0.083 0.000 ** -0.679 0.000 ** -0.699 0.000 ** -0.835 0.000 **
λ7 NAPM -0.083 0.000 ** -0.753 0.000 ** -0.723 0.000 ** -1.037 0.000 **
λ8 Nonfarm Payrolls -0.135 0.000 ** -0.727 0.000 ** -0.722 0.000 ** -1.155 0.000 **
λ9 PPI (Core) -0.010 0.498 -0.385 0.001 ** -0.385 0.001 ** -0.735 0.000 **
λ10 Retail Sales -0.057 0.002 ** -0.297 0.007 ** -0.297 0.006 ** -0.440 0.012 **
λ11 Unemployment 0.056 0.001 ** 0.173 0.087 * 0.175 0.087 * 0.114 0.426
ϕ Fed Funds Rate -0.020 0.000 ** -0.059 0.000 ** -0.058 0.000 ** -0.081 0.000 **
γ Quiet Day 0.021 0.004 ** -0.104 0.055 * -0.108 0.046 ** -0.237 0.005 **
μ Constant 0.067 0.000 ** 0.171 0.000 ** 0.172 0.000 ** 0.242 0.000 **
ω C 0.017 0.000 ** 0.097 0.013 ** 0.079 0.034 ** 0.048 0.414
α RESID(-1)^2 0.167 0.000 ** 0.036 0.000 ** 0.039 0.000 ** 0.029 0.000 **
β GARCH(-1) 0.401 0.000 ** 0.939 0.000 ** 0.935 0.000 ** 0.956 0.000 **
δ1 BILL_1_AUC_DUM -0.007 0.201 -0.254 0.164 0.027 0.913 0.751 0.173
δ2 FEDCALLORMEET 0.011 0.269 -0.069 0.667 -0.041 0.809 -0.318 0.290
δ3 QUIET_DAY -0.009 0.000 ** -0.074 0.223 -0.052 0.385 0.073 0.510
τ T-DIST. DOF 4.095 0.000 ** 6.507 0.000 ** 6.461 0.000 ** 8.159 0.000 **
Durbin Watson 2.32 1.86 1.86 1.94
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Log likelihood 716.96 -4362.85 -4372.44 -5464.37
Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999
# One-Year Bil l  Sample:9/24/1993 to 12/31/1999
** 5% Significance
* 10% Significance  
The results from GARCH estimation of OTR securities are provided in table 4.6. and show 
positive mean equation coefficients on the bid-to-cover ratio for three of the four maturities; The 
five-year note coefficient, however, is the only one that achieves a reasonable degree of 
statistical significance – although the 30-year bond has a p-value of 0.118, and warrant some 
degree of attention given the relative infrequency of bond auctions. The sign of the coefficients 
are consistent with prior expectation that a larger-than-expected coverage ratio indicates strong 
demand which causes the market to rally (prices rise as yields decline). The magnitude of the 
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bid-to-cover surprise on the 5-year note is similar, in absolute terms, to that of consumer 
confidence and greater than that of the unemployment rate, core-PPI, durable goods orders and 
capacity utilization. Employment cost index and nonfarm payrolls are much larger in magnitude. 
 
With respect to surprises in noncompetitive bidding, the 30-year bond coefficient has the 
expected sign but, again, is only significant at the 10% level – with a p-value of 0.075. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is similar, in absolute value, to that of core-CPI, core-PPI, consumer 
confidence and hourly earnings. It exceeds that of indicators, such as: capacity utilization and 
retail sales. Three key economic indicators appeared to be much more important to the market: 
the employment cost index, nonfarm payrolls, and the diffusion index produced by the National 
Association of Purchasing Managers.
112
 These three reports were known to be favorites of then-
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who was a macroeconomic forecaster prior to his 
tenure at the Fed. Other maturities are highly insignificant and only the 5-year note has the 
expected sign. 
 
Overall, the results are consistent with Wachtel and Young (1990) in that surprises in auction 
results can have an effect on Treasury returns but results are not necessarily consistent across 
different maturities.
113
 However, the lack of significance in the case of noncompetitive bids may 
be an indicator that this measure has fallen out of favor with market participants since the 1980s 
when they performed their study. Additionally, the 1990s was a declining deficit period, as 
opposed to the skyrocketing deficit decade of the 1980s. As a result, noncompetitive bidding data 
may have been less of a factor. 
                                                          
112
 The National Association of Purchasing Managers has been renamed the Institute for Supply Managers or ISM.  
113
 Wachtel and Young (1990) model the change in yield, as opposed to return. 
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Turning our attention to the coefficients on auction volume increases and decreases, we can 
compare results to two earlier studies. Wachtel and Young (1990) found that neither auction 
volume levels nor surprises in auction volume had a significant effect on Treasuries during the 
1980s. Yet, in a similar study, Wachtel and Young (1987) find that government deficit 
announcements significantly affect rates. This is not necessarily surprising, given that increased 
government spending and lower marginal tax rates in the 1980s sent the deficit on a steady 
upward trajectory. But while their earlier study showed a general sensitivity to higher-than-
expected deficits, the effect appeared to be fully priced into the market by the time the Treasury 
announced how much they would borrow at each maturity. I find that only the 1-year bill appears 
to be significantly affected by increases or decreases in auction volume on auction days, yet both 
have a negative sign. This is counterintuitive, yet may be a result of the Treasury changing 
auction frequency as deficits improved. Perhaps even more important, is the Long-Term Capital 
Management and Asian Currency crises and the resulting spike in demand for short-term T-bills. 
We will see additional evidence of this in the bid-ask spread behavior during the crisis period.  
 
Table 4.7 provides results for the FTR Treasury securities. The results largely mirror those 
presented in the OTR return regressions. This shows that, despite the literature showing that 
market participants have a strong preference for the OTR securities, returns and volatility behave 
in the same manner with respect to Treasury auctions. While most of the trading volume is in the 
OTR securities, FTR security return regressions produce highly similar coefficients. 
Interestingly, improved statistical significance is seen for the bid-to-cover ratio on the FTR 30-
year bond, with a p-value of 0.082. The bid-to-cover coefficient for the FTR 5-year note is nearly 
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half that of its OTR counterpart. However, the decrease in the magnitude of the macroeconomic 
data surprises are also greatly reduced in the FTR regressions. The ranking of the relative 
absolute magnitude of coefficients, however, is well preserved.   
Table 4.7  
Table 7. - GARCH(1,1) Regressions on Daily 1st Off-the-Run Returns
Treasury Rates and Auction Results 1990 - 1999
GARCH(1,1) estimates based on Student's t distribution
         One-Year Bill#     Five-Year Note      Ten-Year Note      30-Year Bond
Auction Announcement Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val.
θ1 Bid-to-Cover Surprise 0.009 0.588 0.300 0.000 ** -0.119 0.506 0.483 0.082 *
θ2 Noncomps Surprise 0.007 0.686 0.057 0.539 -0.207 0.368 0.595 0.047 **
θ3 Decrease Dummy -0.047 0.022 ** 0.106 0.569 0.378 0.612 -0.923 0.305
θ4 Increase Dummy -0.044 0.054 * 0.144 0.565 -0.151 0.628 -0.071 0.904  
Economic Indicators Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val. Coeff.          P-val.
λ1 Capacity -0.067 0.000 ** -0.161 0.019 ** -0.289 0.006 ** -0.417 0.028 **
λ2 Confidence -0.040 0.001 ** -0.361 0.000 ** -0.514 0.000 ** -0.742 0.000 **
λ3 CPI (Core) -0.080 0.000 ** -0.434 0.000 ** -0.579 0.000 ** -0.846 0.000 **
λ4 Durable Goods -0.032 0.083 * -0.299 0.000 ** -0.501 0.000 ** -0.787 0.001 **
λ5 ECI -0.112 0.000 ** -0.574 0.000 ** -1.032 0.000 ** -1.389 0.000 **
λ6 Hourly Earnings -0.080 0.000 ** -0.448 0.000 ** -0.634 0.000 ** -0.876 0.000 **
λ7 NAPM -0.062 0.000 ** -0.504 0.000 ** -0.691 0.000 ** -1.026 0.000 **
λ8 Nonfarm Payrolls -0.114 0.000 ** -0.614 0.000 ** -0.753 0.000 ** -1.198 0.000 **
λ9 PPI (Core) -0.014 0.333 -0.217 0.002 ** -0.310 0.005 ** -0.651 0.000 **
λ10 Retail Sales -0.055 0.001 ** -0.181 0.005 ** -0.310 0.003 ** -0.415 0.020 **
λ11 Unemployment 0.032 0.021 ** 0.153 0.015 * 0.182 0.068 * 0.390 0.013 **
ϕ Fed Funds Rate -0.018 0.000 ** -0.046 0.000 ** -0.050 0.000 ** -0.035 0.003 **
γ Quiet Day 0.017 0.008 ** -0.065 0.043 ** -0.132 0.012 ** -0.185 0.028 **
μ Constant 0.071 0.000 ** 0.140 0.000 ** 0.188 0.000 ** 0.180 0.001 **
ω C 0.001 0.039 ** 0.045 0.003 ** 0.082 0.022 ** 3.993 0.001 **
α RESID(-1)^2 0.055 0.000 ** 0.042 0.000 ** 0.038 0.000 ** 0.025 0.054 *
β GARCH(-1) 0.919 0.000 ** 0.932 0.000 ** 0.934 0.000 ** 0.588 0.000 **
δ1 BILL_1_AUC_DUM 0.000 0.943 -0.081 0.227 0.038 0.871 -2.561 0.159
δ2 FEDCALLORMEET 0.000 0.916 -0.047 0.422 -0.018 0.906 -5.502 0.000 **
δ3 QUIET_DAY -0.001 0.200 -0.046 0.040 ** -0.063 0.258 -1.428 0.009 **
τ T-DIST. DOF 5.023 0.000 ** 6.507 0.000 ** 6.656 0.000 ** 3.259 0.000 **
Durbin Watson 2.07 1.87 1.85 1.96
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.07
Log likelihood 920.66 -3085.49 -4279.09 -5503.58
Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999
# One-Year Bil l  Sample:9/24/1993 to 12/31/1999
** 5% Significance
* 10% Significance  
 
While the lack of significance on the 1-year bill and 10-year note auction surprises does stand 
out, it may be a result of several factors. First, the 10-year note was auctioned only 42 times in 
ten years. Therefore, we don’t have a lot of observations, and an un-modeled factors may come 
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into play. I include 11 of the most important economic announcements in the regressions, 
however, there are another 15 that have been shown to have importance to bond market 
participants. Further, every 10-year note auction occurs on a day when at least one of 26 
macroeconomic data announcements took place. Clearly modeling not enough factors trades off 
with modeling too many factors. 
 
Another reason that auction surprise effects may not show up in the regression results is simply 
that the forecasts of the ARIMAX models may not be a good proxy for expectations at that 
particular maturity. The R-squared of the forecasting model for 10-year note bid-to-cover was 
the lowest compared to other maturities. The in sample MAPE for 10-year note bid-to-cover and 
noncomps, respectively, were the highest compared to other maturities. Clearly modelling 
expectations for the 10-year note is challenging. Why might this be the case? 
 
An important consideration with respect to the 10-year note, is the fact that the US Treasury 
temporarily altered their auction cycle at this maturity in 1996 by increasing the number of 
auctions from 4 to 6 times a year, while at the same time lowering auction volumes. Therefore, a 
structural change in the expectations generating process would have to be modeled in the 
ARIMAX model to reflect market expectations accurately, but the change in frequency was so 
short-lived that accomplishing this would be a challenge. Market participants were likely to 
experience difficulty forming accurate expectations at this time. As a result, I will primarily opt 
to emphasize the results at other maturities but present all results in the table. 
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Likewise, inconsistency in the year bill auction regressions tend to stand out when compared to 
that of the 5- and 30-year securities. Note that the auction data series start in late 1993, as a result 
of full auction history data not being available on the Treasury Direct website. Further, the 1-
year bill auctions were cut in size from just under 20 billion per auction to just 10 billion per 
auction at the end of the decade and were phased out completely during the early 2000s before 
Treasury resumed issuance in 2009 during the Financial Crisis/Great Recession period. 
 
Table 4.8 – Additional Auction Descriptive Statistics 
Auction Increases vs. Decreases
Decreased Increased Unchanged Total
1-Year Bill 35 40 7 82
(%) 42.68% 48.78% 8.54% 100%
5-Year Note 9 17 74 100
(%) 9.00% 17.00% 74.00% 100%
10- Year Note 14 6 18 38
(%) 36.84% 15.79% 47.37% 100%
30-Year Bond 4 9 17 30
(%) 13.33% 30.00% 56.67% 100%
Note and Bond Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999
Bi l l  Sample: 9/23/1993 to 12/31/1999  
 
In table 4.8, I provide additional descriptive statistics for announcements of auction terms during 
the 1990s. We see that, despite the fact that total borrowings declined as the deficit was 
eliminated, the auctions that existed throughout the decade actually saw more volume increases 
than decreases. This occurred as auctions at other maturities – e.g., 3-year notes – were 
eliminated. The 5-year note and 30-year bonds were mostly unchanged while auction volumes 
for 1- and 10-year securities changed often. Given this scenario, that we see difficulty in 
modeling bid-to-cover and noncomp expectations for those two maturities, it is not surprising. 
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G. Announcement Effects on Volatility 
 
In this section elaborate on the variance GARCH modeling to explore the effect that auctions 
exert on interest rate volatility. Volatility effects have not yet been examined with respect to 
Treasury auction announcements.
114
 The model bears similarity to that of Jones, Lamont and 
Lumsdaine (1998), who studied the effect of macroeconomic announcement on interest rate 
volatility, in that I allow dummy variables enter into the variance equation of a GARCH model.   
 
The model structure is further modified to accommodate standardized surprises in the mean 
equation, doing so obviates the need for an autoregressive term and, I believe, provides a better 
representation of the underlying error process. We assume the error term t- distribution, with 
degrees of freedom estimated for each equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
114
 Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) incorporate volatility as an independent variable based on implied volatility of 
Treasury derivatives, but to not analyze the effect of announcements on volatility. 
 124 
 
Table 4.9 – GARCH Coefficient Tests 
Tests of Coefficient Equality 
Panel A. -  On-the-Run Garch Equations
Test 1. Null Hypothesis: C(22)=C(23) One-Year Bill Five-Year Note Ten-Year Note Thirty-Year Bond
Test Statistic Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability
F-statistic 2.677 (1, 1544) 0.102 0.605 (1, 2477) 0.437 0.055 (1, 2477) 0.815 2.713 (1, 2477) 0.100
Chi-square 2.677 1 0.102 0.605 1 0.437 0.055 1 0.815 2.713 1 0.100
Test 2. Null Hypothesis: C(23)=C(24)
Test Statistic Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability
F-statistic 4.285 (1, 1544) 0.039 0.001 (1, 2477) 0.975 0.005 (1, 2477) 0.945 1.741 (1, 2477) 0.187
Chi-square 4.285 1 0.038 0.001 1 0.975 0.005 1 0.945 1.741 1 0.187
Test 3. Null Hypothesis: C(22)=C(23)=C(24)
Test Statistic Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability
F-statistic 2.195 (2, 1544) 0.112 0.541 (2, 2477) 0.582 0.051 (2, 2477) 0.950 1.485 (2, 2477) 0.227
Chi-square 4.390 2 0.111 1.082 2 0.582 0.102 2 0.950 2.969 2 0.227
Panel B. - 1st Off-the-Run Garch Equations
Test 1. Null Hypothesis: C(22)=C(23) One-Year Bill Five-Year Note Ten-Year Note Thirty-Year Bond
Test Statistic Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability
F-statistic 0.016 (1, 1525) 0.900 0.157 (1, 2477) 0.692 0.044 (1, 2477) 0.834 2.404 (1, 2477) 0.121
Chi-square 0.016 1 0.900 0.157 1 0.692 0.044 1 0.834 2.404 1 0.121
Test 2. Null Hypothesis: C(23)=C(24)
Test Statistic Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability
F-statistic 0.214 (1, 1525) 0.644 0.001 (1, 2477) 0.979 0.098 (1, 2477) 0.755 15.485 (1, 2477) 0.000
Chi-square 0.214 1 0.644 0.001 1 0.979 0.098 1 0.755 15.485 1 0.000
Test 3. Null Hypothesis: C(22)=C(23)=C(24)
Test Statistic Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability Value df Probability
F-statistic 0.147 (2, 1525) 0.863 0.153 (2, 2477) 0.859 0.130 (2, 2477) 0.878 7.743 (2, 2477) 0.000
Chi-square 0.294 2 0.863 0.305 2 0.859 0.260 2 0.878 15.486 2 0.000
Note and Bond Sample: 1/2/1990 to 12/31/1999 C(22)= Coefficient on Auction Day
Bill Sample:  9/23/1993 012/31/1999 C(23)= Coefficient on FOMC Call of Meeting Day
C(24)= Coefficient on Quiet Day  
 
From Tables 4.6 and 4.7, we see that the variance equation coefficient on the auction dummy 
variable are all insignificant. However, we do find that quiet days tend to have a negative sign on 
the coefficient. The OTR results are only significant for the 1-year bill, but FTR results are 
significant for 5- and 30-year securities. Overall, the results support the Brown-Forsythe tests 
presented earlier. Auction day volatility does not appear to differ significantly when compared to 
macro announcement and quiet days. I interpret the combined results as evidence that the US 
Treasury conducts borrowing operation in a manner that minimizes disturbances to financial 
markets in terms of volatility, despite the increased scarcity of Treasury supply during declining 
borrowing periods. 
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We can further analyze volatility effects by testing variance equation dummy-variable 
coefficients relative to one another – thereby providing a gauge of volatility caused from 
Treasury vs. Federal Reserve operating procedures. Additionally, comparison of these results to 
the earlier results from the Brown-Forsythe tests, to see if the results are consistent when we 
switch to a GARCH model where macroeconomic announcements enter into both the mean and 
variance equations.  
 
I tested three hypotheses: 1.) that the coefficients on Treasury auctions and FOMC meetings 
were equal, 2.) that coefficients on FOMC and “quiet days” were equal, and 3.) that all three 
were coefficients were equal. Panel A. presents the OTR results, while panel B. shows FTR 
results. When we look at these F- and chi-squared tests of these hypotheses in table 8, it is clear 
that we cannot rule out the equality of any of the tests for OTR or FTR notes. However, p-values 
on test 1 indicate that applying a loose level of significance of around 10% would achieve 
borderline significant results for the 30-year bond.
115
 This suggests that, while we don’t have a 
precise estimates for the parameters themselves, that they are equal appears unlikely. Obviously 
we would want to exercise extreme caution in emphasizing this result as it could be completely 
spurious. However it may deserve closer scrutiny over a larger data set with more auction 
announcements. 
 
For the FTR series, results are insignificant other than in the case of the 30-year bond, where 
FOMC and quiet days are decidedly different in terms of their contribution to volatility. Again, a 
nearly significant result is seen between the Treasury and FOMC for the 30-year bond as 
                                                          
115
 The p-value for the 1-year bill is 0.102 but coefficients in the regressions are so insignificant that attempting to 
draw any inference would be highly inadvisable. 
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homogeneity of variance cannot be rejected at a standard level of significance, yet the p-vale of 
0.121 is not far from rejecting the null at the 10% level. 
 
H. Yield Behavior on Days Surrounding Announcements 
 
In this section, I present results of OLS regressions that include additional leads and lags of 
auction day dummy variables, so that we can assess the behavior of interest rates in the days 
surrounding auctions. Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) provide an analysis of interest rate behavior 
over an extensive 28-year period from 1980 to 2008. They present evidence suggesting the 
behavior of rates is consistent with increasing prior to auction days and decline in the days 
following. While their results are compelling and their data sample is extensive, with many 
auctions taken into consideration, other factors, such as economic announcements, may warrant 
consideration.
116
 
 
Employing a regression framework to examine over a narrower time period allows us to see if 
their findings are robust within a sub-sample that could be characterized as a declining-deficit 
regime and would be considered as a likely data range where behavior may have been altered. 
The data from the 1980s are over a rising-interest-rate and increasing-deficit regime.  The data 
from the 2000s, are a mix of the two, with rising deficits and Treasury borrowing but still falling 
interest rates. So we can think of their study as coving three distinct regimes – each of which 
may have different behavior. 
 
                                                          
116
 While they focus largely on the 2-year note, they also provide results showing similar behavior at other 
maturities. In constructing this study of 1990s behavior, I chose to exclude the 2-year note due to possible effects 
associated with the Salomon Brothers scandal. However, 5- and 10-year maturities are common to both studies. 
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In particular, the 1990s were also a period of intense scrutiny of macroeconomic indicators. Fed 
Chairman Greenspan, having been an economic forecaster, was considered a “data junkie” who 
would base policy on a wide range of economic indicators. Macro announcement drove activity 
during this period and incorporating them into the analysis is paramount. 
 
To facilitate this regime-specific analysis that incorporates announcements, I simply re-run 
regressions for the four maturities under OLS with one-day yield change as the dependent 
variables and add three auction day dummy variable leads and lags to the set of independent 
variables from the mean equations in the earlier GARCH regressions. Estimation results of the 
lead and lag coefficients are presented in table 4.10, with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (Newey-West) standard errors and t-statistics.
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Results suggest that, when restricting the sample to the 1990s regime and incorporating 
macroeconomic indicators, there are still positive coefficients in the days prior to 5- year note 
auctions and zero or negative coefficients on the lags. Similar results are seen in the 10-year note 
and 30-year bonds. Signs and significance of coefficients are consistent when comparing 
between OTR and FTR regressions. I conclude that the results found in Lou, Yan and Zhang 
(2013) hold up to the closer scrutiny as including macroeconomic announcement surprise effects 
and limiting the sample to a regime where markets were less likely to be disturbed by auction 
operations does not alter the conclusions of their study.  
 
                                                          
117
 Daily yield changes are expressed in basis points and are not cumulative, as those presented in Lou, Yan and 
Zhang (2013). However, this is done intentionally as it allows us to see if the said declines and recoveries in rates 
around auctions are concentrated in specific days. We limit the leads and lags to three to limit the number of 
parameters being estimated. 
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I would, however, emphasize that including macroeconomic announcement data in any study of 
auction effects on returns or yields in Treasury markets is still advisable, as they have been 
shown in numerous studies to be a primary source of market movement. Doing so may offer 
more robust results, while failure to do so introduces a potential source of error and omitted-
variables bias. Given the near equal magnitude of auction surprises and macro announcement 
surprises and the regularity of auction and announcement schedules, neglecting to include 
macroeconomic announcement variables is potential source of misleading results. Researchers 
would be advised to err on the side of caution and include all variables that are important to the 
data generating process in order to have greater confidence in their estimated parameters and 
standard errors. 
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Table 4.10 – Days Surrounding Auctions 
Interest Rate Behavior on Days Surrounding Treasury Auctions
Panel A: On-the-Run Issues
Macro & Other Variables Included Macro & Other Variables Excluded
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(3) -0.009 0.013 -0.674 0.501 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(3) -0.008 0.014 -0.588 0.557
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(2) 0.013 0.013 0.978 0.328 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(2) 0.015 0.014 1.082 0.279
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(1) 0.008 0.005 1.604 0.109 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(1) 0.007 0.005 1.482 0.139
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.001 0.007 -0.084 0.933 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-1) 0.001 0.007 0.112 0.911
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-2) 0.003 0.006 0.534 0.593 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-2) 0.002 0.007 0.235 0.815
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.003 0.005 -0.539 0.590 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-3) 0.001 0.005 0.091 0.927
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(3) 0.016 0.005 3.288 0.001 ** NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(3) 0.019 0.005 3.903 0.000 **
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(2) 0.006 0.006 1.021 0.308 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(2) 0.009 0.007 1.369 0.171
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(1) 0.005 0.005 0.961 0.337 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(1) 0.008 0.005 1.445 0.149
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-1) 0.000 0.006 0.020 0.984 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-1) 0.000 0.006 0.039 0.969
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.011 0.006 -1.957 0.051 * NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.010 0.005 -1.912 0.056 *
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.005 0.005 -0.945 0.345 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.004 0.006 -0.706 0.480
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(3) 0.007 0.010 0.727 0.467 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(3) 0.008 0.011 0.723 0.470
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(2) 0.002 0.008 0.186 0.852 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(2) 0.004 0.009 0.431 0.666
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(1) -0.014 0.008 -1.818 0.069 * NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(1) -0.014 0.008 -1.784 0.075 *
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.012 0.007 -1.747 0.081 * NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.018 0.007 -2.374 0.018 **
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.011 0.008 -1.383 0.167 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.011 0.008 -1.301 0.194
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-3) 0.004 0.009 0.410 0.682 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-3) 0.008 0.009 0.835 0.404
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(3) 0.013 0.010 1.224 0.221 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(3) 0.016 0.010 1.516 0.130
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(2) -0.003 0.006 -0.457 0.648 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(2) -0.001 0.006 -0.178 0.859
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(1) 0.008 0.007 1.163 0.245 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(1) 0.010 0.007 1.369 0.171
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.006 0.013 -0.481 0.630 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.008 0.013 -0.614 0.539
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.034 0.009 -3.774 0.000 ** BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.033 0.009 -3.486 0.001 **
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.013 0.009 -1.369 0.171 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.012 0.009 -1.435 0.151
Panel B: Ist Off-the-Run Issues
Macro & Other Variables Included Macro & Other Variables Excluded
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(3) 0.005 0.005 1.021 0.307 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(3) 0.007 0.005 1.469 0.142
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(2) -0.005 0.005 -0.876 0.381 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(2) -0.003 0.005 -0.587 0.557
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(1) 0.005 0.005 1.012 0.312 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(1) 0.005 0.005 0.938 0.349
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.001 0.007 -0.202 0.840 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-1) 0.000 0.007 0.067 0.947
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.001 0.005 -0.135 0.893 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.001 0.006 -0.205 0.837
BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.002 0.005 -0.464 0.643 BILL_1_AUC_DUM(-3) 0.000 0.005 0.015 0.988
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(3) 0.013 0.004 3.285 0.001 ** NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(3) 0.016 0.004 4.073 0.000 **
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(2) 0.001 0.005 0.265 0.791 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(2) 0.004 0.006 0.774 0.439
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(1) 0.002 0.005 0.379 0.704 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(1) 0.004 0.005 0.945 0.345
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.001 0.005 -0.180 0.857 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-1) 0.000 0.005 -0.069 0.945
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.011 0.005 -2.340 0.019 ** NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.011 0.005 -2.258 0.024 *
NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.004 0.005 -0.764 0.445 NOTE_5_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.003 0.005 -0.556 0.578
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(3) 0.010 0.010 1.062 0.288 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(3) 0.011 0.010 1.030 0.303
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(2) 0.001 0.008 0.127 0.899 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(2) 0.003 0.009 0.340 0.734
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(1) -0.013 0.008 -1.612 0.107 * NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(1) -0.013 0.008 -1.609 0.108 *
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.013 0.007 -1.806 0.071 * NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.018 0.007 -2.448 0.014 **
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.010 0.008 -1.250 0.211 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.010 0.008 -1.156 0.248
NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-3) 0.003 0.009 0.359 0.720 NOTE_10_AUC_DUM(-3) 0.008 0.009 0.833 0.405
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(3) 0.013 0.011 1.239 0.216 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(3) 0.016 0.011 1.520 0.129
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(2) -0.004 0.006 -0.735 0.463 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(2) -0.003 0.006 -0.441 0.659
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(1) 0.007 0.007 1.040 0.299 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(1) 0.009 0.007 1.242 0.214
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.009 0.012 -0.742 0.458 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-1) -0.011 0.013 -0.873 0.383
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.027 0.009 -2.991 0.003 ** BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-2) -0.025 0.009 -2.739 0.006 **
BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.009 0.009 -1.071 0.284 BOND_30_AUC_DUM(-3) -0.009 0.008 -1.112 0.266
Shading in Std.Error column indicates  the lower SE comparing when macro are included vs . excluded. In 10 of the 48 cases , the lower SE comes  when 
including macroeconomic variables . Only one estimated SE i s  lower when excluding macro variables .
Shading in the coefficient column indicates  a  s ign change compared to the coefficient estimate when excluding macro variables .  
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I. Treasury Auctions and Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
Finally, I provide some graphical evidence to show how auctions and bid-ask spreads relate to 
one another and how this behavior varies across different maturities. The following set of 
graphics provides a sense of how bid-ask spreads vary over time in the Treasury market. The 
signature characteristic of the charts is clearly that bid-ask spreads vary very little in the US 
Treasury market. First I look at the 1-year bill and 5-year note charts. 
 
Figure 1 shows a consistent “jigsaw” pattern in the time series path of the bid-ask spread that 
seems to vary almost entirely based on the auction schedule, with the transition from peak 
immediately following auctions, to trough on auction day. The vertical lines represent auction 
days.  
 
This is a logical pattern consistent with increased supply cutting into dealer profits when new 
supply of securities is auctioned. However, we also notice occasional level shifts, as we see in 
the single transient spike in the early part of the decade, followed by a permanent shift in 1998, 
which may have coincided with either the LTCM crisis or the announcement that 1-year bills 
were on track to be eliminated due to lower borrowing needs during the economic expansion. 
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Figure 4.1 
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The results for the 1-year bill stand in stark comparison to that of the 30-year bond which is 
displayed in figure 4.2. No jigsaw pattern is associated with the auction schedule as the spread 
remains unchanged at the daily frequency for extended period of time. Auction frequency 
changes several times during the sample period and the number of transient spikes increases 
tremendously, with spikes appearing to be connected to the auction schedule.  
 
Where the 1- and 30-year bear similarity is in that when a shift in the level occurs it is either a 
doubling of the spread or a cutting in half. Additionally the permanent level shifts both occur at 
end of sample. Note that the 30-year auction was also eliminated from the Treasury auction 
schedule. 
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Figure 4.2 
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What we can take from this is that the primary market auction schedule and the spreads charged 
by dealers in the secondary market appear to be closely connected. However, due to the depth 
and liquidity of the market disturbances to the bid-ask spread are short lived and episodic. 
 
 
J. Conclusion 
 
The 1990s presented a change of environment in terms of government budget deficits. Cuts in 
spending and increases in tax rates resulted in improvement on the budgetary front, eventually 
budget deficits gave way to surpluses by the end of the decade. This led to greater scarcity of 
Treasury securities. 
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In this study I examine the secondary-market response of U.S. Treasury rates, returns and bid-
ask spreads to the release of details from the government’s primary-market auctions during the 
1990s. In our preliminary analysis, standard t-tests for differences in mean interest rate changes 
between auction and no-auction days show that returns differ significantly only for on-the-run 1-
year bills and off-the-run 5-year notes. Longer maturities did not reveal differences in mean 
returns.   
 
However, Brown and Forsyth’s F-test of homogeneity of variance indicate no significant effects 
stemming from the existence of Treasury auctions. I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
homogeneous variance, even when partitioning the sample into auction-, announcement-, and 
“quiet” days. However, these results do not account for surprises in contemporaneous 
macroeconomic announcement effects, nor do they take into account the information content of 
the auction results.  This strongly suggests that a more sophisticated analysis would be required 
to assess more carefully if Treasury auction operations represent a substantial source of 
disruption to the market. 
 
I proceed by adopting a GARCH model to control for other important announcements including 
both macroeconomic reports and Federal Reserve target rate changes. In doing so, we are better-
equipped to evaluate the significance of specific auction demand statistics and are able to 
compare the effects of Treasury fiscal policy funding operations to the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy operations. 
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Specifically, I examine how the release of auction details affect US Treasury return movements 
based on both surprises in auction results (bid-to-cover ratios and volume of noncompetitive 
bids) and changes in issuance volume.  
 
Consistent with my priors, I find a positive relationship between surprises in bid-to-cover ratios 
and returns on Treasury notes in three out of four maturities under investigation. The lone 
exception appears to be more of a function of modeling expectations of the 10-year note which 
was affected by changes in the auction schedule, as well as having relatively fewer auctions to 
base estimation on. Additionally, the effect of surprises on this ratio is largely of an equal order 
of magnitude to coefficients on standardized surprises of several key macroeconomic variables 
and actually greater than that of some widely followed announcements – such as: unemployment, 
retail sales and capacity utilization.  
 
The volume of noncompetitive bids, on the other hand, offers little or no additional explanatory 
power. Only the 30-year Treasury bond appears sensitive to surprises in this auction statistic. 
However, that the benchmark 30-year bond coefficient on surprises in noncomps is greater than 
that of the bid-to cover ratio is notable. Clearly, surprises in auction demand statistics were most 
important on the long end of the yield curve. The fact that this maturity has the fewest auctions, 
yet achieves the most significant results underscores the relative importance at this maturity. 
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With respect to market volatility, I employ a GARCH model to characterize the effect of auction 
data on conditional variance. I find interest rate volatility to be largely unaffected by the 
Treasury auction process. By comparison, Federal Reserve policy announcements and quiet days 
– when no macroeconomic announcement or auction takes place – are shown to have a 
significant effect on volatility. 
 
The results provide evidence that the U.S. Treasury’s financing operations are conducted in a 
manner that exerts no more pressure on the market than that of most regularly-scheduled 
macroeconomic announcement. Further, I find the market to be more sensitive to FOMC policy 
surprises than Treasury operations. 
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APPENDICES 
A. SAD Incidence and Onset 
 
 
B. – 15 Notable No Announcement Days 
  
15 Days of Bond Market Moves and No Macro Announcements
Sample: 1/1/1990-9/10/2001
                Returns                Spreads      Fed Funds Indicator Saturation Captured           Standardized Returns      Standardized Spreads
OTR FTR OTR FTR Change Change Bp Chg. Bp Chg. OTR FTR OTR FTR OTR FTR OTR FTR Change Change
Date 30 Yr Bond 30 Yr Bond 10 Yr Note 10 Yr Note Treas 10-1 Baa-Aaa Actual Expected 30 Yr Bond 30 Yr Bond 10 Yr Note 10 Yr Note 30 Yr Bond 30 Yr Bond 10 Yr Note 10 Yr Note Treas 10-1 Baa-Aaa
2/20/1990 -7.49 -7.50 -4.87 -4.56 0.05 -0.02 0 0 XS XS XS XI -3.21 -3.27 -3.18 -3.09 1.26 -1.19
8/6/1990 -9.93 -9.80 -6.17 -6.09 0.21 -0.02 0 0 XI XS XS XI -4.26 -4.27 -4.03 -4.14 5.29 -1.19
8/20/1990 0.96 0.72 0.15 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0 0 0.41 0.31 0.10 0.02 -0.76 4.17
10/9/1990 -6.89 -6.75 -3.91 -3.80 0.05 -0.01 0 0 XS XI -2.96 -2.94 -2.55 -2.58 1.26 -0.60
11/5/1990 2.93 2.87 1.91 1.97 -0.05 0.09 0 0 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.34 -1.26 5.36
8/21/1991 0.87 0.75 0.19 0.08 -0.16 -0.01 0 0 0.37 0.33 0.12 0.05 -4.03 -0.60
4/9/1992 3.59 3.51 2.06 2.16 0.15 -0.02 -25 -24 1.54 1.53 1.34 1.47 3.78 -1.19
5/21/1992 -2.59 -2.51 -3.40 -3.07 -0.03 0.01 0 0 XI -1.11 -1.10 -2.22 -2.09 -0.76 0.60
4/18/1994 -4.94 -4.56 -4.21 -4.00 -0.01 -0.02 25 10 XI XS XS XI -2.12 -1.99 -2.75 -2.72 -0.25 -1.19
12/8/1994 1.03 0.90 0.42 0.31 -0.18 -0.01 0 0 0.44 0.39 0.27 0.21 -4.53 -0.60
10/5/1998 0.15 6.55 0.40 0.15 -0.04 0.01 0 0  0.06 2.86 0.26 0.10 -1.01 0.60
10/8/1998 -14.81 -6.81 -9.81 -9.84 0.34 -0.01 0 0 XI -6.35 -2.97 -6.40 -6.68 8.56 -0.60
10/9/1998 -8.00 -7.79 -5.96 -5.38 0.16 -0.01 0 0 XS XS XS XI -3.43 -3.40 -3.89 -3.65 4.03 -0.60
10/13/1998 0.22 2.11 0.17 0.14 -0.13 0.01 0 0 0.09 0.92 0.11 0.09 -3.27 0.60
4/19/2001 -6.90 -6.53 -4.18 -3.82 0.16 0.00 -50 -43 XS XS XS -2.96 -2.85 -2.73 -2.60 4.03 0.00
Sigma r 2.33 2.29 1.53 1.47 0.04 0.02 Saturation IIS+SIS SIS SIS IIS
% Captured 40.0% 33.3% 33.3% 46.7%
Shading indicates the LTCM Crisis
Bold indicates standardized returns greater than 2 standard deviations
                                          Headline/Market Comments
2/20/1990 Foreign and domestic interest rate expectations Source
8/6/1990 High inflation fear Wall Street Journal/ New York Times
8/20/1990 Middle East issues New York Times
10/9/1990 Rising oil prices, weakening dolar New York Times
11/5/1990 Falling oil prices New York Times
8/21/1991 Political coup in USSR New York Times
4/9/1992 Decline in Federal funds rate Wall Street Journal
5/21/1992 Credit markets were thrown into turmoil yesterday by an article in the WSJ suggesting that credit conditions would not be eased, and prices of Treasury securities fell sharply New York Times
4/18/1994 Federal Reserve announced raise in short term interest rates to moderate the economy's growth and stave off inflation pressures New York Times
12/8/1994 Continued concerns over impact of the bankruptcy of Orange County, California. Hints of fed raising short-term rates again because of signs of the economy improving. New York Times
10/5/1998 Bond prices surge for biggest one day gain in over a year. Due to global stock market downfall us market affected reinforcing the demand for treasury securities. New York Times
10/8/1998 Global market weakness boosts short maturities. New York Times
10/9/1998 After shock of the Federal Reserve's $3.5 Billion bail-out. Worries about a global credit crunch and fears of American economy weakening. Collapsing hedge funds. Wall Street Journal
10/13/1998 Cedent Corporation calls off a $3.1 Billion American Bankers deal causing all its own brand of stocks to drop. Merrill Lynch and Company eliminated 2,00 jobs in the US Boston Herald
4/19/2001 Rate cut help auto and housing markets however borrowing costs for credit worthy companies still too high New York Times
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C. – Indicator Saturation FOMC Days 1990s References 
FOMC Meetings and Indicator Saturation
99 FOMC Meetings of the 1990s
OTR FTR OTR FTR
FOMC Fed Funds Fed Funds Fed Funds Macro OTR Bond FTR Bond OTR Note FTR Note 30-Year Bond 30-Year Bond 10-Year Note 10-Year Note
Date Call or Meet Change (bp) FF_EXPECTED FF_SURPRISE Announcement 30-Year Return 30-Year Return 10-Year Return 10-Year Return II Saturated SI Saturated II Saturated SI Saturated
2/7/1990 X 0 0 0  0.31 0.19 -0.04 0.08     
3/27/1990 X 0 0 0  -0.37 -0.62 -0.14 -0.04     
5/15/1990 X 0 0 0 X -1.46 -1.27 -1.12 -1.04     
7/3/1990 X 0 -1 1  0.41 0.30 0.63 0.41     
7/13/1990 X -25 -11 -14 X 1.51 1.52 1.07 1.19     
8/21/1990 X 0 0 0  -0.61 -0.48 -0.60 -0.58     
10/2/1990 X 0 -1 1 X 0.31 0.08 0.54 0.63     
10/29/1990 X -25 -23 -2  -2.55 -2.28 -1.30 -1.48     
11/13/1990 X 0 4 -4 X 4.53 4.54 2.75 2.68     
11/14/1990 X -25 -29 4 X 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.29     
12/7/1990 X -25 2 -27 X 6.69 6.61 3.86 3.63  X    
12/18/1990 X -25 -4 -21 X 1.23 1.15 0.85 0.72     
1/8/1991 X -25 -7 -18  -1.92 -1.96 -0.58 -0.56     
2/1/1991 X -50 -25 -25 X 4.85 4.73 3.02 2.81     
2/6/1991 X 0 4 -4  0.28 0.39 -0.03 0.08     
3/8/1991 X -25 -9 -16 X -2.99 -2.83 -1.31 -1.11     
3/26/1991 X 0 0 0 X 0.44 0.41 0.08 0.19     
4/30/1991 X -25 -8 -17  1.60 1.68 1.23 1.04     
5/14/1991 X 0 -2 2 X -2.97 -2.69 -1.53 -1.52     
7/3/1991 X 0 3 -3 X 0.78 0.91 0.31 0.42     
8/6/1991 X -25 -10 -15  2.46 2.48 1.76 1.76     
8/20/1991 X 0 -3 3  0.76 0.64 0.76 0.74     
9/13/1991 X -25 -20 -5 X 0.41 0.19 0.30 0.40     
10/1/1991 X 0 0 0 X 0.19 0.29 0.40 0.50     
10/31/1991 X -25 -20 -5  -0.14 -0.03 0.40 0.61     
11/5/1991 X 0 -2 2 X -2.67 -2.52 -1.24 2.10     
11/6/1991 X -25 -12 -13  0.41 0.62 0.40 -2.47     
12/6/1991 X -25 -16 -9 X 3.54 3.23 -1.15 -1.10     
12/17/1991 X 0 2 -2 X 0.96 1.04 0.85 0.82     
12/20/1991 X -50 -22 -28 X 3.89 3.58 3.49 3.25    X  
2/5/1992 X 0 0 0  0.84 0.71 2.06 1.35     
3/31/1992 X 0 0 0 X -0.47 -0.59 -0.04 -0.14     
4/9/1992 X -25 -1 -24  3.59 3.51 2.06 2.16     
5/19/1992 X 0 0 0 X 2.20 2.02 2.09 1.76     
7/1/1992 X 0 0 0 X 1.18 1.25 0.95 0.63     
7/2/1992 X -50 -14 -36 X 5.68 5.62 4.47 4.27     
8/18/1992 X 0 0 0 X 1.93 1.85 2.26 1.86     
9/4/1992 X -25 -3 -22 X 3.65 3.62 3.63 3.21    X  
10/6/1992 X 0 -7 7  -3.01 -2.83 -1.62 -1.57     
11/17/1992 X 0 0 0  0.87 0.66 0.88 0.84     
12/22/1992 X 0 0 0 X 1.94 2.00 1.66 1.58     
2/3/1993 X 0 0 0 X 0.82 0.85 0.28 0.28     
3/23/1993 X 0 0 0  1.81 1.50 1.39 1.39     
5/18/1993 X 0 2 -2 X -1.91 -1.84 -1.93 -1.81     
7/7/1993 X 0 0 0  0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.05     
8/17/1993 X 0 0 0 X -0.05 -0.46 -0.51 -0.16     
9/21/1993 X 0 -7 7 X -3.15 -3.17 -1.27 -1.23   X   
11/16/1993 X 0 4 -4  0.17 0.37 0.95 0.92     
12/21/1993 X 0 0 0  -0.84 -0.55 -0.39 -0.48     
2/4/1994 X 25 13 12 X -2.62 -2.27 -3.39 -3.05     
3/22/1994 X 25 28 -3 X 4.16 3.99 3.04 2.83     X
4/18/1994 X 25 15 10  -4.94 -4.56 -4.21 -4.00  X  X  X  X
5/17/1994 X 50 37 13 X 8.70 7.84 5.31 5.65  X  X  X  X
7/6/1994 X 0 5 -5 X -0.58 -0.63 -0.04 0.06     
8/16/1994 X 50 36 14 X 5.09 5.09 2.93 2.77     
9/27/1994 X 0 20 -20 X -2.03 -2.15 -0.74 -0.61     
11/15/1994 X 75 61 14 X 1.75 2.20 0.57 0.66     
12/20/1994 X 0 17 -17 X -0.63 -0.61 -0.03 0.07     
2/1/1995 X 50 45 5 X -1.30 -1.12 -1.35 -1.17     
3/28/1995 X 0 -10 10 X -3.09 -3.22 -2.45 -2.24     
5/23/1995 X 0 0 0  2.23 2.31 1.67 1.55     
7/6/1995 X -25 -24 -1  4.68 4.54 3.71 3.63    X  
8/22/1995 X 0 0 0  -0.96 -0.98 -0.73 -0.84     
9/26/1995 X 0 0 0 X 0.28 0.17 -0.49 0.06     
11/15/1995 X 0 -7 7 X -0.25 -0.71 -0.70 -0.79     
12/19/1995 X -25 -15 -10  2.62 2.33 1.30 1.24     
1/31/1996 X -25 -18 -7 X 0.26 0.34 0.83 1.10   X   
3/26/1996 X 0 3 -3 X -0.18 -0.48 0.42 0.06     X
5/21/1996 X 0 2 -2  -1.06 -0.83 -0.72 -0.54     
7/3/1996 X 0 6 -6  0.07 0.29 0.52 0.42   X   X
8/20/1996 X 0 4 -4 X -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.07     
9/24/1996 X 0 13 -13 X 1.47 1.37 1.51 1.51     
11/13/1996 X 0 0 0 X -0.14 -0.28 -0.05 -0.08     
12/17/1996 X 0 -1 1 X -1.53 -1.69 -1.11 -1.11     
2/5/1997 X 0 3 -3  -2.18 -2.29 -0.99 -0.89     
3/25/1997 X 25 22 3 X -2.01 -2.00 -1.46 -1.05     
5/20/1997 X 0 11 -11  0.68 0.72 0.81 0.61     
7/2/1997 X 0 2 -2  1.48 1.43 0.94 1.00     
8/19/1997 X 0 1 -1  0.50 0.25 -0.11 0.17     
9/30/1997 X 0 0 0 X -0.40 -0.42 -0.05 0.04     
11/12/1997 X 0 4 -4  2.59 3.07 1.45 1.55     
12/16/1997 X 0 1 -1 X 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.09     
2/4/1998 X 0 0 0  0.26 -0.16 0.11 0.11     
3/31/1998 X 0 0 0 X 2.08 2.09 1.67 1.66     
5/19/1998 X 0 3 -3 X -0.51 -0.63 -0.29 -0.02     
7/1/1998 X 0 0 -1 X 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.31     
8/18/1998 X 0 -1 1 X -0.36 -0.73 -0.55 -0.70     
9/29/1998 X -25 -31 6 X 1.38 1.32 0.05 0.40   X   X
10/15/1998 X -25 1 -26 X 6.73 2.07 8.51 8.50  X   X  X
11/17/1998 X -25 -19 -6 X -0.35 -0.02 -0.24 -0.18     
12/22/1998 X 0 2 -2  -4.18 -3.85 -1.80 -1.41     
2/3/1999 X 0 0 0  -0.74 -0.71 -0.75 -0.70     
3/30/1999 X 0 0 0 X 3.16 2.87 1.91 1.72     
5/18/1999 X 0 4 -4 X 0.21 0.11 -0.52 -0.58     
6/30/1999 X 25 29 -4 X 5.01 5.71 3.86 3.96  X  X  X  X
8/24/1999 X 25 23 2  2.74 2.74 1.87 1.99     
10/5/1999 X 0 4 -4  -4.56 -4.83 -2.70 -2.32     
11/16/1999 X 25 16 9 X -1.63 -1.64 -1.02 -1.02     
12/21/1999 X 0 -2 2  -1.04 -1.20 -0.43 -0.44     
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